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**The Nuclear Bargain:
Turkey and Tactical Nuclear Weapons**

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Executive Summary¹

This paper provides an overview of Turkey's history with forward-deployed tactical nuclear weapons and the reasons for Ankara's commitment to the maintenance of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe. To do so, the paper compares the Turkish position on the maintenance of U.S. forward deployed nuclear weapons with the policies of the other NATO that states that host nuclear weapons. To evaluate whether nuclear weapons play a functional role in the Turkish security strategy, the paper analyzes Ankara's military modernization program and includes a detailed analysis on Turkey's procurement and development of air and ballistic missile defense and precision strike. It concludes that while Turkey invests in developing indigenous conventional capabilities and does not assign a role to nuclear weapons in its strategic planning, the NATO deterrent continues to be the backbone of Turkish security policy. As such, Ankara continues to perceive the tactical nuclear weapons as a symbol of alliance coherence against threats from the Middle East.

Introduction

Non-strategic, i.e. tactical, nuclear weapons deployed in Europe have been considered as the symbol of the U.S. commitment to the European security.² The discussion of maintaining or eliminating the tactical nuclear weapons is political and conceptual, rather than military, as Central and Eastern European countries and Turkey perceive the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons on their soil as a concrete security guarantee and privileged status within the NATO alliance. However, the debate about whether nuclear weapons should continue to be stationed in Europe is heating up, and the calls to remove them from European soil have grown louder in recent years. Many within the Alliance advocated for their removal, while others opposed,

¹ This research has been funded with support from the "The William and Flora Hewlett Foundation". The views expressed in this report are entirely the authors' own and not those of The William and Flora Hewlett Foundation.

² Elaine Bunn thinks tactical nuclear weapons in Europe are like wearing a wedding ring: "...there are those in cultures that don't wear wedding rings who are perfectly committed to their spouses, and others who wear them who don't really have much of a commitment at all. But once you start wearing one, it means something entirely different to be seen without it than it does for someone who never wore one." at: <http://csis.org/blog/process-over-politics-nato's-tnw-decision>

saying they should remain until the nuclear threat to NATO is removed.

Turkey quietly supports maintaining the weapons on its territory and expects other NATO countries to continue their tactical nuclear weapons stewardship as part of the Alliance's burden-sharing principle. Thus far, Turkish officials haven't publicly addressed the issue, suggesting a certain amount of reticence about throwing their full support behind a withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons.

As part of its NATO commitment to nuclear sharing, Turkey has hosted American nuclear weapons for nearly six decades. In the past, Turkey's main reason for hosting American nuclear weapons was to deter its historic regional rival, the former Soviet Union, and to solidify its membership to the Alliance. Throughout the Cold War, Turkish security policy was largely pegged to defense cooperation with the U.S. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the weapons' strategic value waned, raising questions about their military utility and whether or not the forward deployment of tactical nuclear weapons enhances NATO security.

Turkish officials, meanwhile, have believed that NATO's weapons have deterred its proliferation-prone neighbors like Iran, Syria, and Iraq under Saddam Hussein, and have given Turkey privileged status within the Alliance. For Turkey, the forward deployment of American tactical nuclear weapons speaks to the larger issue of Turkey's stance on nuclear deterrence, Turkey-U.S. relations, and how Ankara envisions reconciling its commitment to disarmament and promoting a weapons of mass destruction (WMD) free zone in the Middle East with its immediate security concerns especially with the ongoing instability near Turkey's borders and the perceived threats from the neighborhood.

Turkey was actively involved in the drafting of NATO's 2010 Strategic Concept, which stated: "Deterrence, based on an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional capabilities, remains a core element of our [NATO] overall strategy. The circumstances in which any use of nuclear weapons might have to be contemplated are extremely remote. As long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance."³ The 2010 Strategic Concept underlined that in

³ "Active Engagement, Modern Defense: Strategic Concept," The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, November 2010, at: http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_publications/20120214_strategic-concept-2010-eng.pdf

In addition to the conventional and nuclear capabilities, ballistic missile defense has become a core element of NATO collective defense. Despite this, the growing debate within NATO regarding the cost of maintenance and modernization vs. utility of the tactical nuclear arsenal will likely force the Alliance to address this topic in the not so distant future, prompting the need for a serious reevaluation of NATO's burden-sharing principle.

This paper aims to elaborate the conditions under which Turkish security policy makers would be more inclined to support a potential NATO decision to remove the forward deployed U.S. tactical nuclear weapons from the European theater at a time when security concerns regarding political instability, extremism, and control of weapons arsenals dominate the region's political and security debates. In particular, it will explore what systems NATO/U.S. could forward deploy to appease Turkey and the other Allies that continue to support tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. The following questions will be specifically addressed:

- Would Turkey accept missile defense as a substitute to nuclear weapons?
- What would the implications be if they did so? (in terms of relations with Russia).
- Would Turkey accept the removal of tactical nuclear weapons, so long as NATO maintains the capability to forward deploy in a crisis?
- What possible consequences would such a posture have for a frontline state like Turkey?
- Can Turkey accept to rely on U.S. sea based forces for deterrence in the event of withdrawal?

A Relic of the Cold War: Turkey's History with Tactical Nuclear Weapons

After the end of World War II, Ankara faced a growing security threat from the Soviet Union. For much of Europe, the defeat of Nazi Germany allowed for combatants in the conflict to focus on rebuilding their countries. In Turkey, however, the end of World War II resulted in the country's encirclement by the Soviet Union. The presence of Russian troops on Turkey's eastern and western borders, combined with its sharing of a maritime boundary with the Soviet Union in the

Black Sea, prompted Ankara to seek out a robust security relationship with the United States.⁴ The traditional enmity between the Ottoman Empire and Russia was punctuated by 13 wars between the two nations and the emergence of Russia as a great power in the 18th century. Russia perceived Turkey as a gateway to the Mediterranean through the Straits and a possible invasion route to Russia through the Black Sea basin and the Caucasus. Turkish sensitivity also arose from the risk of involvement in a possible military confrontation between the superpowers as a “shield” or “stepping stone.”⁵

Russia and Turkey have history of contention over control of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles Straits, connecting the Black Sea to the Aegean. Before World War I, the United States had been apathetic to the issue of control and had supported efforts to internationalize Turkey’s strategic waterways.⁶ This changed at the start of the Cold War.⁷ In 1945, the Soviet Union revoked the 1925 friendship pact with Turkey and demanded the Kars and Ardahan provinces in Eastern Turkey, as well as the military bases along the Straits.⁸ After World War II, Turkey remained weak militarily, and reached out to the United States for inclusion in a western defense pact. Turkish security policy was focused on the main objective of deterring the Soviets and containing their expansion.⁹ At the time, Turkey was incapable of meeting its own defense needs and, along with the historical legacies of defensive *realpolitik* and Westernization in security policy making, opted to abandon neutrality in favor of a proposed security arrangement with United States.¹⁰

In late 1948, the Turkish Ambassador to the United States made it known to the U.S. government that Turkey wished to be included in the emerging North Atlantic security

⁴ Turkey shared a 610-km-long common border with the Soviet Union during the Cold War.

⁵ Duygu Bazoglu Sezer, “Turkey’s Security Policies,” Adelphi Papers No. 164, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Spring 1981, LSG, London, p. 14.

⁶ The United States and the Question of the Turkish Straits, Confidential, 5 October 1943, RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Records of Harley A. Notter, 1939-1945, Records of the War Advisory Committee on Post-War Foreign Policy, Box no. 70, Lot 60 D-224, The United States National Archives.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Malik Mufti, “Daring and Caution,” *Middle East Journal*, vol. 52, no. 1 (Winter 1998), p. 41.

⁹ Ali L. Karaosmanoglu, “Turkey’s Security and the Middle East,” *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 62, no. 1 (Fall, 1983), pp. 157-175.

¹⁰ 19th century onwards, fear of loss of territory and fear of abandonment became central elements of Turkish security culture, inherited by the Turkish Republican elite. These fears became known as the “Sevres-phobia,” named after partition envisioned by the 1920 Treaty of Sevres among European powers, that external forces were conspiring to divide up Turkey.

arrangement.¹¹ The US, however, was concerned about committing to aid of the myriad of states that in the aftermath of the conflict approach Washington with requests for robust security guarantees. For this reason, the US concluded that a Mediterranean grouping of states, which would include Spain, Greece, Turkey, and Italy would be a more logical approach to regional security. This arrangement, however, would lack a specific U.S. security guarantee. The Turkish government was reticent of the US proposal, arguing that they wanted to be included with the rapidly emerging North Atlantic Alliance, and not a new and separate security pact. The disagreement culminated in Turkey's first formal request to join NATO in August 1950, which the Alliance subsequently turned down.¹²

As late as 1951, the American Joint Chiefs of Staff continued to oppose the extension of U.S. security commitments to the Mediterranean and the Middle East.¹³ The United States concluded that Ankara would be satisfied with a minimum guarantee that included the use of American air and naval forces.¹⁴ The American military, in conjunction with the Central Intelligence Agency, conducted a secret National Intelligence Estimate about Turkey in 1951. The CIA concluded, "Turkey [is] clearly aligned with the west, primarily as a tool to resist Soviet expansion. Their principle aim is to secure a binding U.S. security guarantee and a pledge to come to Turkish aid in the event of a Soviet or Warsaw pact attack."¹⁵ Moreover, despite substantial U.S. military assistance, the intelligence community believed that "[Turkey] remains convinced of the need to secure a formal security guarantee" and that U.S. counter offers centered on the establishment of a separate security group was worthless, unless the United States agreed to participate and

¹¹ Memorandum of Conversation by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee), Subject: Turkish Proposal that the US Adhere to British-French-Turkish Mutual Defense Pact; Participants: Mr. Feridun C. Erkin – Ambassador of Turkey, Mr. George C. McGhee – Assistant Secretary, Near Eastern Affairs the United States Department of State, *Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States*, 1951, volume V. The Near East and Africa. U.S. Government Printing Office, 1951, pp. 1110-1113.

¹² Ibid; William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy Since 1774: Third Edition*, (London: Routledge, 2010) pg. 82.

¹³ Memorandum by Henry S. Villard to the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Nitze), PPS Files, Lot 64 D 563: Record Copies January – April 1951 in the United States Department of State, *Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States*, 1951, volume V. The Near East and Africa. U.S. Government Printing Office, 1951, pp. 1117-1119.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ National Intelligence Estimate, NIE-9, Turkey's Position in the East-West Struggle, 26 February 1951 in the United States Department of State, *Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States*, 1951, volume V. The Near East and Africa. U.S. Government Printing Office, 1951, pp. 1119-1126.

commit military forces.¹⁶ Thus, just one year before Turkey joined NATO, American officials had concluded that the most pressing issue for Turkey was the receiving of a direct U.S. security guarantee.

American military analysts believed that Turkey could resist a Russian led attack for two-to-three months, but would quickly be overwhelmed. In addition, Turkey's geography made it particularly exposed to Soviet expansion because it lacked a credible air force or navy and Turkish territory is far from Western military centers of strength and is encircled by weak Western allies that would also be quickly overrun.¹⁷ General Pendleton, who led the U.S. Military Aid Mission in Ankara said "from the late 1940s to the mid-1950s we built up the Turkish Army from scratch."¹⁸ The military aid was accompanied by the Marshall Plan under the Truman Doctrine, i.e. the U.S. financial support between 1948 and 1959, an estimated \$2.2 billion for post-war reconstruction in Europe and Soviet containment.¹⁹

According to a study conducted by the American post-war advisory committee, "the fate of Turkey is largely dependent on the Straits." Moreover, the "new factor of airpower fundamentally alter[ed] the setting of the problem. A non-riparian fleet could hardly challenge Soviet airpower by entering the Black Sea, while Soviet airpower, based on the region of the Straits, could dominate Turkey and other Balkan powers."²⁰ Despite these vulnerabilities, the United States remained opposed to Turkish membership in NATO and was only willing to invite Turkey and Greece to become associate members, rather than full alliance partners. Both turned this option down, arguing that such an arrangement relegated Ankara to "second class citizenship" in a two-tiered alliance in its security dealings with the United States.²¹

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ S. V. Mayall, *Turkey: Thwarted Ambition*, Washington D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University Press, 1997, p. 28.

¹⁹ Fotios Moustakis, "Turkish Security Challenges and its Relationship with NATO," in *The Greek-Turkish Relationship and NATO*, Frank Cass Publishers, Portland, Oregon, 2003, p. 68.

²⁰ The Problem of the Turkish Straits, 6 January 1945, RG 59 General Records of the Department of State, Records of Harley A. Notter, 1939-1945, Records of the Advisory Committee on Post-War Foreign Policy, 1942-1945, Lot 60D, Box no. 70, United States National Archives.

²¹ Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy Since 1774: Third Edition*, pg. 85.

In late 1951, the United States' military and political community changed its opinion about including Turkey in NATO. According to an American National Security Study:

[Turkey] not only controls the important land, sea, and air routes (including the Turkish straits, which Russia has coveted for nearly 200 years) from the USSR to the Cairo-Suez area and the Middle East oil fields, but it offers bases from which the USSR could launch operations against the islands of Crete, Rhodes, and Cyprus and against communications in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East.²²

The Joint Chief's of Staff indicated that an attack on the Dardanelles would therefore threaten the security of the United States and precipitate American participation in any conflict involving Turkey. Thus, any attack on Turkey would lead to global war and the United States would have to come to Turkey's defense regardless of the presence of a security guarantee or not.²³

The classification of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus Straits as a strategic U.S. asset allowed for the United States to justify the extension of its security commitments to include Turkey under its security umbrella. Thus, in 1951 the United States reversed its previous policy and invited Turkey and Greece to join NATO and thereby committed itself to coming to Turkish defense if attacked. Moreover, Turkey sought to establish itself as a trustworthy ally and decided to deploy troops to Korea to support the US led military operation against communist forces. Turkey suffered numerous casualties during the conflict. This confluence of events, along with a later decision to deploy nuclear weapons in Europe, paved the way for the start of Turkey's hosting of tactical nuclear weapons.

In 1956, the US military put forward plans for the stationing of large numbers of ground forces, air forces, and "special" weapons mainly in the Adana area. In tandem, NATO, in 1957, agreed at

²² National Security Study, *The Position of the United States with Regards to Turkey*, NSC 109, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351: NSC 109 Series, undated, in the Department of State, *Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States*, 1951, volume V. The Near East and Africa. U.S. Government Printing Office, 1951, pp. 1151-1162.

²³ Ibid.

the Paris Summit “to establish stocks of nuclear warheads, which will be readily available for the defense of the Alliance in case of need.”²⁴

For Turkey, the forward deployment of nuclear weapons was viewed as a critical tool for the defense of its territory from an aggressive – and expansionist – Soviet Union and a solid evidence of the U.S. commitment to Turkish defense. In 1959, for example, Foreign Minister Zorlu and Fletcher Warren, the U.S. Ambassador to Turkey at the time, exchanged the necessary diplomatic notes to bring the agreement for the “Cooperation on the uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defense Purposes” into force. The agreement allowed for the deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons in Turkey.²⁵ Turkey received two Honest John battlefield missile battalions in 1957. The battlefield missile was capable of carrying a conventional warhead and the W-7 nuclear warhead. The U.S. had concluded that Turkish military units should be trained to use the systems in order to instill more confidence in the limited deployment. The training took place during 1958 and the first nuclear warheads were introduced in February 1959.²⁶ Moreover, during the same year, the United States also deployed the first nuclear gravity bomb in Turkey.

Turkey’s enthusiasm for nuclear weapons was very much in line with US thinking about atomic war planning during the 1950s. In 1957, US President Dwight D. Eisenhower wrote to NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) and requested that he pressure to begin to rely

²⁴ Final Communiqué, Chairman: Mr. P.H. Spaak, Secretary General of NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 16-19 December 1957, accessed on 9 October 2013, available at: <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c571219a.htm>.

²⁵ Transmission of the exchange of notes regarding the entry into force of Agreement for the Cooperation on the uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defense Purposes, File no: 611.8297/7-2959, 29 July 1959, General Records of the Department of State, National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Box 2553.

²⁶ Telegram from the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State, Department of State, Central Files, 711.56382/3-2657, Top Secret, 26 March 1957, in the United States Department of State. Glennon, John P., Editor *Foreign relations of the United States, 1955-1957. Soviet Union, Eastern Mediterranean*, Volume XXIV. U.S. Government Printing Office, 1955-1957, pp. 713-715; National Security Report, NSC 5708/2, Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC Memoranda, Top Secret, in the United States Department of State. Glennon, John P., Editor *Foreign relations of the United States, 1955-1957. Soviet Union, Eastern Mediterranean*, Volume XXIV. U.S. Government Printing Office, 1955-1957, pp. 720-727; History of the Custody and Deployment of Nuclear Weapons (U): July 1945-1977, Prepared by the Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, February 1978, available at, http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/NuclearChemicalBiologicalMatters/306.pdf; Robert S. Norris, William M. Arkin and William Burr, “Where They Were,” *The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, 1 November 1999, vol. 55, no. 26, pp. 26-35.

more heavily on U.S. nuclear weapons for security.²⁷ At the time the letter was written, the United States had been putting pressure on Turkey to scale back its military expenditures, in favor of a dedicated approach to training non-commissioned officers. Nuclear weapons, therefore, were seen as a way to decrease the necessity of Turkish military expenditures, while also retaining a robust capability to defend Turkey from Soviet invasion. While Ankara resisted the US pressure to scale back its military expenditures, it did adopt the US approach to nuclear weapons, and came to view them as the most important symbol of the United States' commitment to defend Turkey from attack.

Negotiations with Turkey for the deployment of a Jupiter missile squadron began on 10 September 1959. As of 16 September, the Turkish government accepted the U.S. draft proposal for the Jupiters without making any changes to the text of the American draft agreement. The Turkish-American nuclear weapons agreement was completed on 16 September 1959.²⁸ In December 1959, Fatin Rustu Zorlu, Turkey's Minister of Foreign Affairs, told President Eisenhower that the goal of the Soviet Union was to dominate the world. Zorlu went on to argue that a relaxation of the arms race would embolden the Soviet Union and could have troubling consequences for the free world nations.²⁹

Moreover, while Zorlu did not rule out disarmament, he indicated that the process should be based on mutual reductions, as well as transparency on the Soviet side. This policy has since become Turkey's de facto approach to arms control and disarmament.³⁰ Zorlu's private

²⁷ Letter from the President to the Supreme Allied Commander, Allied Powers, Europe (Norstad), Eisenhower Library, White House Office, Office of the Staff Secretary Records, 1952-1961, Top Secret, 15 July 1957, in the United States Department of State. Glennon, John P., Editor *Foreign relations of the United States, 1955-1957. Soviet Union, Eastern Mediterranean*, Volume XXIV. U.S. Government Printing Office, 1955-1957, pp. 727-730.

²⁸ Completion and Announcement of IRBM Agreement with Turkey during Krushchev visit, Secret Memorandum, Department of State, Digital National Security Archives, 16 September 1959; Memorandum From Secretary of State Herter to Eisenhower, Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles-Herter Series, Secret, 16 September 1959, in the United States Department of State. LaFantasie, Glenn W., Editor, *Foreign relations of the United States, 1958-1960. Eastern Europe; Finland; Greece; Turkey*, Volume X, Part 2, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1958-1960, pp. 812-813.

²⁹ Ataturk, the founder of Turkish Republic, had a deep mistrust of the Bolsheviks and communism, and this mistrust was inherited by the Republican elite.

³⁰ Memorandum of Conversation with President Eisenhower, Eisenhower Library, Staff Secretary Records, International File, Prepared by Major Eisenhower, 6 December 1959, in the United States Department of

conversations with the United States about Turkey's thinking about nuclear weapons echoed the 1957 NATO communiqué. Like its other allies, Turkey, both privately and in public, did not eschew disarmament, but were committed to a verifiable process that hinged on Soviet reciprocation. And, in the interim, the Alliance would have to rely on medium range missiles to blunt the Soviet Union's perceived missile superiority. Thus, when Turkey eagerly engaged with the United States to host nuclear weapons, it was at a time when American officials were encouraging Turkey to rely more heavily on nuclear weapons for defense.

The 15-missile deployment began in 1961. These weapons, however, were removed in exchange for the Russian removal of nuclear weapons from the island of Cuba. During the Cuban Missile Crisis, American officials concluded that the Turks would bristle at the notion of being equated with Cuba, arguing that their participation in both the NATO alliance and the Korean War cemented Turkey's status as a Western country.³¹ U.S. diplomats, drawing on their conversations with their Turkish counterparts, believed that Turkey would have preferred that the United States offer to trade a military system in a non-NATO ally.

The Turkish perception of Cuba was that it was a non-Warsaw pact client state of the former Soviet Union and, therefore, not comparable with NATO member Turkey. The fact, according to American diplomats, that the Jupiter missiles were outdated, vulnerable to pre-emptive attack, and were slated for replacement by the Polaris submarine launched ballistic missile, did not influence Turkish thinking about the issue.³² Turkey was wary of relying on Polaris, and had turned down an offer to substitute the stationing of Jupiter with the permanent deployment of the submarine in the Mediterranean earlier in 1961.³³

Nevertheless, the United States agreed in secret to remove the missiles, but only on the condition that the removal take place at a later date, and appear not to be linked to the Russian removal of its nuclear forces on Cuba. The apparent de-linkage of these two appealed to Turkish officials, who believed that they had been successful in their attempts to de-couple Turkey from

State. LaFantasie, Glenn W., Editor, *Foreign relations of the United States, 1958-1960. Eastern Europe; Finland; Greece; Turkey*, Volume X, Part 2, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1958-1960, pp. 820-824.

³¹ Ibid

³² Ibid

³³ Ibid

Cuba. The Turkish diplomats, however, had been deceived. Turkey was not consulted about the deal, which shielded the United States from drawing criticism from Ankara. It also touched off an effort by the United States to convince the Turkish government to make a unilateral decision to remove the missiles.³⁴

Turkey eventually acquiesced to the American decision, but felt as if the U.S. was an over indication of the willingness to “trade Ankara for Washington” in times of crisis. While Turkish nuclear weapons policy is a state secret and no documents have been published on the subject, Turkish officials did seek an independent capability to use American nuclear weapons in 1967. The move was likely part of a larger effort to make the security commitment more viable, while also ensuring that NATO would not sacrifice Turkey.

The request was aimed at ensuring Turkish security and overcoming security concerns on the Turkish side that NATO would act too slowly to prevent the invasion of Turkish territory. At a meeting of the Nuclear Planning Group in Ankara, Turkish Defense Minister, Ahmet Topaloglu, put forward a plan for the use of atomic demolition munitions (ADM) – otherwise known as nuclear mines – in the mountainous areas on Turkey’s eastern border. Secretary McNamara reportedly favored the plan.³⁵

As part of the deployment, Topaloglu indicated that Turkey felt it necessary to have predelegated control over the weapons and that the Turkish military have permission to detonate the munitions automatically in the face of an invasion of division strength.³⁶ Turkey argued that under the then arrangement, the use of nuclear weapons would come too late to prevent Turkish forces from being overrun. Ankara argued that ADMs were purely defensive

³⁴ Turkish IRBMs, Secret Internal Paper, United States National Security Council, Digital National Security Archives, 30 October 1962.

³⁵ “NATO Nuclear Planning Group, What Happened at Ankara,” NARA, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, Box 1597, DEF 12 NATO, Paris 4422, 30 September 1967, Department of State Telegram, General Records of the Department of State, National Archives and Records Administration.

³⁶ Terence Smith, Special to The New York Times. 1967. “NATO Unit Asks Plan for Deploying Atom Mines.” *New York Times (1923-Current File)*, Sep 30, 6.
<http://search.proquest.com/docview/117908569?accountid=11862>.

weapons intended to signal in a non-provocative way Ankara's intent to repel a Soviet invasion.³⁷

Under Secretary for Political Affairs at the State Department, "The Turks are known to be the strongest advocates of predelegation ... this is understandably so because without predelegation time delays in receiving permission to use nuclear weapons would result in Turkish forces being overrun ..."³⁸ According to Brigadier General Alvin E. Cowan, who was speaking at a classified symposium about tactical nuclear weapons, the ADM plan for eastern Turkey was completed on 15 January 1968. The concept of the defense plan was to use ADM's to "supplement existing obstacles" to slow down an invasion in eastern Turkey and, perhaps, from the Black Sea. The Turkish battle plan called for 72 ADMs to be deployed. According to General Cowan, "29 ADMs of all types were required in covering the force area; 30 were required for protection of the main defensive area; with 13 in reserve ..." The study concluded that the use of ADMs could "provide significant delay against a USSR advance into Eastern Turkey ..."³⁹

NATO updated the political guidelines for the use of nuclear weapons in December 1969. The updated rules did not include the forward deployment of ADMs in Turkey, but promised that NATO would hasten the time in which to agree on the use of nuclear weapons in appropriate geographical areas to prevent Soviet forces from overrunning defense.⁴⁰ However, the issue was further complicated in 1968, after Greece made a similar request. The Greek plan was based on the Turkish plan, but the inherent hostilities between the two countries represented a serious problem with predelegating control over the weapons.

The United States never did deploy ADMs in Turkey or Greece, and chose instead to keep them stored with the 66th ADM engineers based out of Vicenza, Italy. The engineers were first

³⁷ William Beecher, Special to The New York Times. 1967. "Turkey Requests Leeway in using Atom Land Mines." *New York Times (1923-Current File)*, April 06, 1.

<http://search.proquest.com/docview/118079056?accountid=11862>.

³⁸ NATO Nuclear Planning," NARA, US Nuclear History, NH01023, Secret, Memorandum, January 10, 1967, published in The Digital National Security Archive.

³⁹ Proceedings of the Tactical Nuclear Weapons Symposium, Held at Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory of the University of California, Los Alamos, New Mexico, LA-4350-NM, Redacted Copy, held on 3-5 September 1969," National Archives and Records Administration.

⁴⁰ Drew Middleton, Special to The New York Times. 1969. "NATO Approves Rules for Defensive use of Tactical Nuclear Weapons." *New York Times (1923-Current File)*, Dec 04, 1.

<http://search.proquest.com/docview/118605145?accountid=11862>.

deployed in 1956, so the Turkish plan was not the reason for their deployment. However, like in the case of the Jupiter missiles, Ankara viewed nuclear weapons as both a critical tool to prevent invasion, and as a symbol of the United States commitment to come to Turkey's defense.

Turkey took the issue of predelegation so seriously, it affected Ankara's position on the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). While Turkey was in substantial agreement with the United States about the merits of the NPT, Ankara argued that all members of the NATO alliance needed to be in agreement about the interpretation of all of the Treaty's provisions. Moreover, in a reference to Ankara's ADM plan, Turkey specifically asked American officials whether or not the NPT would preclude the predelegation of the firing authority to use nuclear weapons to NATO states.⁴¹ Thus, while Turkey did sign the NPT in 1969, the Parliament did not ratify the Treaty for a decade.

During the 1980s, Turkey's nuclear posture remained largely unchanged. Ankara supported the introduction of ground-launched cruise missiles and the medium range Pershing II missiles to address the threat posed by the Soviet Union's SS-20 medium range ballistic missile.⁴² Moreover, unlike in other European NATO states, the forward deployment of these systems did not result in massive anti-nuclear protests. In turn, Turkish leaders did not have to contend with large-scale anti-nuclear demonstrations. The lack of public awareness about nuclear issues in Turkey is a key point of distinction from other NATO states that host forward deployed nuclear weapons. To this day, Turkish politicians are insulated from debates on the topic and the anti-nuclear movement in Turkey has failed to influence the debate in local Turkish politics beyond demonstrations by environmentalist groups.

Nevertheless, Ankara was quick to point out during the rather contentious debate about the introduction of these systems into Europe that it would not host the missiles. Instead, after the removal of the Jupiter missiles in 1964, the weapons deployed in Turkey were slated for delivery

⁴¹ "Status report on the views of various countries consulted about the proposed nonproliferation treaty. These countries include: Belgium; Canada; Denmark; West Germany; France; Greece; Iceland; Italy; Japan; Luxembourg; the Netherlands; Norway; Portugal; Turkey; the United Kingdom," Memo, Department of State, Secret, Issue Date: 12 February 1967. Date Declassified: 14 April 1999. Unsanitized, *Declassified Documents Reference System* (Farmington Hills, MI: Gale, 2014)

⁴² Special to The New York Times. "Turks Back Missile Plan." *New York Times (1923-Current File)*, Dec 11, 1979. <http://search.proquest.com/docview/123894430?accountid=11862>.

via aircraft and artillery shells. The deployments sharply curtailed the scenarios under which the Turkish military could conceivably use nuclear weapons. The deployment suggests that the main function of the weapons was to slow-down a Soviet invasion through modern day Bulgaria and Georgia, before the Turkish military, which was expected to tactically retreat in the face of an invasion, could be strengthened by U.S. and European troops in the south of the country. And from there, the Allied forces were expected to launch a counter-offensive to retake Anatolia and Thrace.

The End of the Cold War: Turkey Supports a Relaxed Nuclear Posture

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Turkish policymakers worried that the elimination of NATO's *raison d'être* would ultimately result in the breaking up of the alliance. Turkey feared that the Alliance would then be replaced with a Eurocentric security regime that comprised the EU member states and the United States. For Turkey, the elimination of NATO would seriously erode its access to advanced American arms, whilst also depriving its policy community of its most tangible link to the West. These fears proved to be unfounded. Nevertheless, these fears did influence policy.

To prove its commitment to the Alliance, Turkey contributed to new NATO missions required by the new security problems arising from civil conflicts, such as Bosnia and Kosovo. The policy of non-involvement was replaced by regional cooperative security and multilateralism in foreign affairs. For instance, Turkish president Turgut Ozal broke with Turkey's post-1958 embrace of apathy towards the Middle East, and fully supported the United States led military operation to oust the Iraqi military from Kuwait. Turkey contributed to Allied operations by granting permission of airbases, deploying 150,000 troops along the Iraqi border, and participating to NATO naval operations to maintain the security of the sea lines of communications in the Mediterranean.⁴³

For Ozal, the war allowed for him to demonstrate Turkey's continued importance for American interests in the region. In this regard, Ozal's overarching foreign policy concern was tied to his

⁴³ Ali L. Karaosmanoglu, "The Evolution of the National Security Culture and the Military in Turkey," *Journal of International Affairs*, Fall 2000, 54, 1, p. 199.

growing concerns about the continued viability of the NATO alliance, which continued to constitute Ankara primary conduit to Washington, as well as the ultimate guarantor of its security. If the Alliance were to be disbanded, Ankara feared that its successor would only include the United States and states from the European Union.⁴⁴

In supporting the US position vis-à-vis military/economic action, Ozal elevated the Turkish relationship with the United States over that of Europe for security related matters. The decision was controversial. According to Cameron S. Brown:

On the one hand, Ozal saw the situation as both a threat to Turkey's long-term security and a prime opportunity to prove anew Turkey's value to its Western allies. On the other hand, every other group— the Foreign Ministry, military, parliament, and the public—were generally much more concerned about preserving the country's historic neutrality...⁴⁵

The reluctance stemmed from real concerns about Turkey's economic well-being, the possibility of Iraqi scud attacks against Turkish targets, and the abandonment of the "Peace at home, Peace abroad" foreign policy mantra that Mustafa Kemal Atatürk reportedly proposed shortly after the declaration of the Turkish Republic in 1923.

The war also had an impact on Turkish civil-military relations: The Gulf crisis bolstered the Ozal administration's ties with the U.S. through the Turkish involvement in the U.S.-led intervention. However, it also broke ties with the traditional elite's view of Turkish foreign policy, and led to the resignation of the chief of Turkish armed forces, Necip Torumtay.⁴⁶ While proving the Turkish role in the alliance, the war cost Turkey approximately \$5.6 billion in revenues lost from

⁴⁴ Turkey became an official candidate to the EU at the December 1999 Helsinki Summit. Turkey argued that, along with EU's enlargement policy, EU's military deficit could be addressed by Turkish membership, due to Turkey's NATO membership, geostrategic position, i.e. stabilizer in the Middle East, Balkans, and the Caucasus, and advanced military capabilities. Meltem Müftüler-Bac, "Turkey's role in the European Union's Security and Foreign Policies," *Security Dialogue*, vol.31, no.4, December 2000, pp. 489-502.

⁴⁵ Cameron S. Brown, "Turkey in the Gulf Wars of 1991 and 2003," *Turkish Studies*, vol. 8, no.1 (Spring, 2007), pp. 86-87.

⁴⁶ Philip Robins, "Foreign Policy Principles and the Gulf Crisis," Turkey and the Middle East, Royal Institute of International Affairs, Pinter Publishers, 1991, p. 72.

trade with Iraq. The losses were a result of Turkey closing the oil pipeline pumping Iraqi oil to the Mediterranean and war expenditures.⁴⁷

Ozal's policy during the first Gulf War differed considerably from Turkey's policy during the Iran-Iraq war and previous disengagement from the Middle East. Throughout the Iran-Iraq war, Ankara opted for strict neutrality and even signaled to the United States its concerns that its support for Baghdad was short-sighted. Throughout the conflict, Ozal offered to mediate between the two parties, while also pledging to increase annual trade to \$3 billion with the Islamic Republic. To support its commercial and energy policies, Ankara and Iran negotiated oil deals based on barter and credit during the war. Taking advantage of the Western-led embargo of Iran during the Iran-Iraq war, Turkey insisted on paying for Iranian crude with Turkish industrial goods. The goods were of low quality and priced similarly to, or in excess of, better made Western European products. Iran initially tolerated the barter deals, but after the 1986 drop in oil prices began to insist on cash payments. Turkey refused, and the episode led many in Tehran to conclude that Turkey was not a trustworthy actor and only interested in exploiting Iran to maximize its own economic interests.⁴⁸

Ozal's decision to take a proactive stance on Middle Eastern politics was a stark departure from Ankara's historic embrace of neutralism, i.e. not to be associated with the conflicts in the Middle East to minimize security risks. The economically minded leader had envisioned using the conflict to tighten ties with the United States, while also being in a position to capitalize on the post-war reconstruction boon in Iraq. Moreover, it signaled the extent to which the end of the Cold War had changed Turkey's decision-making calculus. As part of this revamped approach to policy-making, Ankara supported the Alliance's increased focus on the developments in the Middle East.

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Turkey found itself drawn into Middle East affairs due to its Kurdish issue, a water conflict with Syria and Iraq, an increased need for expansion of economic ties, and the growing belief within the foreign policy establishment that Turkey

⁴⁷ Duygu Bazoglu Sezer, "Turkey's New Security Environment, Nuclear Weapons, and Proliferation," *Comparative Strategy*, 14:2, p. 162.

⁴⁸ Elliot Hentov, "Asymmetry of Interest: Turkish-Iranian Relations since 1979", PhD thesis, Princeton University, 2011.

should play active role as a balancer or intermediary in the region.⁴⁹ While the U.S. direct involvement in the Middle East diminished with the disappearance of Soviets, Turkey faced strategic dilemmas not only there but also in the Balkans, the Black Sea, and the Caucasus. Henri Barkey argues that Turkey had the historic opportunity to be the strongest regional military and economic power as an emerging market, but its activism had a price in each surrounding region.⁵⁰

For Turkey, the United States' impressive military operation in Kuwait and Iraq touched off a serious debate about modernizing its armed forces. In tandem, the subsequent revelations about the Iraqi government's development of weapons of mass destruction raised increased concerns about Turkey's exposure to asymmetric attack. Turkey's three neighbors – Iran, Iraq, and Syria – were all thought to be intent on further developing their missile and WMD capabilities. During the Gulf War, Turkey lacked defenses against tactical ballistic missiles. To defend against the potential threat, Ankara asked that NATO provide two Patriot missile batteries near the Turkish-Iraqi border.⁵¹ After the conflict, Turkey began to actively seek out ballistic missile defense, cruise missiles, remotely piloted aircraft (RPAs, or more commonly known as drones), and ballistic missiles. Collectively, these systems, once fully introduced, are intended to give Turkish security planners the capability to attack missile sites both before launch and while in flight, as well other targets like terrorist training camps.

However, these programs are not intended to take the place of nuclear weapons. These systems – which are still under development – are independent from Ankara's nuclear weapons' policies. For Ankara, the nuclear weapons are a NATO issue, whereas its domestic military modernization efforts are national in scope. The separation of these programs – particularly in the area of missile defense – has led to some friction within the Alliance about interoperability and Alliance cohesion.

⁴⁹ Henri J. Barkey, "Turkey and the New Middle East: A Geopolitical Exploration," in Henri J. Barkey ed., Reluctant Neighbor: Turkey's Role in the Middle East, Chapter 16, United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington D.C., 1996, pp. 25-6.

⁵⁰ Henri J. Barkey, "Turkey and the New Middle East: A Geopolitical Exploration," in Henri J. Barkey ed., Reluctant Neighbor: Turkey's Role in the Middle East, Chapter 16, United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington D.C., 1996, pp. 25-6.

⁵¹ Duygu Bazoglu Sezer, "Turkey's New Security Environment, Nuclear Weapons, and Proliferation," *Comparative Strategy*, 14:2, p. 166.

Moreover, Ankara's missile defense and precision strike procurement plans are still in their infancy, which decreases the likelihood that the systems could help change the policy calculus over the removal of tactical nuclear weapons. For now, the conventional systems under development are unlikely to change Turkish opinion about the need for the maintenance of the nuclear status quo to ensure Alliance cohesion. The systems, even if deployed in the near future, are unlikely to provide an adequate defense for the range of missile threats Ankara potentially faces. Military planners, therefore, are likely to continue to view deterrence – and, by extension, the need for the Alliance burden sharing – as critical for Turkish security moving forward and put these needs forward in demanding concrete security commitments from the Alliance.

With the centennial of the Turkish Republic in 2023 approaching, Turkey has been consistently increasing its defense and security budget in line with economic growth, the defense expenditure as percentage of GDP being 3.2 percent and 21.8 billion Turkish Lira (approximately 10.1 billion USD), 7.1 percent increase from 2013 to 2014.⁵² Turkey ranks among very few NATO members that have a high defense-spending-to-GDP ratio and has plans to incorporate very expensive technologies such as a national air and missile defense system and a space command.

Yet, the defense and security budget remains outside parliamentary oversight and there are discrepancies between the Turkish Finance Ministry and NATO figures that exclude non-deployable elements and arms procurement by the Under-secretariat for the Defense Industry (SSM).⁵³ The scope and speed of the military modernization projects require scrutiny for both economic and security consequences of making important decisions under civilian policymakers, who don't have much experience in defense issues. Other challenges are the continued issues with transparency in full disclosure of the figures and the incomplete transformation of the civilian oversight on the military.

⁵² Lale Kemal, "Turkey's Defense Budget in Line with Growth Rate," *Today's Zaman*, February 27, 2014, at: http://www.todayszaman.com/columnists/lale-kemal_340680-turkeys-defense-budget-in-line-with-growth-rate.html

⁵³ Lale Kemal, "Turkey's Defense Budget in Line with Growth Rate," *Today's Zaman*, February 27, 2014, at: http://www.todayszaman.com/columnists/lale-kemal_340680-turkeys-defense-budget-in-line-with-growth-rate.html

Conventional Weapons and Missile Defense: Turkey's Quest for Precision Strike and Missile Defense

One of the major threats identified in the 2010 NATO Strategic Concept was the proliferation of ballistic missiles as a real and growing threat to the Euro-Atlantic alliance. This focus has been the reasoning behind establishing the active layered theater ballistic missile defense (ALTBMD) architecture in Europe. Following the 2010 Lisbon Summit, the future of NATO's nuclear policy has been centered on missile defense and Russian nuclear policy with respect to tactical nuclear weapons, as well as the connection between the two issues.

One of the central arguments in the 2010 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) was strengthening missile defense capabilities to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons. Hence, the allies have discussed the possibility of endorsing territorial missile defense as a core NATO mission by linking the land and sea-based missile interceptors with European sensors.⁵⁴ NATO Secretary General Rasmussen promoted the idea, arguing that territorial missile defense "can become a security roof under which all Allies find shelter, not just some. And I am convinced that this roof can be wide enough to include other European countries as well, including Russia."⁵⁵ Yet, whether NATO missile defense could substitute NATO's nuclear sharing has been questioned due to the costs and technical limitations of these systems.

For missile defense to be a source of defense and deterrence, it has to be credible and reliable. Reassurance to the allies also depends on whether missile defense would address their security concerns. If the allies perceive an imminent existential threat by ballistic missiles, they would expect greater commitment from NATO and fast deployment of missile defense systems such as SM-3 batteries. Proponents of the current European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) argue that, while the system will never be perfect, it will alter the calculations of the adversaries that their missile attack may not be successful. While the Germans consider missile defense as a substitute to nuclear weapons, the French disagree.

⁵⁴ Raymond Knops, "U.S. Non-strategic nuclear weapons in Europe: A Fundamental NATO Debate," NATO PA Committee Report, 2010 Annual session, at: <http://www.nato-pa.int/default.asp?SHORTCUT=2083>

⁵⁵ Raymond Knops, "U.S. Non-strategic nuclear weapons in Europe: A Fundamental NATO Debate," NATO PA Committee Report, 2010 Annual session, at: <http://www.nato-pa.int/default.asp?SHORTCUT=2083>

During the Alliance's debate about the 2010 Strategic Concept, Turkey made clear that any future European missile defense system must protect all of Turkish territory. Moreover, Ankara prefers that the project be a NATO one, rather than a U.S. led effort with Alliance participation. To this end, Turkey agreed to host an early-warning radar facility in the eastern Anatolian city of Kurecik, Malatya for the EPAA system. The Army Navy/Transportable Radar Surveillance (AN/TPY-2) is an X-band, high-resolution radar designed for ballistic missile defense that can be "coupled with layered sensors, to give the ballistic missile defense systems a continuous tracking and discrimination capability."⁵⁶ The X-band radar in Kurecik is intended to detect the launch of a ballistic missile in the Middle East, transfer the information to the U.S. SM-3 interceptors based on Aegis destroyers, which will then try and hit the missile mid-flight.

However, Turkey only agreed to host the radar, after NATO agreed not to name any country, i.e. Iran, as a specific threat to the Alliance and that no information would be passed onto non-NATO states, i.e. Israel. Moreover, during the deliberations, Turkey demanded that it play a role in the NATO missile defense command so that it had some control over the ballistic missile defense system. The request is reflective of Turkey's historic discomfort with verbal guarantees and its determination to have some control over the command and control over NATO systems intended to defend Turkish territory. The proximity of the city of Malatya to the Iranian border provides an advantage to the NATO system, as the radar is the first chain loop in the system to transfer information to the interceptors. However, due to the trajectory of ballistic missiles and Turkey's geographical proximity to the region, the existing architecture doesn't cover Turkey's eastern territories.⁵⁷

According to a recent National Academy of Sciences study on ballistic missile defense, Turkey needs its separate defense against shorter-range threats through Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense System (THAAD) or equivalent systems.⁵⁸ The SM-3 interceptor engages the target midcourse – at the aperture of the missile's ballistic flight in space – and in the terminal phase –

⁵⁶ Missile Defense Agency, Fact Sheet, July 2011, at: http://www.mda.mil/global/documents/pdf/an_tpy2.pdf

⁵⁷ M.K. Kaya, "How much security will NATO's missile defense shield provide for Turkey?" *Turkey Analyst*, vol. 5, no.2, January 23, 2012, at: <http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/inside/turkey/2012/120123A.html>

⁵⁸ "Making Sense of Ballistic Missile Defense: An Assessment of Concepts and Systems for U.S. Boost-Phase Missile Defense in Comparison to Other Alternatives (2012)" The National Academies Press, at: http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=13189

atmospheric reentry – and therefore cannot engage the missile while it is in eastern Turkey during its ascent phase.⁵⁹ ALTBMD cannot address shorter-range missiles originating from Syria or Iran, either, restating the need to protect eastern provinces and the air bases that Turkey and the alliance have in proximity to possible missile launches from the Middle East.

Turkey has therefore shown sustained interest in procuring an independent missile defense capability to defend against shorter-range threats. While ASELSAN has been awarded the low and medium-range air defense system development, the tender for the Turkish Long Range Air and Missile Defense System (T-Loramids) project was launched in 2008, and eventually resulted in Turkey selecting to first negotiate for China’s HQ-9 system from China Precision Machinery Export Import Corp (CPMIEC). While the negotiations have yet to be finalized, Ankara initially expressed an interest in acquiring twelve missile-firing units in a co-development model. Yet, after NATO criticized the negotiations, Turkey has made clear that it has yet to make a final decision about the HQ-9 missile system. Turkish officials argue that the co-developmental model, the price of each missile battery, and the speed with which China has promised to begin co-production in Turkey were the reason for the selection of the non-western system⁶⁰ NATO, however, has made clear that if Turkey finalizes a co-production arrangement with China for the HQ-9, NATO will not allow for the system to be made interoperable with the Alliance’s missile defense system.

As the U.S. Department of State sanctioned CPMIEC in February 2013 over proliferation concerns, the U.S. National Defense Authorization Act of 2014, signed into law on December 26, 2013, stated that “We are concerned that the Government of Turkey made an initial decision to purchase a Chinese air and missile defense system for its territorial use...Such a system would not be compatible with, and should not be integrated with, missile defense systems of the North

⁵⁹ “A System of Elements,” Missile Defense Agency, U.S. Department of Defense, at: <http://www.mda.mil/system/elements.html>

⁶⁰ Lale Sariibrahimoglu, “Turkey to buy and co-develop T-Loramids SAM,” *IHS Jane's Defense Weekly*, March 21, 2013, at: <http://www.janes.com/article/11554/turkey-to-buy-and-co-develop-t-loramids-sam>.

Atlantic Treaty Organization.”⁶¹ NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen and U.S. Air Force General Philip Breedlove, NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Europe, reiterated this concern as their clear position.⁶² Meanwhile, an unnamed NATO ambassador in Ankara told a Turkish daily: “I have no idea why the Turks do not see the simple fact that the alliance’s security threat perception in the next 20 years is based on China. Air and missile defense will be the top defense issue in the foreseeable future, with China being under the magnifier.”⁶³ Although Turkish defense officials stated that the system would be NATO-compatible, an unnamed defense attaché from a NATO member state called the system a “virus,” the main operational issue being the NATO Identify Friend or Foe (IFF) system to distinguish aircraft.⁶⁴

Turkey is not expected to finalize the controversial Chinese missile defense deal until after the first presidential election by popular vote in August 2014. The Undersecretariat for the Defense Industry (SSM) has recently extended the deadline for the expiration of the bids to August 31, 2014.⁶⁵ If the talks with CPMIEC fail, Eurosam and the Lockheed Martin-Raytheon partnership are expected to follow respectively. Meanwhile, the U.S. bidders have proposed a government-to-government deal to give Turkey used PAC-2 systems deployed in Germany, to be eventually replaced by the PAC-3 system.⁶⁶

⁶¹ Mike Gruss, “U.S. Defense Bill Could Undercut Turkey’s Missile Defense Deal with China,” *Space News*, January 10, 2014, at: <http://www.spacenews.com/article/military-space/39038us-defense-bill-could-undercut-turkey-s-missile-defense-deal-with-china>

⁶² “NATO’s top commander questions Turkish missile deal with China,” *Hurriyet Daily News*, November 7, 2013, at: <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/natos-top-commander-questions-turkish-missile-deal-with-china.aspx?pageID=238&nID=57511&NewsCatID=359>

⁶³ Burak Bekdil, “Chinese air defenses in Turkey a ‘virus’ for NATO,” *Hurriyet Daily News*, October 15, 2013, at: <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/chinese-air-defenses-in-turkey-a-virus-for-nato.aspx?pageID=238&nID=56239&NewsCatID=483>

⁶⁴ Burak Bekdil, “Chinese air defenses in Turkey a ‘virus’ for NATO,” *Hurriyet Daily News*, October 15, 2013, at: <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/chinese-air-defenses-in-turkey-a-virus-for-nato.aspx?pageID=238&nID=56239&NewsCatID=483> See also: Zachary Keck, “NATO’s Mounting Opposition to Turkey’s Chinese Missile System,” *The Diplomat*, October 2013, at: <http://thediplomat.com/2013/10/natos-mounting-opposition-to-turkeys-chinese-missile-system/>

⁶⁵ “Basin Bildirisi: Uzun Menzilli Bolge Hava ve Fuze Savunma Sistemi Projesi,” 2 Temmuz 2014, at: http://www.ssm.gov.tr/anasayfa/hizli/duyurular/PressReleases/Sayfalar/20140703_UMTAS.aspx

⁶⁶ “New options emerge in disputed air defense deal,” *Turkish Weekly*, April 8, 2014, at: <http://www.turkishweekly.net/news/165364/new-options-emerge-in-disputed-air-defense-deal.html>

Yet, Turkey might eventually choose to replace the acquisition project with local development depending on the new Turkish political landscape. In the latter case, ASELSAN, Turkey's military electronics corporation would be contracted to build a long-range air and anti-missile defense system, in addition to the air defense systems ASELSAN is partnering with the Turkish missile manufacturer, Roketsan, with longer delivery time than the foreign acquisition option.⁶⁷

For Turkey, the main reason for its interest in missile defense stems from the threats posed by its Middle Eastern neighbors. Yet, Ankara's pursuit of missile defense will certainly draw the ire of Russia. Moscow argues that the unrestrained development of U.S. missile defenses could – at some point in the future – pose a risk to Russian strategic missile forces, despite the U.S. decision to cancel the fourth phase of the European missile defense system that concerned Russia the most. In turn, this threat could then damage strategic stability, and possibly change U.S. calculations about the military efficacy of launching a first strike with nuclear weapons.

For now, Turkey has yet to make up its minds about its future missile defense system, and is considering both financial and political consequences and technical limitations of the HQ-9. If Ankara continues with the development of the HQ-9, its lack of interoperability with NATO sensors could lessen Moscow's opposition to the deployment of the system. However, if Ankara opts for a NATO interoperable system – whether it be the SAMP/T or Patriot – Turkey's relations with Moscow could suffer. In any case, Ankara and Moscow's relationship is multi-faceted and underpinned by a number of shared economic and political interests, e.g. Turkey's energy dependency on Russia and the nuclear power plant project in Akkuyu. The two sides have shown a willingness to compartmentalize their disagreements and focus heavily on areas the areas where they agree.

More broadly, Turkey's recent negotiations for a missile defense system has taken place against the backdrop of Syria's use of chemical weapons in August 2013, the subsequent U.S.-Russia brokered agreement to dismantle and neutralize Bashar al Assad's chemical weapons, the ongoing P5+1 talks with Iran about its nuclear program, and Russia's annexation of Crimea. For Turkey, these foreign policy challenges have coincided with on-going regional difficulties in Iraq,

⁶⁷ Burak Bekdil, "Air defense program continues to stumble into chaos," *Hurriyet Daily News*, June 10, 2014, at: <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/air-defense-program-continues-to-stumble-into-chaos.aspx?PageID=238&NID=67585&NewsCatID=483>

Turkey's struggle to proceed with the Kurdish opening, as well as problems related to Ankara's handling of the Arab revolts; terrorist development in Syria in particular.

In this regard, Turkey finds itself in a unique position in defining security threats arising from the turmoil in the Middle East and the defense tools to address them. On the one hand, the elimination of Syria's declared chemical weapons, as well as its depletion of its ballistic missile arsenal has benefited Turkish security. In tandem, Turkey has already signaled its willingness to "live with" an Iran that has a well-monitored enrichment program. Thus, while Iran's ballistic missile arsenal will still be a concern for Turkish defense planners, the curtailing of its enrichment program is certain to be a welcome development for policymakers that have been cultivating close trade relations with Iran. However, on the other hand, the regional turmoil, particularly in Iraq and Syria, has elevated the threat of regional terrorism, raised renewed concerns about the theft of nuclear material, and Turkish border security.⁶⁸

These overlapping issues have certainly underscored the continued need for Turkish reliance on NATO membership. Thus, by extension, Ankara has a continued support for the forward deployment of nuclear weapons as a political tool to ensure Alliance cohesion, even though they have no relevance or military utility for the threats Ankara currently faces. While this approach does not preclude an increased reliance on conventional weapons, the presence of nuclear weapons on Turkish territory continues to serve as political symbol for collective defense.

NATO's Nuclear Debate: The Turkish Position

NATO went through a crisis of relevance in the aftermath of the Cold War and had to address the massive force-restructuring program. The 1990 London Declaration reinstated the *raison d'être* of NATO alliance by underlining that the essential purpose of the alliance to guarantee the security of its allies and its values of democracy, human rights, and rule of law remained

⁶⁸ In July 2014, the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria militants took hold of nearly 40 kilograms of low grade uranium compounds from the University of Mosul. See: "U.S. officials: Terrorist seizure of nuclear materials in Iraq of minimal concern," *CNN*, July 10, 2014, at: <http://edition.cnn.com/2014/07/10/world/meast/iraq-crisis/index.html> Although the materials are very limited in quantity for scientific research, terrorist seizure of such materials and control over large territories has created significant concern.

unchanged. The revised NATO concept captured the multi-directional nature of security threats and the challenge of predicting and assessing those threats. In doing so, the alliance would maintain an appropriate mix of conventional and nuclear forces in the European theater, though at a significantly reduced level. With respect to the nuclear forces, the strategic forces of United States, United Kingdom, and France would provide the supreme guarantee to the alliance, and the European allies, including Turkey, would continue to host nuclear forces to demonstrate solidarity.

Turkey has, since the end of the Cold War, begun to view nuclear weapons as political weapons that help ensure Alliance cohesion. In September and October 1991, the U.S. significantly reduced the number of nuclear weapons deployed in Europe. As part of this withdrawal, the US weapons stored at Eskisehir air base were removed. Shortly thereafter, NATO agreed that the alliance had no requirement “for ground-launched short-range ballistic missiles and artillery.”⁶⁹ As a result, the nuclear artillery shells and warheads for battle field artillery units were removed from Turkey. The decrease in weapons prompted the United States to consolidate the weapons deployed abroad at various European air bases, where it was building specialized bunkers, known as the Weapons Storage and Security System (WS3).

In 1995, the United States’ Base Realignments and Closures (BRAC) study recommended the consolidation of air force operations in Europe at four air bases in Europe: RAF Lakenheath in England, Ramstein Air Base in Germany, Incirlik Air Base in Turkey and Aviano Air Base in Italy. In Turkey, this resulted in the withdrawal of the 39th Munitions Support Squadron (MUNSS) from Balikesir Air Base and the 739th MUNSS from Akinci Air Base near Ankara. The two teams completely withdrew from Turkey in April 1996, and the nuclear weapons stored at the base were transferred to Incirlik, where they were still reserved for delivery by Turkish F-16s. The weapons were stored in the WS3 vaults, which had been completed in 1990. The 6 vaults apiece at Balikesir and Akinci are empty, but they remain in caretaker status. In the event of a conflict,

⁶⁹ Final Communiqué, Chairman: Manfred Wörner, The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 17-18 October 1991, available at: <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c911018a.htm>; Hans Kristensen, “U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Europe: A Review of Post Cold War Policy, Force Levels, and War Planning,” National Resources Defense Council, February 2005.

weapons from either the United States or those based at Incirlik could, in theory, be reintroduced.⁷⁰

Turkey is reported to currently host 70 nuclear weapons at Incirlik air force base, decreased from 90 in 2001.⁷¹ However, Turkey's dual capable air wings, i.e. The 142nd fighter/bomber squadron of the Turkish Air Forces at Akinci, known as the "Gazelles," are not stationed at Incirlik air base. Moreover, Turkey is reported to have made the decision to de-certify the pilots previously tasked with delivering nuclear weapons. Currently, Turkey's F-16s are capable of carrying nuclear weapons, but, according to reports, the pilots are not NATO-certified to do so. Thus, in order for the weapons at Incirlik to be used, the United States would first have to fly in its own dual capable aircraft (DCA) from a separate NATO air base in Europe. The weapons would then be loaded on to the aircraft, before the U.S. pilots – perhaps flying with a fighter Turkish escort – would fly on to their targets.

Nevertheless, Turkish aircraft still retain the capability to deliver to nuclear weapons until they acquire the dual-capable F-35. According to Hans Kristensen, Turkish F-16s have received a "stop-gap" upgrade to ensures that they will retain the capability to deliver the B61-12 until Turkey's dual capable F-35s are delivered. According to the U.S. Air Force budget request for the fiscal year 2015, "integration of the B61-12 on NATO F-16 and Tornado aircraft will start in 2015 for completion in 2017 and 2018." The integration, according to Kristensen, will "take place on Belgian, Dutch, and Turkish F-16s and on German and Italian PA-200 Tornado fighter-bombers."⁷² Moreover, according to U.S. Air Force plans, all of the F-35 deployed in Europe are slated to be dual-capable by 2024. Turkey has plans to purchase 100 F-35s, which indicates that Ankara will retain its dual-capable aircraft for the foreseeable future. However, there are no indications that Turkey has plans to re-certify its pilots for the nuclear mission.

Turkey's relaxed nuclear posture is indicative of the country's evolving approach to nuclear weapons. According to Ibrahim Kalin, the chief foreign policy adviser to Prime Minister Recep

⁷¹ "Turkish jets to deliver nuclear warheads, report says," *Hurriyet Daily News*, December 1, 2011.

⁷² Hans Kristensen, "B61-12 Nuclear Bomb Integration On NATO Aircraft To Start In 2015," Strategic Security Blog, Federation of American Scientists, 13 March 2014, <http://fas.org/blogs/security/2014/03/b61-12integration/>.

Tayyip Erdogan, and Suat Kiniklioglu, a former AKP MP who served as deputy chairman of foreign affairs for the AKP, “‘Turkey would not insist’ that NATO retain forward-deployed nuclear weapons. Conventional forces are sufficient ...”⁷³ These statements, however, suggest a level of comfort with the current nuclear status quo.

The NATO Baltic states, for example are on record as supporting the continued deployment of nuclear weapons, which thereby precludes the Alliance from reaching a consensus on the issue in the near future. Turkey, therefore, need not worry about making a decision on its nuclear weapons status in the near future, but rather will remain reactive to developments in the alliance. Nevertheless, the Alliance remains conflicted about the future role of nuclear weapons in Europe.

Belgium, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, and Turkey have been hosting U.S. nuclear weapons as part of NATO’s nuclear sharing policy. In peacetime, U.S. soldiers guard nuclear weapons stored in non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS), and the codes for detonation are under U.S. control. In case of war, NATO’s main operating bases take over the command and control of the tactical nuclear weapons. The five NATO allies who currently host nuclear weapons, however, have different policies about the continued need for the maintenance of American nuclear weapons in Europe. These weapons – like in Turkey – can be delivered by U.S. and host-nation pilots. However, in all cases, the dual-capable-aircraft certified the B61 bomb are reaching the end of their service life.

The B61s deployed in Europe are certified for delivery via the F-16, F-15E, or Tornado aircraft. In the future, the F-35 will take over the nuclear mission. The 2010 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review makes clear that “The Air Force will retain a dual-capable fighter (the capability to deliver both conventional and nuclear weapons) as it replaces F-16s with the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter.”⁷⁴ This is a highly controversial issue. Given the fiscal environment of sequestration in the U.S., the costs of assuring allies and guaranteeing alliance security by maintaining and modernizing the tactical arsenal in Europe remains to be assessed.

⁷³ “Official: Ankara Doesn’t Need NATO Nukes,” Arms Control Wonk, 8 December 2009, available at: <http://lewis.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/2561/official-ankara-would-not-insist-on-nato-nukes>.

⁷⁴ Nuclear Posture Review Report, Department of Defense, April 2010, <http://www.defense.gov/npr/docs/2010%20nuclear%20posture%20review%20report.pdf>.

According to the Obama administration's fiscal year 2014 budget request for National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Weapons Activities, upgrades to the B-61 nuclear gravity bomb is considered as part of the life-extension programs (LEP) accounting for nearly \$500 million in the 2014 budget request, only a portion of the July 2012 projection of Pentagon of \$10.4 billion for the entire B-61 LEP.⁷⁵ The Pentagon has already announced that if these five NATO countries choose not to upgrade nuclear aircraft capabilities, then other NATO countries will "pick up the load," stating that the future of the U.S. nonstrategic nuclear weapons is not reliant on air-delivery capability of host states.⁷⁶

Germany has already made clear that it will not purchase the U.S. built aircraft. Moreover, its current DCA, the Tornado, is expected to be retired some time in the early 2020s. Berlin intends to replace its Tornado fleet with the Eurofighter, which is not certified to carry the B61 gravity bombs deployed in Europe. For now, Germany appears to have made the decision to extend the life of its dual capable Tornado aircraft until 2024.⁷⁷ However, once the aircraft is retired, the anti-nuclear movement in Germany – which has considerable support amongst Germany's leadership – could push for the removal of US nuclear weapons from Büchel air base.

Belgium has yet to decide about which aircraft will replace its F-16s. Unlike the Dutch, Turks, and Italians, the Belgians did not join the F-35 consortium. While Belgium is considering purchasing 35⁷⁸ F-35, *De Standaard* reports "The SP.A [Socialist Party - Different] is determined to maintain its resistance to the replacement of the F-16 fighter planes, even during possible formation talks [refers to negotiations for formation of new government] after the elections."⁷⁹

The Netherlands, on the other hand, had committed to purchasing the F-35. However, due to the aircraft's increasing costs, the Dutch have had to cut the number of aircraft it plans to

⁷⁶ Rachel Oswald, "U.S. Tactical Nuclear Arms Mission Could Shift Among Nations," *Global Security Newswire*, March 26, 2014.

⁷⁷ Andrea Berger and Hugh Chalmers, "A Tornado in a Teacup? Examining Germany's Alleged Nuclear Strike Aircraft Modernization," Royal United Services Institute, 7 September 2012, <https://www.rusi.org/go.php?structureID=commentary&ref=C5049CC5E5A166#.U6v88xZ95uY>.

⁷⁸ "Exclusive: Belgium considers Lockheed F-35 to replace F-16s – source," Reuters, 17 September 2013, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/17/us-lockheed-fighter-belgium-idUSBRE98G00OQ20130917>.

⁷⁹ "Belgium: Flemish party to take veto on purchase of fighters into election," BBC Monitoring Europe – Political, 4 February 2014.

purchase from 85 to 37. The Dutch air force has received two test aircraft and plans to replace its current fleet of F-16s by 2021.⁸⁰ However, there has yet to be any information suggesting how many nuclear capable F-35s the Netherlands plans to purchase, or when the dual capable F-35 will be developed.

Moreover, while Italy has cut the number of aircraft it intends to purchase from 131 to 90, it has indicated that will not cancel its participation in the F-35 consortium.⁸¹ However, there continues to be a debate in the country about the size of the defense budget and whether Italy's defense priorities should focus on European integration. This would mean that Italy would forego its purchase of the F-35, in favor of the Eurofighter. However, in July 2014, Italy was reportedly close to finalizing an agreement to become the top maintenance provider for the aircraft in Europe. Italian Defense Minister Roberta Pinotti, who is a strong supporter of the program, has indicated that Italy will continue with its purchase, despite its recent economic downturn.⁸²

In parallel, the U.S. Air Force, which has currently prioritized the development of a new long-range bomber (LRS-B) to replace the B2, has subtly questioned the need to make the F-35 dual capable. Former US Air Force Chief of Staff Norton Schwartz, for example, has indicated, "that without financial buy-in by the NATO partners, either the F-35 nuclear integration or through fielding of an independent or equivalent European manufactured aircraft, F-35 investment dollars should realign to the long range strike bomber."⁸³

The nuclear strike package is expensive and there appears to be a feeling within the Air Force that those dollars could be better spent on the development of the LRS-B. Currently, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates "The cost of U.S. tactical nuclear forces will total

⁸⁰ "The Netherlands' rocky road to F-35 acquisition," *Flight International*, 4 March 2014.

⁸¹ Giovanni de Briganti, "Italy to Cut F-35 Buy, But Not Pull Out: Prime Minister," *Defense-Aerospace.com*, 17 March 2014, <http://www.defense-aerospace.com/article-view/feature/152466/italy-to-revise,-cut-f-35-buy.html>.

⁸² Chiara Vasarri and Andrew Frye, "Italy's Pinotti Says U.S. Deal Within Reach on F-35 Maintenance," *Bloomberg*, 3 July 2014, <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-07-02/italy-s-pinotti-says-u-s-deal-within-reach-on-f-35-maintenance.html>

⁸³ Aaron Mehta, "Former USAF Chief of Staff: Move Away From Nuclear F-35," *Defense News*, 17 January 2014, <http://www.defensenews.com/article/20140117/DEFREG02/301170028/Former-USAf-Chief-Staff-Move-Away-From-Nuclear-F-35>.

about \$7 billion over the next 10 years,” out of which \$4 billion of will be spent on “sustaining and operating the F-16 and F-15E aircraft, sustaining and operating storage systems for theater nuclear weapons, and supporting NATO.” Moreover, excluding any procurement costs, “the CBO estimates that it would cost about \$350 million to finish developing the modifications to make the F-35 nuclear-capable.”⁸⁴

The U.S. nuclear posture review, however, notes that the decision to develop a nuclear capable F-35 did “not presume the results of future decisions within NATO about the requirements of nuclear deterrence and nuclear sharing, but keep open all options.” In keeping with this approach, the 2010 NATO Strategic Concept emphasizes the need for NATO to remain a nuclear alliance, so long as nuclear weapons exist, but also indicates “The supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies is provided by the strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the United States...”⁸⁵

However, it also linked the further the further reduction of nuclear weapons to a “Russian agreement to increase transparency on its nuclear weapons in Europe and relocate these weapons away from the territory of NATO members.”⁸⁶ Yet, over the last couple of years, the two countries have been at odds over several issues, including the divergence of interests in the Middle East after the Arab uprisings, missile defense, and Russian annexation of Crimea. Both these political problems and the disparity in the two countries’ tactical arsenals are challenges to the next round of arms control negotiations between the U.S. and Russia.

The Baltic NATO states (Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia), for example, are particular concerned with Russia’s reliance on tactical nuclear weapons for its security, as well as its recurring threats to deploy nuclear weapons in Kaliningrad. According to Shatabhisha Shetty, Ian Kearns and Simon Lunn:

Talk of the removal of NATO’s NSNW [non-strategic nuclear weapons] from Europe in the current circumstances is thought to be misguided, and it is believed that any such

⁸⁴ Projected Costs of U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2014 to 2023, Congressional Budget Office, December 2013, <http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/12-19-2013-NuclearForces.pdf>.

⁸⁵ Active Engagement, Modern Defense, “Strategic Concept For the Defense and Security of The Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, November 2010, <http://www.nato.int/lisbon2010/strategic-concept-2010-eng.pdf>.

⁸⁶ Ibid

move would undermine the credibility of the U.S. commitment to European and Baltic security. From the Baltic perspective, any move of this nature would require, at a minimum, substantial reductions in the Russian stockpile, as well as measures that demonstrate that the character of the Russian state and the way in which it treats its neighbors have fundamentally changed.⁸⁷

In tandem, the Baltic States have embraced the necessity of bolstering NATO's conventional forces; believing that such a policy contributes to the political will to enforce Article V.⁸⁸ The Baltic States' concerns about Russian aggression have grown more acute; particularly after the annexation of Crimea in 2014. For its part, Russia has sought to link further nuclear reductions to concurrent limits on U.S. conventional forces. Russia's recent actions in Ukraine, however, is certain to reinforce the Baltic States' central argument; namely that the premature removal of nuclear weapons from NATO host states would be misguided, owing to the increased Western-Russian tensions. This approach differs considerably with the position in Germany, but shares a number of similarities with Turkey's current approach to NATO tactical nuclear weapons in Europe.

The 2010 Strategic Concept and the U.S. NPR, underscore the growing importance of conventional weapons for allied defense. The United States, for example, has decreased the role of nuclear weapons for deterring non-nuclear attacks, while also making noting that maintenance of a credible nuclear deterrent, combined with the increased reliance on conventional weapons like missile defense and other conventional capabilities is necessary to reassure the U.S.' non-nuclear armed allies.⁸⁹ In 2012, NATO's Deterrence and Defense Posture Review reached a similar conclusion, noting, "Nuclear weapons are a core component of NATO's

⁸⁷ Shatabhisha Shetty, Ian Kearns and Simon Lunn, "The Baltic States, NATO and Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons in Europe," RUSI Occasional Paper, Royal United Services Institute, December 2012, https://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/201212_OP_Baltic_States,_NATO_and_NSNW.pdf.

⁸⁸ Ibid

⁸⁹ Nuclear Posture Review Report, Department of Defense, April 2010, <http://www.defense.gov/npr/docs/2010%20nuclear%20posture%20review%20report.pdf>.

overall capabilities for deterrence and defense alongside conventional and missile defense forces.”⁹⁰

Currently, only Italy and Turkey are firmly committed to the purchase of the F-35. The position of Germany, the Netherlands, and Belgium contrasts considerably with the nuclear policies of the NATO Baltic States. These states are particularly concerned with Russia’s reliance on tactical nuclear weapons for its own defense, as well as Moscow’s frequent threats to deploy warheads and short-range delivery vehicles in the Kaliningrad. These fears are certain to grow more acute in the wake of the Russian annexation of Crimea and its continued support for separatists in eastern Ukraine.

On 6 January 2014 - two months before Russia’s seizure of Crimea - Estonian Defense Minister Urmas Reinsalu told a public audience in Washington “nuclear deterrence is badly needed for NATO. Surely it is a very valuable ‘pro’ which the U.S. provides to the security of the alliance.”⁹¹ The increased tensions in Europe will certainly exacerbate the growing schism within the Alliance about the continued salience of forward deployed tactical nuclear weapons, despite the precedent that the US extends its nuclear umbrella to Japan and South Korea without forward deployment.

Turkey has embraced the idea of a nuclear weapons free world, but believes that disarmament will not take place for the foreseeable future. Turkey continues to argue that “so long as these weapons do still exist in other parts of the world, it is indispensable for NATO to preserve a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal that will be capable of deterring all sorts of enemies in order to ensure the security of all of its allies.” During the negotiations for the 2010 Strategic Concept, for example, one Turkish official noted, “our country will want to see an explicit confirmation of the commitment [of the alliance] to the preservation of an effective and credible deterrent by way of maintaining a combination of conventional and nuclear weapons

⁹⁰ Deterrence and Defence Posture Review, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 20 May 2012, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_87597.htm?mode=pressrelease.

⁹¹ Adam Lowther, “Improve Nuclear Weapons, Missiles, Bombers To Deter Putin’s Russia,” *Breaking Defense*, 31 March 2014, <http://missilethreat.com/improve-nuclear-weapons-missiles-bombers-to-deter-putins-russia/>.

capability.”⁹² This statement reflects the legacy of fear of isolation and abandonment in Turkish security policy.

Ankara has paired its continued support for a NATO nuclear force with a more visible effort to hasten the process of global disarmament, with a focus on the Middle East to reduce security risks. In April 2012, President Abdullah Gul argued that “Establishing a credible global non-proliferation regime would not be achievable, while ignoring de facto existence of nuclear weapons of certain countries at the heart of most delicate regions.”⁹³ To do so, Gul underscored the importance of working to establish a Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone in the Middle East (MEWMDFZ) and Turkey’s “leading role on this issue within the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative [NPDI].”⁹⁴ The NPDI is a 10 nation - Australia, Canada, Chile, Germany, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, Poland, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates - initiative focused on “diminish[ing] the role and significance of nuclear weapons in military and security concepts, doctrines and policies.”⁹⁵ Along with its objective to establish a cooperative security framework toward disarmament and MEWMDFZ, Turkey had also facilitated the Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) working group of the 1991 Madrid Peace Conference.

However, as George Perkovich notes, “seven of the ten states live under the U.S. nuclear umbrella, and among the seven, there are divergent perceptions of threat from nuclear-armed competitors.”⁹⁶ Turkey is one of these seven states. Yet, despite the apparent conflict of interest, the purported of the end-goal of the NPDI fits closely with Turkey’s approach to the tactical nuclear weapons issue. On the one hand, Turkey has already devalued the role nuclear

⁹² Mustafa Kibaroglu, “A Warm Reception: Turkey (Mostly) Embraces Obama’s Nuclear Posture,” *The Nonproliferation Review*, vol. 18, no. 1 (March 2011).

⁹³ H.E. Abdullah Gül’s Address at the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), 18 April 2012, <http://www.tccb.gov.tr/speeches-statements/344/82688/he-abdullah-guls-addreb-at-the-organization-for-the-prohibition-of-chemical-weapons-opcw.html>

⁹⁴ Ibid

⁹⁵ Transparency of nuclear weapons: the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, Working paper submitted by Australia, Canada, Chile, Germany, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, Poland, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates, Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.12, 12 April 2012, http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/event/2012/4/pdfs/0427_01_01.pdf.

⁹⁶ George Perkovich, “Reducing the Role of Nuclear Weapons: What the NPDI Can Do,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 27 November 2012, <http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/11/27/reducing-role-of-nuclear-weapons-what-npdi-can-do/emyn>.

weapons have for its own security. Yet, on the other, Ankara still continues to place value in presence of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons on its territory because of the political value attached to the maintenance of the Alliance's nuclear status quo..

Turkey's nuclear policy, therefore, continues to elevate the importance of disarmament, but Ankara, for the moment, is unwilling to fully commit to the removal of nuclear weapons, until the goal of complete disarmament is close to coming to fruition. Yet, in a departure from its Cold War policy, Turkey has devalued nuclear weapons for security planning. Turkey has already made the decision to de-certify its DCAs, reportedly in exchange for robust assurances from the United States about the continued viability of the NATO nuclear missions. With that said, Ankara does still retain the capability to deliver the B61. Turkish dual-capable F-16s have received a stop-gap upgrade to ensure the continued Turkish capability to carry and deliver the latest B61 "mod" - the B61-12, albeit without the NATO-certified pilots to deliver them.

The Future: Foreign Policy Concerns, Turkey's Embrace of Precision Strike and Nuclear Deterrence

As Ankara continues to seek to implement a more proactive foreign policy with states in its near abroad, yet having realized the failure of the "zero problems" policy especially in Syria and Iraq, the issues associated with the continued presence of nuclear weapons on its territory are certain to become more pronounced. Iran and Syria perceive these weapons as a threat to their national security and Egypt has labeled them a symbol of "Western imperialism."⁹⁷

Nevertheless, in classifying nuclear weapons as political weapons, Turkey has, in fact, adopted a similar nuclear policy to that of the United States. The 2010 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review, for example, notes:

the strategic situation has changed in fundamental ways. With the advent of U.S. conventional military preeminence and continued improvements in U.S. missile defenses and capabilities to counter and mitigate the effects of CBW, the role of U.S.

⁹⁷ Mustafa Kibaroglu, "Reassessing the Role of U.S. Nuclear Weapons," *Arms Control Today*, June 2010, at: https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2010_06/Kibaroglu

nuclear weapons in deterring non-nuclear attacks – conventional, biological, or chemical – has declined significantly. The United States will continue to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in deterring non-nuclear attacks.

Turkey, however, does not have the same conventional capabilities as the United States. In turn, the NATO alliance continues to be the centerpiece of Turkish defense policy. Ankara, therefore, has a continued incentive to ensure that the Alliance remains cohesive, politically relevant, and that all of its members share the burden of collective defense and cooperative security. In this regard, nuclear weapons will continue to have relevance for Turkish security planners.

Ankara has, however, embarked on an ambitious national project to modernize its own armed forces by the 2023 deadline, while going through the continued transformation of enhanced civilian oversight over the military establishment. The concurrent development of improved intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and precision strike is aimed at giving Turkish defense planners greater military capabilities to defend against a range of threats, including ballistic missiles and WMD. The modernization program began in the mid-1980s, but really began to accelerate in the mid-1990s. Turkey's acquisition of advanced arms, - like ballistic missile defense and long-range air defense– has been slowed by its insistence on far-reaching technology transfer and coproduction provisions.

Despite this, Ankara has, for close to three decades, steadfastly pursued a procurement program and enhanced indigenous production intended to provide Turkish defense planners with greater conventional capabilities and independence. However, these programs cannot replace the political value Turkish leaders currently attach to NATO nuclear weapons and the traditional alignment with NATO security policy. Moreover, they are unlikely to be capable of providing Ankara with a robust defense against ballistic missiles and WMD for the foreseeable future, given the costs and technical limitations of the systems even for the US.

More broadly, Turkey's embrace of conventional weapons as a means to defend against ballistic missiles and WMD was never intended to replace NATO's nuclear deterrent. As a result, the two policies have largely evolved independent of one another. Nevertheless, Ankara has already made clear that it will not block any Alliance wide consensus on the tactical nuclear weapons issue. The prospect of an Alliance wide agreement on the issue, however, remains politically

difficult. Thus, absent any major push by the United States to remove these weapons, Ankara is likely to continue to support the current nuclear status quo. However, Ankara's relatively lax nuclear options does provide it with more flexibility than other pro-nuclear states within the nuclear Alliance, although the vagueness in Turkish nuclear policy causes debate about whether Turkey would consider developing its own nuclear weapons, especially if the U.S. nuclear weapons are removed from Turkish territory..⁹⁸

Turkey has never explicitly ruled out relying on U.S. strategic forces for deterrence. Historically, Ankara has shunned this option. However, after the 1995 decision to de-certify its DCA pilots, Ankara essentially outsourced its nuclear strike role to U.S. aircraft and pilots stationed elsewhere in Europe. In this regard, Turkey's nuclear posture already differs considerably from that of the other European states that host U.S. nuclear weapons. In the case of Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, and Italy, the B61 bombs are stored at air bases with DCAs on site. According to the former Turkish Air Force Commander General Celasun, "Turkey's nuclear strike duty within NATO has ended in 2001."⁹⁹

However, after the removal of U.S. Jupiter missiles from Turkey in 1963, Ankara shunned the idea of relying solely on American strategic forces for its defense. While Turkey has, without interruption, hosted American nuclear weapons since 1959, the forces deployed on its territory were primarily for short-range delivery systems like nuclear artillery and nuclear gravity bombs slated for delivery via aircraft. During the 1960s, Ankara supported the idea of a NATO multi-lateral nuclear force, which envisioned the deployment of multi-national crews aboard American ships and submarines dedicated to the nuclear mission. The NATO MLF was eventually

⁹⁸ A Track II exercise conducted by the Naval Postgraduate School in 2012 between Turkish and American policy specialists revealed that a number of changes in status quo could change Turkey's satisfaction with the current burden sharing in NATO: change in Turkish leadership, American isolationism, collapse of the NPT, change in threat perceptions, or a combination of these factors. Turkish panelists in this exercise stated Turkey's oil deal with the Kurdish Regional Government in Northern Iraq, Iran's nuclear program, the Cyprus issue, stability in the Middle East, and terrorism as potential factors complicating U.S. support of Turkish security interests and NATO credibility. Yet, the participants disagreed on how Ankara would react if Turkey remained the only NATO member to host tactical nuclear weapons, i.e. whether Turkey would be the "American puppet" or would return the weapons to promote nuclear nonproliferation in the region. See: Victoria Clement and Ryan Gingeras, "U.S.-Turkey Strategic Dialogue," Naval Postgraduate School, November 2012, PASC Report Number 2012 019.

⁹⁹ "Turkish jets to deliver nuclear warheads, report says," *Hurriyet Daily News*, December 1, 2011.

cancelled, which then prompted Ankara to begin to explore the issue of predelegation of SADMs more closely.

Currently, Ankara has decreased its nuclear readiness. This decision was not made independently, but rather reflects NATO nuclear decision-making in the post Cold-War environment. Yet, despite Turkey's relaxed nuclear posture, security planners continue to attach value to the forward deployment of nuclear weapons in Europe. As such, it is unlikely that Turkey actually envisions the use of nuclear weapons, but feels as if their premature removal from Turkish territory would have adverse affects for NATO and burden sharing. Thus, absent some agreement with the Russian Federation for reciprocal tactical nuclear weapons reductions, Turkey is unlikely to advocate for a policy of total reliance on U.S. strategic forces for its security. This policy is not borne out of any belief that nuclear weapons will be used, but instead reflects Turkey's continued belief in the political value associated with the forward deployment of nuclear weapons in NATO states.

Moreover, the NATO missile defense debate reveals lingering Turkish suspicions about the viability of collective security guarantees, as well as solidarity and burden sharing. In this regard, the maintenance of NATO's nuclear status quo continues to serve as a political tool to ensure that Turkey's privileged status in NATO remains intact.¹⁰⁰ As such, unless Turkey can be assured that it can play a role in the command and control of a conventional weapons system, Ankara is likely to resist any effort to undermine its position in NATO.

In turn, Turkish leaders are not likely to actively support the withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons from European territory. Moreover, while Ankara is supportive of increasing the Alliance's conventional capabilities, the current plans for a NATO missile defense system has thus far failed to address Turkey's core security concerns. In addition, Ankara remains committed to stringent co-production arrangements when procuring conventional weapons systems. To date, these demands have slowed the conclusion of numerous agreements with western suppliers. Thus, before supporting the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Europe, Ankara would first have to be assured that any transfer of conventional weaponry would include assurances about technology transfer arrangements. In tandem, Ankara would also have to be assured that it

would retain some control over the contingencies in which these systems could be used, particularly as it pertains to an out-of-area conflict akin to Turkey's concerns in Syria.

Thus, while Ankara would not block any Alliance wide decision to remove nuclear weapons from Europe, it will also not actively lobby for their removal. To this end, Turkey appears content with the nuclear status quo, regardless of the increased focus within the Alliance on conventional weapons.