Stansfield Turner:
In His Own Words

Thoughts from the Collected Works of Admiral Stansfield Turner

Compiled and edited
by
M. Merrick Yamamoto

Stansfield Turner

Stansfield Turner, a native of Highland Park, Illinois, attended Amherst College and then the U.S. Naval Academy at Annapolis, Maryland (Class of '47). There, while completing a Bachelor of Science degree, he also played varsity football and was the Commander of the Brigade of Midshipmen. After graduation he served one year at sea before entering Oxford University as a Rhodes Scholar, and earned a master's degree in philosophy, politics, and economics. Following Oxford, he served at sea primarily on destroyers, and in 1967 commissioned the guided missile cruiser USS *Horne*. Key assignments as an admiral included serving as the President of the Naval War College, and Commander-in-Chief of NATO's Southern Flank.

His assignment as the President of the Naval War College was particularly noteworthy. As president, he instituted fundamental and enduring curriculum changes in the academic content and pedagogical style of the War College's course. The course was based in part on the study of military history, going back to the Peloponnesian Wars; in part on reading the classical military strategists; and in part on case studies of decisionmaking techniques in the midst of ambiguity and uncertainty. These revisions in the curriculum remained basically in effect for decades and became a model for higher military education.

In 1977 President Jimmy Carter appointed Turner as the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), and as such he headed both the Intelligence Community (composed of all of the foreign intelligence agencies of the United States) and the Central Intelligence Agency. As DCI, Turner developed new procedures for closer oversight of the Intelligence Community by Congress and the White House, led the Intelligence Community in adapting to a new era of real-time photographic satellites, and instituted major management reform at the CIA.

After leaving the agency and retiring from the Navy, Turner became a TV commentator, lecturer, educator, and writer. Turner taught at Yale University, and at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point as the first John M. Olin Distinguished Professor of National Security. For many years he taught at the University of Maryland School of Public Policy (MSPP), during which time he introduced the Naval War College's signature course, "Strategy & Policy," as well as "Terrorism & Democracy," a course that inspired further research on terrorism. In 1995 he was awarded a Senior Research Fellowship at the Norwegian Nobel Peace Institute in Oslo.

Admiral Turner authored five books. *Secrecy and Democracy: The CIA in Transition* discusses the problems of conducting secret intelligence activities in our open, democratic society; *Terrorism and Democracy* addresses how a democracy can respond to acts of terrorism without undermining its democratic principles; *Caging the Nuclear Genie: An American Challenge for Global Security* develops a plan for controlling nuclear weapons; *Caging the Genies: A Workable Solution for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Weapons* discusses how to deal with weapons of mass destruction; and *Burn Before Reading: Presidents, CIA Directors, and Secret Intelligence* examines the relationships between U.S. presidents and their CIA directors.

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Preface

In this book Admiral Stansfield Turner talks to you about leadership, strategy, the U.S. Navy, intelligence, terrorism, and success in life. In his words he shares his knowledge and experience with you, knowledge gained from serving the United States for many years as a Naval leader and innovator; Director of Central Intelligence; and writer, lecturer, and educator. By building on his thoughts you can become a better leader, improve your skills as a strategist, and gain a deeper insight into security challenges and their solutions.

Chapters 1 through 4 address the art and science of leadership, strategy & policy, the Naval War College and military education, and the Navy. Chapters 5 through 7 address areas of global concern—intelligence and the challenges of reconciling secrecy and democracy, fighting terrorism without endangering democracy, and decreasing the risk to the world from weapons of mass destruction. Chapter 8 addresses personal achievement and success. The thoughts of Admiral Turner are an invaluable legacy that can help us meet the challenges of today and tomorrow.

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In order to express Admiral Turner's knowledge and experience in the most concise form, the thoughts in this book were compiled and synthesized from many sources including his books, articles, letters, addresses to civilian and military audiences, interviews, radio and television appearances, Congressional testimony, personal communications, and course discussions in the classes he taught. Though most of the selections are verbatim transcripts of his words, in a number of cases editorial changes have been made.

The project of gathering and sharing Admiral Turner's thoughts began in 1999, and earlier versions of selected chapters were published by the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM) at the University of Maryland School of Public Policy. However, after the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States in September 2001, Admiral Turner requested that the project be postponed while he reinstated his course, "Terrorism & Democracy." With the completion of a second project, a monograph on terrorism that builds on many of the principles and materials used in the course, Admiral Turner's thoughts from his collected works could be completed. The project is intended to help support scholarships in his honor at the Maryland School of Public Policy and the U.S. Naval Academy, and to support the Naval War College.

Many thanks to George Thibault, Admiral Turner's students, Dr. John Steinbruner, Dr. Andrea Williams, Ken Williams, Sue Borcherding, Pat Moynihan, and Marion Turner for their contributions. Special thanks to Dr. Margaret Scheffelin, who helped with so many aspects of the publication, and to Edward Scheffelin and Clifford Yamamoto for their invaluable help.

Chapter 1: *Leadership*

I. The Fundamentals of Leadership.[1]

1. The Two Principles of Leadership. Leadership is as old as mankind and has not really changed. The purpose of leadership is to get the job done, but what is it that motivates people to get the job done well? You motivate people in two ways: by *gaining their respect* and by *getting those you lead to believe in what they are doing*.

How does a leader go about gaining respect and getting those he leads to be inspired by the mission and want to accomplish it? To earn respect, you as a leader must *be professional*, *be honest*, and *care for your people*. To get those you lead to believe in what they are doing, you as a leader must *listen*, *define the mission and have a forward vision*, and *communicate the mission and vision*.

1. The First Principle of Leadership: Earn Respect by Being Professional, Being Honest, and Caring for Your People. Let's talk about what it takes to gain the respect of those around you.

—Earn Respect by Being Professional. In order to be a good leader you've got to know your stuff—to be well-versed in your field. You've got to be competent professionally, and you've got to be seen as a professional—you can't lead people if you don't know what you're doing. You can't be inept; you can't be ignorant of your profession. No one wants to follow someone who may lead the team into difficulties. I am not saying that to be a leader you must know everything about the field you are in, but you must be well-informed about what goes on at your level—about what your job requires. Professionalism is more important than anything else. Some people think it requires charisma, and some have it like an Eisenhower. But most do not. Charisma can help, but it is never enough over the long run. All the charisma in the world won't make up for not understanding what you're supposed to do, whether it's commanding a ship, firing mortars, or handling a problem in Lithuania—whatever level you're working on. Your first task is to be sure you've got a grasp of what you're supposed to do—your job description. And you must prove yourself even more as you move upward.

—Earn Respect by Being Honest. Earning respect requires more than being well-informed. Being honest, having integrity, and having ethical standards is obviously something that's needed to get people's respect. No one wants to work with someone he cannot trust. If there is any doubt about a leader's honesty, the supposed leader will almost certainly fail.

These supposed leaders will fail because subordinates will not respect them. They will fail also because they all know that they are not doing the job the way it should be done. Even more importantly, a leader who faces issues of honesty, integrity, and ethics squarely will gain strength. Honor is at the heart of the development of character—it is integral to the warrior ethic: battles and lives may depend on it. Knowing that you are acting honestly in accordance with your highest standards builds self-confidence and inner satisfaction, and only those who are confident and satisfied with themselves will truly lead.

—Earn Respect by Caring for Your People. The key element in concern for people is a really genuine interest in them. You've got to look out for your people—really take an interest in them—really love them. You must know something about their lives, their ambitions, their problems, interests, and needs. Just being aware that they have these ambitions and problems is half the battle. You want to feel that their problems are your problems. Now that doesn't mean you kowtow to them and cater to their problems if they don't fit it with what the organization is allowed to do for them. But you want to be conscious of their problems; you want to be conscious of their aspirations. You want to be sure that you give them an opportunity to use their particular talents to the best of their ability. And making them feel important is crucial to good leadership.

There is also the question of how much time you can spend really getting to know your people and still meet the other requirements of professionalism. Your ability to lead is your ability to handle these functions or factors, because they sometimes conflict. Sometimes trying to do one hurts one of the others. First of all, there are conflicts in how much time you can dedicate to

each one. You can't spend your whole day finding out what your troops are doing and thinking because you're concerned about them. But if you get so absorbed in your big, broad mission that you forget that you've got troops over here that you need to be concerned about, you've put the balance wrong. So there are conflicts there. Sometimes just stressing one hurts the others.

And other conflicts arise. What happens when your people genuinely make mistakes and you have to decide, "Is my sense of concern for them such that I try to get them out this mess and get them off the hook, or do I think it is better for the unit—and maybe for the individual—that they go through the normal process and get punished or whatever has to happen?" It's a slippery slope because if you do it for one and the next day someone else does the same thing, you've either got to keep going or be inconsistent and so on. There are two sides to this coin: one is being fair to the whole unit and to the individual, and being firm.

2. The Second Principle of Leadership: Get Those You Lead to Believe in What They Are Doing. Let's talk about the second principle of leadership and what it takes to engender a sense of mission in those around you. Some people say leaders are born, but no matter how much native charisma or leadership traits individuals may have, no one is born with the sense of mission for whatever group or team or organization he or she happens to work with today. No one joins an organization knowing all about it.

—Listen—Listen and Learn. More than ever leaders need to listen because so much is changing, so fast that no one can stay abreast of everything he needs to know. You've got to bring your people into the process. First of all because none of us are infinitely smart, and there's a lot of wisdom out there. Secondly, it helps the communication process because they become part of defining the mission. Listening to them helps you define the mission so that when you've got yourself wrapped around the mission you will be able to communicate it to them—the next step.

—Define the Mission and Your Forward Vision. After listening, the next key to instilling a sense of mission in any group is to define the

mission. First, *you* have to understand your mission. You have to be sure you have defined it, and after really understanding it yourself, shape the mission. And to understand your organization, you must explore some of the failures, problems, and mistakes in the organization's history—those are often what led to shaping it into what it is. That's especially the case with an organization whose history is controversial. In telling the story of most organizations, though, one can usually balance past problems with accounts of successes. After you understand your organization and its mission, then develop a concept of ambitions or desires of what you want to do for the organization.

It takes vision to conceive what a mission is or should be. Developing vision takes an ability to look past one's own tasks, an ability to see the larger purposes of the organization. Again, this is particularly true today when the world is changing so much. Look at foreign policy. Yesterday's containment is out. We need new vision. Look at our military policy. Yesterday's adversary has disappeared and we need new vision. Look at our industrial policy. Yesterday's large domestic market gave us a great advantage. Today it is a larger world market and we need a new vision of how to deal with it. You must have the vision to look past where you are to where the group, the team, is supposed to be going. If we are to withstand the reverberations caused by disquieting forces, we must expand our vision and initiatives.

—Communicate the Mission and Your Forward Vision. How do you get people to believe in the mission of your unit, your ship, and your organization? Define the mission for them so that they understand it well. It does no good to listen and then develop a sense of mission if the leader cannot communicate it to those he is leading. Communication is not always easy. Remember that old parlor game where someone starts on one side of a room and whispers something to the person next to him, and then it passes around the room whisper by whisper, but when it comes out at the end it usually is entirely different than when it started? Well, communicating in organizations can be like that. You need to look around you and see how good leaders manage to get their vision across without

distortion and in a way that is persuasive to those who hear it.

You also have to be able to persuade people that their job is an important job and that it is something that she or he wants to do because it's going to achieve something for the organization. You can almost say that's conning people into doing menial jobs and making them feel that the jobs are important. I don't feel that's the case: it's a case of making sure that the job *is* important. In any organization employees need a clear understanding of what is expected of them, and a clear recognition of the importance of the work that they do. You want every person to feel fully challenged, and thereby feel a full sense of contribution, reward, and accomplishment.

2. Developing Leadership.

1. Strengthen Your Leadership Skills. None of us is equally good at all elements of leadership; we each have individual strengths and weaknesses. We must be conscious of them all and try to make up for our deficiencies. We must find the areas in which we're not as strong and put more stress on those areas.

2. Develop Leadership in Your Subordinates. It is important to impart an attitude of leadership as widely as possible—not just to generate a few great leaders like Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, General Omar Bradley, or a towering civilian figure like Winston Churchill. Few of us will reach those heights, but it is my experience that those who get ahead in life are those who act as leaders, whether in positions of great responsibility at the top, or positions of little authority at the bottom of the ladder—whether a junior sailor in the Navy, a rookie cop on the beat, the newest mechanic in the shop, a professor in a classroom, or a businessman in an office. Unless you are a hermit or perhaps a great artist like a painter or sculptor, most of us work with other people. How well you do depends not just on your performance but also on how well others do their jobs alongside you. If teamwork is bad, everyone looks bad no matter where you are. If you use the principles of leadership to encourage others to do their jobs well, whether they are above or below you, your job will be easier and the mission will be accomplished better.

3. Watch Out for Authoritarianism. Many people in leadership positions rely on the authority they are given over other people, like the right to fire or to promote them, or to assign tasks. When superiors can make or break their subordinates they can and do command them; they don't have to lead them, because the employees know that pleasing their boss is ultimately more important than producing results. That is not leadership, that is authoritarianism—"leading" by threatening. It never brings out the best in people. It never gets the kind of results that earning respect and inspiring people with the group's mission does.

4. Remember That Leadership Is the Same at All Levels. The principles of leadership are the same whether you are the President of the United States or the most junior sailor in the Navy. My first career was in the Navy, and as a junior officer I had to get a group of enlisted men to be enthusiastic and conscientious about keeping our portion of a cruiser shipshape. Later as an admiral I had to keep a group of captains enthusiastic about keeping their ships ready for war. The words I employed as an admiral were different from those as an ensign, but the basic principles for motivating one group or the other were the same. In my second career as head of the CIA I had to keep a group of spies enthusiastic about taking the risks involved in spying, even at the risk of their lives. The spies, the captains, and the sailors responded to essentially the same stimuli. Moreover, as head of the CIA, where I reported directly to the President, I observed that, despite all the great authority he had, the President had to follow the same rules as the rest of us—such as to get his cabinet to pull together as a team.

3. Summary.
There are lots of theories about how to get others to want to do what you want them to do because they believe they want to do it. Most experts on leadership tend make it a more complicated task than it is. There are always new terms being coined—beware of fancy terminology about leadership and of new fads and theories. The fundamentals of leadership remain the same, and following these principles enables anyone to exercise leadership in any circumstance, in any age, at any level.

II. Leading Organizations.

1. Take Control of the Key Processes. Three standard managerial techniques to bring an organization under centralized control include:
 —revamp the organizational mechanisms to gain control of people, budgets, and future plans;
 —place people in key spots; and
 —open up communications from top to bottom.
 1. Revamp the Organizational Mechanisms to Gain Control of People, Budgets, and Future Plans.

The budget is the primary process by which the wheels of government turn. Budgets outline decisions on funding priorities, levels of service, and available resources—decisions that determine what agencies can do and to what extent.

Get the organization to focus on long-range issues. It is hard to get senior officials who are fully consumed with today's problems to concentrate on long-range issues—to get the decisionmakers in our system to give studied attention to issues that have not reached crisis proportions.

When a manager becomes so absorbed in the details of current actions, he does not have time to concern himself with the broader issues, such as the value of what he is doing or its ethics. In my experience a bigger staff does not help such a person step back to look at the big picture; instead, it gives him time to become mired in the details of directing his subordinates. What is needed is a better management technique. A manager can develop it with a smaller staff, because he will have to learn, under the pressure of an increased workload, to delegate details.

Sometimes an organization can be running the 50-yard dash when it needs to work on a long-distance run. The budget process is an excellent vehicle for forcing attention on the future. As the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), once every six months or so I gathered the heads of the major intelligence agencies for a day-and-a-half retreat. We weren't there just to solve specific problems, but to exchange ideas and discuss common concerns.

2. Place People in Key Spots. Choose key subordinates carefully. You've got to sense with your intuition, your best senses, and find who are the people you feel have real integrity, the people who have enthusiasm for carrying out orders the way you want them carried out, and put them in charge. Choosing the people close to you is one of the most difficult tasks in any high position, because you have to have people who are loyal to you. You need total trust in those around you.

3. Open Up Communications from Top to Bottom. Getting control of any large organization takes more than rules and inspectors and others. It is in part the tenor of leadership that you exert. It is in part the example you set. Place high importance on discipline and compliance with law, regulation, and ethical standards, and make certain that those persons who report to you fully understand their responsibilities and what is expected of them. See to it that they get whatever guidance is required and then hold them responsible for the proper execution of the tasks within their jurisdiction.

The following excerpt from my confirmation hearings to be Director of Central Intelligence demonstrates this philosophy: "I am going to make it clear in my first days in office that I don't want any plausible denial theories with respect to my stewardship. I am going to make it clear that if I ever have to come before this committee and confess that I didn't know what was going on, and it was not good, that I will not ask for excuse. [If I am approved for the job I will accept the responsibility, and my subordinates in the CIA] had better be prepared to accept their responsibility also. If I ever find that their sense of their own responsibility is such that they feel they are entitled to hide anything from me or in any way feel I am not entitled to know every detail of what is going on, there will be some fireworks out there. [Furthermore] the tools, the official legal tools available [to the DCI] are adequate. From there, I think it is a matter of personal leadership. You must not only have a threat of some sort over people, you must be able to win their enthusiastic support for what you are doing."

—**Communicate within the Organization.** As Director of the CIA I found it necessary to establish a means of communicating directly with the people of the CIA. I instituted informational notices to go on the bulletin boards. These "Director's Notes" discussed the reasons behind any changes being made, informed employees of what the facts were when the CIA was falsely accused in the press, quelled the bad rumors that often cropped up, brought new opportunities to the attention of employees, and generally attempted to keep people informed about how things were going. They became so popular that we had to print enough for each employee in Headquarters as well as for our people overseas.

I also established a rule that any employee could communicate with me directly by writing a note and delivering it in a sealed envelope to my office. I assured them I would open such communications personally and handle them discreetly, but that they were only for my information. I would not try to resolve personal problems by this route. When I received a suggestion that merited consideration, I sent it down the chain of command for review, making sure that the person who had written to me remained anonymous.

I got an even more direct feel for employee attitudes from a series of discussions with various groups of middle-management people, like midcareer espionage officers, analysts at the desk level, minorities, secretaries, and the handicapped. I appreciated well that the captain of a ship doesn't know what the attitudes and morale are on his ship if he talks only to the executive officer and the department heads. I wanted to know what the CIA's equivalent of the Navy's junior officers and chief petty officers were thinking. I asked George Thibault to set up these discussions and decide which cross-sections of people might provide different insights. He met with the participants to help them organize their sentiments and encourage them to be hard-hitting and candid, and then scheduled their meetings with me. Then he and I would meet with them, without anyone else present.

Another way I got feedback was by developing an interchange with the chiefs of our overseas stations, very important people to the success of the Agency. I asked each to write me a letter of not more than two pages, once every six months, describing what was going on in his area of the world and at his station. From these letters I could deduce who were the good thinkers and who were the ones willing to call the shots as they saw them.

—**Communicate Outside the Organization.** No important public institution in this country can survive over the long run if it does not have the support and understanding of the American people. In a democratic society, a public institution must operate in maximum candor, both about its achievements and its shortcomings. A defensive posture doesn't help—and often hurts—the institution. An open communication policy permits—and even facilitates—criticism, recognizing that a great institution can withstand the storm, and that unjustified attacks will ultimately be revealed for what they are. As DCI I had a responsibility to communicate to Congress my concept of the mission—what was I trying to do with the Intelligence Community, because if I didn't get them to agree to that then I didn't get the appropriations to do it. It was a *sine qua non* for achieving my mission.

As DCI, I wanted to release more information to the media. I brought in a seasoned public affairs specialist, Herb Hetu, who had been a public affairs officer in the Navy and chief of public relations for the Bicentennial Commission. He set up the first Office of Public Affairs at the CIA, a single, highly visible point of contact between the CIA and those outside. He began with a far-reaching but carefully controlled plan. He expanded the Agency's briefing program for the media; brought TV into the Headquarters for the first time with *60 Minutes* and *Good Morning America*; ensured wide distribution of unclassified CIA studies to the media; arranged for groups like college alumni clubs, the Young Presidents, and the Sigma Delta Chi journalism fraternity to meet for briefings and question-and-answer periods; and scheduled frequent press conferences and interviews with me.

But perhaps of greatest importance, Herb answered all reasonable inquiries from the press and the public. His policy was never to limit his responses to "no comment." Questions were

carefully considered. Those that could be answered, were; an explanation was given for those that could not. On one hand I felt the CIA had to recognize that it had become a well-known part of the government and needed to correct the many erroneous or exaggerated stories that appeared in the wake of several investigations. On the other hand we attempted sincerely to provide useful services to the American media. By being more responsive within the limits of secrecy, we developed a more stable and fruitful relationship between the CIA and the press.

2. Lead Organizational Change and Growth. No great institution can afford to become static. Leadership and change are almost synonymous in today's environment, where organizations that sit still are left behind. Managing change requires a particular kind of leader—one who can earn respect, project a vision, and inspire others to act.

One problem is that institutions by their very nature are resistant to change. Every change will be fought by some constituency, and many constituencies are very good at protecting their interests. Bureaucracies have many ways of resisting change and it is never easy to redirect the thrust of an established, proud, and successful organization. Yet there are times in the life of almost every bureaucracy when change is important. When the usual things don't work, it is time to try a different tack—to try new strategies to meet new challenges. Frequently only an outsider can bring it about. Insiders are often either too close to the problems or too circumscribed by their affiliations within the organization. Having no institutional bias or resistance to change is an advantage when arguments against change are based heavily on tradition rather than on logic.

1. Reorganize Carefully, Decentralize When Appropriate, and Keep the Headquarters Overhead Down. It is always tempting to correct a problem by reorganizing. Also, making more decisions on-site and fewer by centralized bureaucracies offers clear advantages: increased flexibility, greater responsiveness, shorter turnaround time, improved morale, and reduced costs.

Excess overhead and bureaucracy at a headquarters constipates the system and spoils the ability of the operators in the field to do their job. There isn't a bureaucracy of our government that wouldn't be improved by a reduction in its headquarters. President Jimmy Carter noted that bureaucracies grow by themselves and if you're not careful, everybody's in the headquarters and nobody's out in the field tilling the soil.

2. Plan and Implement. In this era of blue ribbon commissions setting forth to improve efficiency and quality, some efforts will succeed and some will fail. What makes the difference? It can be summed up in one word: implementation. The best of studies, left to the forces of politics, concerns of special interests, and fear of change, will fail to make significant change. Others, perhaps less thorough and well-developed in concept, will succeed—when there is a mechanism to move ideas through the politics and structure of government. The litmus test of success is in implementation.

Good navigation begins with laying out the plan you want to follow. But it doesn't end there. Once you've charted a course, you have to regularly establish your position, forecast the weather, check for obstacles, update reports, and adjust your course. Ultimately, the plan is only as good as what you do with it.

3. Measure Organizational Progress and Achievement. Most successful institutions—public and private—collect data that clearly demonstrate institutional progress and performance. The first step is to agree on a short list of measurable, strategic objectives. Then the appropriate data are collected, compared to past results and planned progress, and used as the basis for further improvement. Develop regular surveys on key areas that will help measure performance. Measuring change over time will best show what is working—and what is not—and provide a foundation for continued improvement.

The primary tool to achieve results is the performance indicator, an explicit measure of success or failure that serves as government's "bottom line." Just as business tracks performance by monitoring profitability, market share, and sales growth, governments can track their performance

through measures such as the crime rate and the change in students' test scores. Tracking this performance over time leads to performance accountability systems that help leaders get results—and gain attention for getting results.

4. Instill Good Principles. The answers to problems in government lie not only in actions, but also in attitudes. To truly make a difference, everyone must embrace a new code for managing change. Five principles define this ethic and build the foundation for the future:

—**Mindset.** To succeed, you must want to succeed. Our leaders cannot just tell us why something cannot be done. They must make the internal commitment to what we can do to succeed. They must embrace the historic notion of public service as a noble calling, and dedicate themselves to delivering services to our customers. Everyone in government must think like a taxpayer, which means treating public funds with the same care as the family checkbook.

—**Continuous Improvement.** In a world of constant change, the way the government conducts its business must likewise continue to change. The most successful activities are those that continually monitor and modify what they do and how they do it. Everyone in government needs to commit to a quality-of-service-based concept of continuous improvement. No longer can any of us shy away from the risks that often accompany innovative practice. Recognizing risks and responding to them is what the future is all about.

—**Standards.** The government's high standards for service delivery should not be compromised by temporary fiscal strategies. We must commit ourselves to setting high standards for quality services for our citizens.

—**Fundamentals.** Good government depends on the basics. It is essential that every one of our government employees, from managers and administrators to those providing direct services, know and do the fundamentals right. The fundamentals of government include everything from answering a telephone promptly and courteously to doing something accurately so that it doesn't have to be done again.

—**Accountability.** Too often it is difficult to pinpoint responsibility for the failure—or success–

–of a government activity. But people run programs, people make decisions, people determine the outcome of what we do, and taxpayers need to know who these people are, not for finger-pointing, but to make sure that they have the tools and resources to do what they have to do. Once we give them these tools and resources, we will be able to measure their results and determine if an investment is justified by its return. We want to know who is accountable to the citizens for the quality, cost, and results of programs.

5. Use the Strengths of Bureaucracies, and Guard Against Their Weaknesses.

—**Use the Strength of Bureaucracy.** As an example of the strength of bureaucracies, the National Security Adviser and his staff often are frustrated because they have no direct authority to carry out the President's decisions. That's the task of the bureaucracy, which frequently resists outside direction, even from the President. Bureaucrats are even more likely to resist what they suspect are directives from the National Security Council (NSC) staff. A result of these tensions is that the staff of the NSC often attempts to sidestep the bureaucracy and do as much as possible on its own, but when a major crisis is handled informally by an insider group holding ad hoc meetings without full staffing, the bureaucracy is left behind, unengaged. The big loss is the corporate knowledge the bureaucrats possess from having served many administrations.

—**Guard Against the Weaknesses of Bureaucracies.** Problems endemic to most bureaucracies include how to get good ideas forward, whether grievances are being fairly considered, and whether the information employees want to have is being disseminated properly. When organizations mature, they tend to become conservative, stop taking risks, stop changing things, and simply do things in the old way. Bureaucratic infirmities that come with size include a tendency to stifle originality; an unwillingness to consider outside criticism; and a proclivity to be more interested in immediate, high-visibility issues than long-range, fundamental ones.

—**Use Committees Carefully.** Committees traditionally produce unsatisfactory compromises. When a committee operates by consensus, any

agency representative can frustrate actions he or she opposes. It is easier to do nothing than to do something. In addition, there are problems with a consensus report. After endless hours of arguing over an idea, or even over a word or two, people tend to compromise simply to get on with the drafting. Compromises, though, can often produce a wrong result. If one group has evidence that a war will start on Monday and another that it will be Friday, a compromise on Wednesday, for which there is no evidence, is almost bound to be wrong. Analysis heavily flavored by compromise is apt to contain conclusions that are so innocuous that they are of no value to the decisionmaker.

—**Encourage Teamwork and Cooperation.** Any two people looking at a complicated and important situation will probably come up with different solutions. What is important is how to make it work—not to sit and fight the issue and push for pieces of turf in one place or another.

In most large organizations an elite evolves over time. To ensure that a product is as good as it can be, each branch must play as part of a team, not independently. There is no place for elitism in serious and important work.

—**Support Subordinates.** The head of any bureaucracy feels pressure to support his subordinates, demonstrate his confidence in them, and encourage them to exercise initiative. If he or she does not support enough innovative proposals, subordinates will stop offering them and initiative will wane.

—**Persevere.** In our democratic government there are obstacles at every turn, and especially when you're trying to take innovative and risky initiatives. You must keep trying.

3. Make Sound and Timely Decisions.

1. Consider All Views. It is highly desirable to have at least two views on any subject. You need contrasting views and wider viewpoints to make the best decisions—you need all the options on the table at the same time, so that you can compare them and make a judgment between them.

If a report does not stir any debate, you have probably not done your job.

Any professional coming into a high government program, whether he's a military man, doctor,

lawyer, or whatever, has got to learn to look beyond the confines of *his* profession, his way of looking at a problem.

Presidents need a way to balance both the special interests of their advisers' organizations and the inevitable biases of human beings. Thus, Presidents, at least formally, organize their counselors to ensure that the advice they receive represents several points of view and takes advantage of all available expertise. Too often zealots—and there are some in every administration—see such coordination among bureaucracies as an impediment to decisive action. Actually, it is a sensible way to make certain that everyone exercises good judgment.

Frank Carlucci said that on many occasions Admiral Turner said to him, "I'm not sure about John Doe because he has never argued with me."[2]

*2. **Consider the Ethical Factors.*** Ethical positions are a matter of judgment. You will not be able to avoid making ethical decisions. Issues are not black/white—you will have complex, ambiguous choices. This means you must think about ethics now, not when you are under pressure. As the Director of the CIA, I encouraged the inclusion in recruit training of forthright discussions of the ethical dilemmas and moral standards of intelligence work and of the process we were going through of ensuring that those standards were met by introducing external oversight into the system. My hope was to help the young men and women anticipate the complex ethical issues they would face in the field. With some deliberate forethought and reflection they might make better judgments.

About six weeks after I took over the CIA, a story appeared in the *Washington Post* that two of my employees were also, on the side, working with a man suspected of running guns illegally to Libya. He later went to jail for that. It turned out that the CIA had known about this for eight months, and had been unable to make up its mind what to do.

So I called in seven top professionals involved in these cases. And, to a man, they said to give these two people a very light slap on the wrist. I thought that over, and I saw some merit in it. I'd been there

six weeks. Here were seven of the top people that I had to work with. I had to have their support if I was going to run that agency. They understood the mores of the organization and I didn't. So, perhaps, I should follow them. But, on the other hand, for several years before this the CIA had been getting very bad publicity. And I thought, if I fired these people it would make a *good* story, and it would tell the world that we were really going to set this organization on a new course, on an honest and legal course. But then, you know, I thought to myself: "Do I have the right in judging the future of these two individuals who each had spent some fifteen years in this organization, to take into account what it will do for my ability to exercise leadership inside the organization? Or to take into account what it may do for the image of the CIA with the American public? Or do I have to judge it strictly on the basis of what is fair and just to these individuals?"

I wrestled with that. I can't tell you whether I got these other considerations out of my mind or not. I tried to. I fired the men, but I'll never know if I did the best possible. You have to do that kind of wrestling. You have to be sure that you're looking at all aspects of integrity in situations like that.

Another example came in December 1979 when the Soviets sent 120,000 troops into Afghanistan. The CIA professionals came to me immediately and said, "Let's secretly ship arms to the Afghan resistance fighters. That will let them keep the Soviets off-balance, keep them from consolidating their position in Afghanistan and, therefore, from dominating this region. It will be very good for the United States."

I was enthusiastic until I thought a little about the Afghans. It seemed to me that giving arms to people to fight one of the most sophisticated armies in the world, and one that was far larger than the resistance people were going to be able to field, was almost like asking them to commit suicide. Was I entitled to sacrifice Afghani lives for the foreign policy purposes of the United States of America? I debated that one in my conscience, and I came out on the side of "yes" because the experts on Afghanistan persuaded me that the Afghanis would fight no matter what we did—help them or not—they were so determined. And I'm

pleased that, in the long run, my original projection was wrong. They *were* able to win, and they drove the Soviets out, as you know.

You can only prepare yourself for difficult decisions like these on integrity in your personal life, in your business life, in your public life—if you start *now* to think about those problems. When you read about them in the press, when you come across them personally, what are all of the aspects of each one? Don't just accept the superficial evidence of good or bad.

Advisers must be willing to protect supervisors from themselves, and from errors of law that other assistants might make. When this happens, check: 1) Is what the supervisor telling me to do legal, and 2) Is it within my concept of the ethics of the United States government? If I am put in a position of being asked to execute something I feel is immoral, unethical, or illegal, I believe I have only one option, and that is to make my point extremely forcefully and then, if I am unable to reconcile that difference simply to resign.

President Jimmy Carter led a presidency that was unsullied by scandals and ethical lapses, and set a tone of morality and ethics for our country that has stood it in good stead around the world. He started the emphasis on human rights which everybody has continued ever since and which today makes President Carter one of the most popular Presidents we've ever had in other countries around the world. We will appreciate him more and more as time goes on.

4. Maintain Standards. Any organization needs to set standards if it is to thrive over the longer run. The military especially needs standards of conduct. More than in business life, personal standards permeate the relations of men and women who often must live and work closely together. The closer integration of women into the military in recent years accentuates the need for high standards. And pride is one of the key motivations that keep men and women in military service.

An equally essential component of military effectiveness is accountability. Military leaders from time to time may need to require

subordinates to place their lives on the line. If they do so incompetently or capriciously, the leaders must be held accountable. Otherwise, over time the followers will not follow.

If you keep poor performers, or people who aren't required in an organization, you run the risk that the organization will assume that such low standards of behavior are acceptable or that overstaffing is the norm. I fired one CIA officer, in part because of his unprofessional conduct, but more because, in attempting to extricate himself, he lied to his superiors when they confronted him. As I saw it, if this man could lie to his superiors and get away with it, his superiors might conclude that they could lie to their superiors, and so on up the line to me. Within a government or within a corporation, if the executives lie to each other, you're not going to be very effective over the long run.

5. Do Your Own Work Well.

1. Delegate. Late one afternoon at the CIA, I noticed that my IN basket was empty. When I asked Doris Gibbons, my secretary, to bring in more work, she said that there was nothing that needed my attention. In the six months between the capture of our embassy in Iran in November 1979 and the aborted rescue mission in April 1980, I had spent about 70 percent of my time on the hostage problem. That had forced me to delegate as much other work as I could. Now that the hostages were receiving less attention, I had time to spare. Feeling rather nonplussed, I decided to take the rest of the day off and went home! I am chagrined to admit that six months later, just before I left the position of DCI, my IN basket was perpetually overflowing. In pure bureaucratic fashion, I had taken back most of what I had delegated.

2. Be Timely. When I once complained that a particular CIA report was late, I was told that the analysts were holding it back because they could make it a much better report if they had another week to work on it. I pointed out that, as they knew, the President would be making decisions in this area before another week went by. Doing the best possible job of research had become an end of

greater importance than producing a report of timely usefulness to the policymaker.

3. Check Your Focus. In all professions it is easy to get so close to your work that you fail to realize you are not using good judgment. To prevent that, you need someone with a detached viewpoint to take an occasional look at where you are going.

You've also got to take some time off and step back from your job for two reasons. First, you can get so absorbed in what you are doing that you forget to ask the broader questions. You need to step back so that you can ask—and answer—these broader questions. Second, you will do better work by taking time off. And to get the full benefit of leave, you need to take at least ten days off—a minimum of five workdays with a weekend on both ends.

4. Be Loyal to the Job at Hand. Throughout my career I have felt it was always necessary to transfer one's loyalty completely to the job at hand and let the future worry about itself.

5. Above All Be Responsible. "Anything that happens in the CIA will be my responsibility and there will never come a time when I'll come before a committee of Congress and say either I didn't know or it was somebody else's fault." Everything is my responsibility.[3]

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
Chapter 2: *Strategy & Policy*

I. Policy & Strategy. The concepts of *policy* and *strategy* provide an effective framework for achieving goals at all levels, from the national level to the individual level.

Policy is a set of goals. At the national level, these goals come from national interests. National interests are the broad conditions or values a nation strives to achieve or maintain in the world. Examples are national survival, a favorable world order, and national prestige. Senior political leaders establish policy, in consultation with civilian and military advisers.

Strategy is a plan to achieve *policy* (the set of goals). At the national level, senior leaders establish policy, then use the elements of national power to achieve policy goals. The elements of national power are wide-ranging, and include political, diplomatic, legal, military, economic, scientific, technological, informational, psychological, ideological, moral, human, environmental, geophysical, and aerospace resources. The adept government combines the elements of national power into a coherent, adaptable, and synergistic strategy. To be most effective, strategy focuses on short–and– long-term national goals, war as well as peace, and keeps within the nation's standards and ideals.

Policy and strategy "cascade"—that is, the *policy* of the higher decisionmaker becomes the *strategy* for the next level. To use the military as an example, the U.S. president has a *policy* regarding the defense of the nation. The secretary of defense develops a *strategy* to implement the president's policy. The military services then take the secretary of defense's *strategy* as their *policy*, and each service develops a *strategy* to implement that policy. In this way, the process continues through the different levels of military command to the operational level and the actual units and servicemembers who execute the mission.

The concepts are the same at every level. A squad leader uses *policy and strategy* in leading his or her squad. His *policy* is his goal, and his *strategy* is his plan for how he intends to accomplish his goals.[1]

II. Military Strategy. The fundamental question to ask in formulating strategy is, *"Why does America need...?"* Strategy can be formulated step by step, on the basis of specific assumptions.

You must first define and then rank the broad objectives for the United States. The same principles can be used for working out priorities for all the military services, and then all the lists of priorities can be woven into one overall military strategy for the nation. Even if others don't agree on what are the right assumptions to make, differences are then clear. We can then debate them explicitly. Such debate would be a valuable part of the strategy-formulation process. It is debate of that sort—identifying our broad national objectives in proper order and setting the military priorities that flow logically from such a list—that is often lacking. And it is this deficiency that has caused us to suffer military reverses for lack of the right kind of troops, with the right training and weapons, at the right place at the right time. Might we not have succeeded in Iran during the Iranian hostage crisis if we had diverted some resources and training to preparing for small, lightning thrusts at long distances?

It is in the task of formulating military strategy that we military must do better if we are to avoid setbacks, and we need to find strategies that fit today's realities. That means anticipating where and in what circumstances the nation's forces may be used next, and fitting weapons and tactics to those ends. Sound tactics are essential, of course, to victory in the field, but it is sound strategy that gives the local commander the right number and kind of troops and weapons to achieve his objectives.

There is a temptation among the military to believe that it is up to the political leaders to avoid future debacles by maneuvering around situations that could lead to the use of force on terms unfavorable to us, and by not placing undue limits on the use of force once we are engaged in combat. We military men would be foolish, however, to count on a much more perfect set of decisions in the years ahead. And we should admit that, whatever the errors on the civilian side, we could have done a better job of formulating strategy— that is, of anticipating the kind of demands likely

to be placed on us. It will take combined military and civilian dedication to prepare our armed forces better for their battle tests in the future. It will also require a systematic approach to translating broad political objectives into decisions on hardware, training, and tactics.

A strategic concept is the foundation of logic which gives coherence to an otherwise complex and confusing plan for defense. It is a vital first step, not only for knowing exactly what we are going to be called upon to do in the years ahead, but for being able to sell those convictions to Congress and the American public so that an appropriate military can be adequately funded.[2]

We need a systematic means of formulating military strategy. What is needed is an eight-step approach:

1. A definition of national objectives for having military forces;

2. A rank ordering of those objectives by priority;

3. A definition of the combat functions each of the military services can perform in support of national military objectives, e.g., sea control, amphibious assault, and bombardment for the Navy; air space control, bombardment, and sea control for the Air Force; and ground control, air space control, and bombardment for the Army;

4. A rank ordering of those functions of the services under each national objective;

5. A rank ordering of the military functions from under all of the national objectives—in other words, a priority list for shaping the U.S. military;

6. An elaboration of what types of equipment and tactics are best suited to performing the individual functions—in other words, turning the generalized functions into more specific procurement and training objectives;

7. A rank ordering of the specific procurement and training objectives into a national strategic plan; and,

8. The application of systems analysis and budgeting techniques to the strategic plan in order to determine how best to spread the available monies and training time to fulfill the plan.

And, most importantly, the assumptions behind each step must be spelled out explicitly. In order to formulate better strategy, our military must have a systematic approach to establishing priorities based on as explicit assumptions as possible. A systematic approach to formulating strategy needs to be so explicit that it can be challenged and debated at every step. Thus, if a planner, for example, disagrees with the substance of the strategy as it evolves, he should ask what assumptions he would make instead and why they would dictate a different strategy. Planners might not agree on what were the right assumptions and where they should lead, but the exercise of debating over respective assumptions and conclusions would be valuable in illuminating where and why planners differed.

There is a continuing need for the traditional style of strategic thinking, but it is insufficient in itself to the needs of our military today. What must supplement traditional strategy formulation is a rigorous and disciplined approach to looking at how and where the nation may next call on its military.[3]

The place to start formulating strategy is by reviewing our national objectives for having military forces. We need to set our strategy in terms of how it contributes to our national objectives, not just to those of the services. What does the country expect from its military and where does each service fit into that?

Beyond selecting national objectives, we need to establish priorities among them. In doing so we can use several criteria: one is what would be the greatest *danger* to the United States if we were not prepared; another is what is the highest *probability* that we will become engaged in military operations; and a third is where are we least prepared and, hence, need the greatest *improvement*: thus *Danger, Probability,* and *Improvement*. The next step in formulating our strategy is to ask what each service can contribute to achieving these national objectives.

This tailoring to specific objectives in priority would require a reshaping of the services as they are structured today and as they are being shaped for the future. Most specifically the assumptions

behind each step in formulating the strategy must be laid out explicitly. Planners can then demonstrate why a change of assumptions would lead to a change in conclusions and in what directions.[4]

To be effective today, military strategists require a broad perspective on national strategy. The ordering of national priorities is forcing very difficult choices between military and nonmilitary expenditures. How this will balance out in the years ahead will depend on many national and international factors. Still, stiff competition for resources must be anticipated. This will require realistic appraisals of the alternative employments of available funds. The amount of funds the Navy receives will be increasingly a function of how our chosen alternatives compare with those of others. This requires officers who can see what others' alternatives might be, as well as our own, and analyze objectively the strengths and weaknesses of both.

We must study choices: choices of weapons characteristics, choices between weapons, choices between weapons and other necessary elements of military power such as personnel, choices of how to procure and manage military forces, how to select and weigh the factors relevant to a decision, and how to understand the organizational and managerial functions of translating a decision into action.[5]

When the term "strategy" is mentioned, military officers may bring to mind one or more of the classical writers on military strategy, such as Clausewitz, Mahan, or Douhet. Clausewitz wrote in the early 19th century; Mahan at the end of that century; and Douhet in the early 20th century. The fact that military men did not turn naturally to more modern writers of strategy raised the question of why there had been so few prominent strategic thinkers and writers in the past years.

One reason is that strategy has become a much more complex and difficult subject today than when those classicists wrote. They could confine themselves to one-dimensional strategies. Clausewitz wrote about land warfare; Mahan

about warfare at sea; and Douhet about the new air warfare. Each wrote of the virtues of his form of warfare in rather broad, sweeping terms, urging its primacy over the others: that is, Clausewitz made the case for a land strategy; Mahan preferred a maritime one; and Douhet felt both land and sea strategies could be replaced by an air strategy. These writers also urged the choice of particular tactics, such as Mahan's preference for engagements of main battle fleets, but there was little need for these writers to recommend choices between weapons systems. There were not many such choices available: troops were troops, though they might be employed in differing maneuvers; ships were ships, though they might be sailed in different formations; and aircraft were aircraft, though they might be engaged on different types of targets.

The products of modern technology have changed this. There are many choices between weapons systems today. That there are adds two dimensions to strategy. The first is deciding when weapons of air and sea warfare can perform roles in land warfare, not just be a substitute for it, as Mahan and Douhet urged. The second is deciding which of the numerous alternative weapons of land, sea, and air warfare are best suited to any particular task.

With respect to the first new dimension, air and naval warfare are definitely competitors for doing the tasks which armies once did exclusively. For instance, naval forces can envelop a flank with an amphibious assault in lieu of an infantry sweep; or can bombard a battlefield using aircraft or short-range missiles in lieu of artillery; or can strike even deeper than artillery, to the very source of enemy power in his homeland with very long-range aircraft or missiles. Thus, while control of the sea lanes over which land commanders and the civilian populations around them are supplied remains the key role of naval warfare, it is not the exclusive one. Similarly, air warfare can compete with either army artillery or naval bombardment forces in direct attacks on the battlefield, and with the Navy in striking deep into an enemy's homeland. Maintaining control of the airspace over a land commander's forces is still the key element of air warfare, but it is not

the only one: Thus, the modern strategist must address the trade-offs between alternative types of military power which can be employed in a single circumstance, rather than the either/or approach of the classical strategists.

The second new dimension is the wide range of options in weapons systems within each type of warfare. That troops are troops, or ships are ships, is no longer true. Troops come in many forms: infantry, light armored, heavy armored, airborne, helo-borne, alpine, and others, and there are endless kinds of artillery and missiles from which they can choose to equip themselves. So, too, there are wide ranges of choices in the weapons of navies and air forces. If strategy is confined to generalized pronouncements about principles of warfare and does not address such choices, it is going to be deficient. Military men may not turn to contemporary strategists because such strategists as there have been have not been willing to address these new dimensions of choices between the use of land, sea, and air warfare, and between the different weapons systems and tactics available within each area of warfare.[6]

A nation has to first ask itself what it wants to accomplish by going to war. To consult Clausewitz, war must have a political objective, and it must not be waged in a way that defeats that political objective.

The second step is to match the means to the end desired—in other words, match the *strategy* to the *policy*. One of the issues with which we must wrestle is the concept of victory in war. MacArthur's famous statement, "There is no substitute for victory," epitomizes the traditional military outlook. This is tempered today in two respects:

—Victory in its traditional military sense simply may not be achievable or recognizable, and,

—Victory in its traditional military sense may not be politically desirable; for example, the costs and risks may outweigh the benefits in war. National objectives may be achieved by a stand-off from which both sides can maneuver.

Our measure of success [in war] should be the earliest termination on favorable terms. How we use force to bring that about is not a military matter but a political judgment. All across the spectrum, then, from very controlled to very wide responses, the desired effects are measured in political terms more than in military terms—not in how much is destroyed but in how quickly the opponent understands that policy objectives cannot be fulfilled by continuing to wage war.

It is neither wise nor fair to charge *military* planners with drawing up plans tailored more to *political* concerns. The last thing we should want is to encourage the military to set the political objectives of war. And above all, *any military decision with significant implications for policy must be based on significant guidance from political authorities.*[7]

Great wasteful wars broke out in the 20th century partly because of misperceived comparisons of armed forces, and we continually observe unnecessary misunderstandings between nations. The United States needs a deeper understanding of what motivates those other nations with whom we must deal on important issues. We have to be more astute, more well-informed, better able to predict the trends of events, to understand the culture, the attitudes, the aspirations of peoples in foreign countries. We need to try to look at issues from the viewpoint of other people—not that we adopt their viewpoint but that we try to understand *why* they think the way they do. In light of U.S. global responsibilities, failure to understand the mores and attitudes of other nations could be serious.[8]

All too often, presidents and their advisers embark on military actions in the hope that the first step they take will solve the problem. Often, it does not. Sometimes it may do the job, but we would be foolish to count on it. The desire for quick response is rooted in the military tradition of counterattacking an aggressor's forces as rapidly as possible so as to weaken those forces before they can consolidate their position and do more damage. We must be willing to escalate hostilities if necessary to fulfill our mission, but we should do so only as a result of cool judgments and with recognition that there will be serious consequences.

The democratic process needs some means of regulating the impulses of politicians who go to war as an escape from domestic difficulties. Legal means such as the War Powers Act is one such technique, but the most important counterbalance to the politician's impulses is an informed and concerned public.[9]

War includes not only a battle of force between the belligerents, but a more subtle, psychological battle of perception. Victory, if one can be found in such a setting, is not only dependent upon the capabilities of the actual forces deployed, but also on the ability to make the other actors perceive your level of commitment to specific goals. This can be perceived as the most ancient of strategic wisdom—to subdue the enemy without fighting.

Deterrence is in the eye of the beholder. It must be our common purpose to create unacceptable risks for our opponents—to make the costs of aggression unacceptably high wherever our vital interests are involved. This is not to advocate universal intervention in troubled areas, but suggests selective involvement in areas of overriding concern.[10]

A nation's military is one means to execute a nation's policy. If you don't have the capability to use military force if necessary, you have fewer tools with which to handle a problem. And when our secretary of state visits Moscow, or shuttles between capitals in Africa or the Middle East, he doubtless does not dwell on specific comparisons of military forces in his political talks, but the armed strength of our nation resonates in his words.[11]

III. When Formulating Military Strategy:

1. Keep a Mission Focus. We in military service must look carefully at which of our missions most suit the tenor of the times. Which of our capabilities is the nation most likely to call upon us to employ? At the same time, we also need to take stock of our purpose in life in order to allocate the diminishing resources available to us in the best possible way.

If we look back at the record since World War II, the United States has been repeatedly surprised at where its vital national interests seemed to be:

—We hardly anticipated Korea in 1950. Our inability quickly to move sufficient force there led to our being pushed back to the edge of the sea before we could struggle back, many bloody and costly battles later.

—After Korea, we never thought we would place military forces onto the Asian mainland again. Then came Vietnam. Again, we were slow off the mark, largely because our training, organization, and equipment were tailored to a traditional European war, not an Asian guerrilla war.

—After Vietnam, we virtually eschewed the idea that we had any vital interests abroad, except in Western Europe. Yet less than seven years later, President Jimmy Carter spelled out our vital national interests in the Persian Gulf.

—We did not anticipate the dissolution of the Soviet Union—an event of immense importance. We also did not anticipate many of the consequences, such as the outbreak of ethnic violence in parts of Eastern Europe and the territory of the former Soviet Union.

If we look ahead, we can see there are numerous dangerous situations in which our economic or political concerns might lead to a decision that vital national interests are involved. It is shortsighted to believe that we can predict today any better than we have in the past where our future vital interests will lie.[12]

2. Be Objective. One of the biggest challenges to the military, whether it's naval, air, or land, is to adapt to new technologies that come along. It's always hard to give up the old cavalry, the old battleships, the things that you are familiar with. And there's a reason for that—military men's lives depend upon their weaponry, and when they are accustomed to certain weapons, and they've relied on them and found them useful, they don't want to give them up. But we must spend our money with all the leverage our advanced technological base and our inherent ingenuity will give us.

We need a willingness at the highest level in the U.S. military to look at the security needs of the

United States with an open mind, uninfluenced by loyalties to military service or branches of services, and unfettered by conventional solutions. Military doctrine and training must be critically examined in the light of the very different world which exists today than existed when virtually all of our present major weapons systems, platforms, and doctrine were conceived. It is only with such a change in attitude that an improved understanding will come regarding how to use existing equipment better and when new equipment is needed to fulfill our responsibilities.[13]

3. Be Flexible. If there is anything that the years have shown us, it is that our strategy must be flexible and adaptive to the dynamics of political change both at home and abroad. Good strategy is alive and must change. When military forces are designed for only one kind of battle, a nation becomes vulnerable to other kinds of battle. There will be more areas of concern to the United States in the years ahead. If we want to be ready to play our role in them, we need forces that are strong and are useful in many different applications.[14]

4. Examine Existing Momentum. There is a momentum to military and strategic concepts which on one hand is reassurance against whimsical tampering, but on the other hand is the cause of the traditional accusation that the military are always planning for yesterday's war. If national objectives change, we must develop military capabilities that serve these new policies, or we may find that we have insufficient resources to meet the old strategy and have not developed the right kinds of forces to support a new one.[15]

5. Beware of Budget Pitfalls. We are making budget decisions not for today, but for 10, 20, even 40 years from today. We can't let ourselves be emotionally tied to the past or lack the vision for what we will need militarily in those next years— the useful life of military systems. We must have the courage to be bold and act on the hard evidence of where military weaponry is trending.

There is an important truth about the United States military that anyone trying to change it must appreciate. Traditional warfare, with the ships, planes, and tanks needed to wage it, has developed military, congressional, commercial, and public constituencies that work to have us buy more of those tools. To advocate a shift away from basic warfare and its familiar equipment is to risk severing oneself from carefully nurtured sources of power and influence.

We should be wary of unrealistically low estimates of the costs of defenses. With almost all new weapons systems, there are cost overruns. The fact that by 1999 we spent more than $50 billion on SDI (Strategic Defense Initiative) shows how easy it is for vast sums to disappear with very limited results. We should not make a decision to procure a new system if we are not willing to pay at least half again the estimated price.[16]

6. Keep in Mind the Inevitability of Obsolescence. All military weapon systems have a finite life span. When the coming version of any weapons system appears to be virtually the ultimate in cost and sophistication, one can safely assume that the evolution of that system is well past its peak. The best battleships, for example, were built during World War II, well after their usefulness had been eclipsed by the airplane and the submarine. The whole history of warfare is littered with cases of military planners preparing for yesterday's battles.[17]

7. Remember Logistics. Logistics usually dominates strategy. When we think of war, we think most of the tanks, ships, aircraft, and other weapons that each side has, and we talk most about the strategies that the commanders will use as they move their weapons about. As often as not, though, wars are won or lost on the question of supplies. Armies can use the advantage of better mobility only if they have adequate supplies. If the commander in the field does not have the right amount of beans, bullets, and fuel at the right time and in the right place, he simply cannot employ his forces as he would like.

The United States should look carefully at our reserves for NATO and for other contingencies. When we buy new equipment the military is often sorely tempted to postpone buying the full requirement of spare parts so as to have more

money to buy a larger number of tanks, aircraft, and ships. After all, this kind of armament is the more obvious and is used to compare how our forces measure up to forces of other countries. Purchases of ammunition and other consumables are also often postponed in a budget squeeze on the theory that they can be made up more quickly than shortages of aircraft, tanks, and ships. Yet, when the same thing happens year after year, there is no makeup. The best built weapon systems will be useless unless we are willing to support them with adequate supplies.[18]

8. Plan for Training. A strategic lesson highlighted by the Falklands War concerns training: one of the most important contributors to Britain's success was the superior training of its personnel. Argentina's personnel were almost untrained in comparison and it made much of the difference on the field of battle. There are several points here of significance for the United States.

It takes money to conduct all manners of training exercises—ranging from an individual rifleman conducting target practice to a massive joint exercise involving several divisions of troops, several air wings of aircraft, and a fleet of ships. One of the first areas affected in a budget squeeze is the money allotted for training. The political leader does not get much public credit by strengthening our military through better training, because that is difficult to see. However, how effective were Argentina's multi-million dollar weapon systems when placed in the hands of untrained men?

The fact that Great Britain was a member of a major alliance (NATO) and Argentina was not a member of any was an important factor affecting relative force readiness. When an alliance conducts multinational exercises, each participant's capabilities will be quite apparent to the others. This serves as an incentive for each country to adequately train its own forces in preparation for those exercises. Moreover, such exercises provide opportunities to exchange ideas on tactics that help prevent a given nation's concepts from growing outdated. For the United States, then, we should be even more than willing to fund our share of the numerous training exercises with NATO and our

other allies. Training together is like a football team: if you wait until Sunday afternoon to go out on the field, you're probably not going to win the game.[19]

9. Include the "Unglamorous" Requirements. It is always difficult to sell Congress, and even Navy men, on spending large sums of money on unglamorous ships such as oilers and reefers. In the many compromises which must be made, the seemingly more vital and glamorous mission, the strategic one, prevails almost every time.[20]

10. Use Systems Analysis, But without Overreliance. We must not fall into the trap of having to explain why we need a military in overly specific terms. Quantitative systems analysis can be carried too far into strategic concepts. We can become too dependent upon scenarios and hypothetical campaign analyses to justify every force level, e.g., a NATO campaign of 90 days, a ground war in Asia, a so-called "unilateral" war in the Mideast, etc. We can fall into this trap from a lack of vision and because we fail to articulate the purposes and historical perspectives of naval power. A Navy must chart its own course in light of its own intended employment and its particular circumstances.[21]

11. Use Technology. On June 26, 1993, we attacked Baghdad with 23 unmanned missiles launched from 300 to 600 miles away. It was a seminal change in the art of warfare. Although we saw this same action during Operation Desert Storm [the 1991 Gulf War], the lesson was lost in the plethora of other activities. The message: sophisticated technology is increasingly being placed in the weapon, rather than in the platform that launches it. In this case it made no difference that the cruise missiles came from a destroyer and a cruiser at sea. The platform could have been an aircraft carrier or a merchant ship; a B-1 bomber or a 747 airliner. The missiles needed no pilot or ship's captain to see their target. The trend is unmistakable.[22]

12. Remember the Human Dimension. It will always be the preparation of the humans involved that will be the measure between success and

failure in warfare. The humans will—and must determine—how the high-tech systems will be put to best use and how to keep them under control. The advent of more and more sophisticated systems only makes the demands on the humans greater as there is less and less time to react. Remember that the skill with which you do your jobs—the understanding you have of your duties—will be the key to the success of our Navy. No matter how many computers you have working for you, and the success of the U.S. Navy will increasingly determine whether the United States is successful when it employs military force. Everyone who has been a part of a ship's history contributed to its success, because it's the continuity of top performance that makes the difference between a ship's being average or outstanding.[23]

IV. Conclusion. The 21st century will be the world's century. On our agenda should be actions to encourage continued peaceful relations between the developed nations. We also need to pay more attention to the fundamental economic problems of less-developed nations, encouraging them to worry less about building military machines and more about improving the lot of their own people. An organized system for limiting the sale of weaponry to less-developed nations would be a highly desirable goal, perhaps one for the UN to organize.

We are at a time when national, ethnic, and religious fervor are endangering peaceful relations within the less-developed world. Nations are fracturing, and widespread economic disparities aren't helping. Nations of the more developed world will want to play different roles in tempering these conflicts, usually by a coalition approach. We can be encouraged by examples: the grand coalition against Iraq's invasion of Kuwait; the European Community's valiant efforts to rein in the conflict in Yugoslavia; and the Economic Community of West African States' peacekeeping efforts in Liberia. Every available mechanism, be it the EC, the UN, NATO, the G-7, ad hoc groups, or simply bilateral ties, needs to be employed according to what turns out to be feasible in a given situation.

Nations are becoming progressively more interdependent today in what is rapidly a single international market place. And, perhaps most important all, the worldwide revolution in communications has meant that peoples all over the world are better and better informed. Today, any international action is almost instantly communicated around the globe, instantly analyzed, and instantly judged. That judgment—often approbation or criticism—influences events and inhibits even major powers. In the past, free nations often took their diplomatic cues from the United States. Now our leverage of influence must be exercised with much more subtlety if it is to be effective. We must be more concerned with long-term influences than just "putting a finger in the dike." And, if we want to be able to anticipate rather than simply react to events, we must be able to recognize and interpret the underlying theme and forces which we can influence over time.[24]

Two particular factors are influencing the trend toward the ascendancy of democracy and free enterprise—man's natural inclination to want to have a say in how he's governed, and his material inclination. Totalitarianism has not worked. It lacks the wisdom of citizen input. Socialist-Marxism did not work. Communism failed because it requires too much central control, which is deadly, and has inadequate incentives—the socialist philosophy that each contributes to his society according to his ability and each receives according to his needs simply is not adequate. These two factors, in addition to the inability of totalitarianism to restrict the flow of information means that armed with the facts, today citizens find that there is power in the streets.

We have the wherewithal to solve our problems and to lead the world to democracy and free enterprise—and even more to growing respect for the rights of individuals everywhere. But having the wherewithal will not be enough. We must exercise our great power in responsible ways. At the same time, we must be conscious of not abusing our power just because we have it, but must look instead to the long-run good. Other nations are going to follow our lead only if they respect us, and we also must not leave a trail of resentment at high-handedness.

During the Cold War much of the world followed our lead because our power protected them. Today they will follow only if we exercise moral leadership. Moral leadership can prevail in human relations and even in affairs of the world. Such leadership, though, must be by example, not exhortation. We have the opportunity to lead the world in the direction of our ideals—democracy, human rights, individual opportunity, and material well-being. We must earn the right of leadership by displaying the integrity, the morality, and the quality of life in our country that becomes a great nation, and that will make other nations want to emulate us.

When our foreign policy has a moral and humanitarian thrust, it should garner respect. Without a foundation of morality, without setting an example for what the rest of the world can and should do, we cannot maintain our position of leadership.

The world is coming to democracy, it's coming to free enterprise, that's going to be the 21st century. It's not going to an easy road—there will be more Tiananmen Squares, more repressive putting down of demonstrations—but the alternative is thoroughly discredited. The trend is inevitable, but we've got to be out in front helping and encouraging people. While we can be confident, we ought not to be complacent. We must ask ourselves, "Are we the model that other countries think we are? Are we holding the torch up high and is it shining brightly? Does our model that we're giving to the world fill the needs of tomorrow?"[25]

Deep respect for the individual and his freedom is a priceless pearl. I believe with my deepest conviction, that the greatest strength we have as a world power is our moral dedication to the rights of the individual. If any part of our government is perceived to function outside of this fundamental American tenet, it can only bring discredit on the whole. I believe that it is the solemn duty of every agency of the U.S. government to protect the constitutional rights of our citizens.

We are inherently a philanthropic, humane nation, and we have this to offer to the world more than does any other country. The Marshall Plan, the activities of the United States with respect to rebuilding our defeated enemies, Japan and Germany after World War II, are remarkable feats in the history of mankind. We need to preserve that, because the world needs that.

What I want to suggest most is that whether we meet domestic challenges or exercise power on the international scene wisely is not a matter just for Washington, but for each of us. The strength of America lies in part in the fact that we as individual citizens, that you and I as an alliance, can band together and help to solve our nation's problems, not relying only on central governmental direction.

There will be more wisdom gained for our country in foreign policy if many voices participate in its formulation. Some of those voices must be those of you and me, the citizens of our great nation. It is we, the people, who must be the arbiters of the kind of government that we want to have in this country.

I believe with my deepest conviction based on my years in government that people do and must run this country. People's wisdom is better than any bureaucracy. It may be slower and less decisive but over time is wiser. If the American people go too far in any one direction, they will always right themselves. I have a lot of faith in the American people.[26]

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
Chapter 3: *The Naval War College and Military Education*

I. The Development of Military Leaders. If a Naval War College is to serve the Navy and the nation well, it must improve officer students' abilities to address in depth three particular areas: U.S. foreign policy and national strategy, defense economics, and tactics.

After considering many alternative approaches at the Naval War College, we chose the study of real-world cases of decisionmaking in three areas of concern. In *Strategy* this meant scrutinizing the decisions of past strategists and recognizing the rational and non-rational, the precise and imprecise factors that past decisionmakers weighed in balance. In the area of *Defense Economics*, it meant looking at cases involving management decisions which highlighted objectives; alternative solutions and their comparisons; and, more importantly, the principles which they imply. In *Tactics* it meant identifying key tactical interactions and estimating the impact of different courses of action at each potential decision juncture.

Overall, this led us to a curriculum that stresses problem-solving in each of these areas, rather than factual data of a contemporary nature. This means teaching how to approach a few representative problems, with the idea that this would prepare the students to handle a variety of problems in their future assignments.

Many officers have a rather rigid and restrictive view of the decisionmaking process. Most midcareer officers come from a "Newtonian world"—a world with rational right and wrong answers to fairly clearly defined questions. Much of their experience is with technical systems that demand exact treatment and with the military command environment, which properly calls for unambiguous response. What we need, then, is a course that involves the students with varying kinds of decisionmaking problems, beset with uncertainty and imprecision, the type they will certainly face in the future. In other words, the task at hand was to design a course that would help them to deal more confidently with decisions involving uncertainty.[1]

We in uniform are very aware of the importance of understanding our relationship to the economic, diplomatic, and other factors of national strategy. But all of us must maintain our ability to offer pure military advice. Few of us in uniform will ever be required to deal in the creation of national strategy. But all of us will influence our military and national strategies through the recommendations we will offer and the decisions we will make on how to allocate those scarce national resources that will be entrusted to the military establishment in the years ahead. We will formulate the strategy of tomorrow by the way we spend and manage our defense budget today.

We in the military establishment have the intellect and the capability to provide the answers demanded of us today. We can tap those capabilities only through hard intellectual endeavor. We must be able to produce military officers who are a match for the best of the civilian strategists or we will abdicate control of our profession. Moreover, our profession can only retain its vitality so long as we ourselves are pushing the frontiers of knowledge in our field.[2]

How do you get officers to think strategy? How do you get officers to think joint operations? The reason we all want officers to have these two capabilities of thinking strategically and thinking joint, is that we are trying to prepare them in war colleges for higher responsibilities. I think that means broadening them out; broadening their perspective; broadening the kinds of issues with which they can grapple, especially issues which they have had no experience with in the past.

The question is how best to do that. Interestingly, the teaching techniques best for broadening people are almost the opposite of what an officer experiences from his commissioning until he goes to a war college. Up until then his education has been in subjects like how to fly an airplane, how to drive a submarine, how to shoot artillery, how to hunt submarines. In each of those, the education is narrowing him. It is focusing him on a particular skill. You don't want to put a man in an airplane and find out you forgot to tell him about the new instrument they just put in the cockpit, or have him go through an experience in how the airplane stalls

that you haven't anticipated, if it could be anticipated. So the teaching emphasizes factual data and completeness of coverage.

Now, of course, when you aggregate half a dozen of those courses over periods of time, you have a better perspective on your profession. You know more about it. But each individual educational experience is a narrowing one, where they try to cram into you as many facts as they can, keep you up to date with all the current data, and cover as much of the field as possible.

If you want to broaden an officer for higher responsibilities, you can't afford to try to fill him with facts. You can't even hope to cover every topic he is going to encounter in his next 5, 10, 15 years as he moves up the ladder. First of all, there are too many topics, and second, they change too rapidly.

If you teach him about a weapons system today, by the time he ever deals with it, it may well be obsolete or it may be completely changed. The best you can do in my judgment is to teach the officer to reason logically, to seek out all the considerations that he should take into account when he makes decisions in areas where he is not conversant or areas in which he has had no experience, because he is going to have to do that as he goes along.

You must literally throw him into experiences that he has never had, and teach him to deal with what is new to him and what is uncertain. This is contrary to the educational experiences he has had up until then. It isn't the military alone that grapples with this issue of how you educate people in mid-career, how you broaden them.

A number of years ago the Navy sent me to the Harvard Business School for a 13-week course designed for business executives. The idea was to take these businessmen who were heading toward chief executive officer and broaden them out. Harvard took the financial wizards and rubbed their noses in marketing, and took the product experts and made sure they understood something about personnel management. They didn't try to teach them the latest personnel management techniques. They didn't teach them how General Motors manages its production lines and so forth. They taught them the principles behind these

operations. They threw them into case studies, historical case studies that actually took place in the business world. They put the man in the spot of being the CEO and said, "How would you make your decision whether to put more money into marketing or whether to put it into better personnel salaries, or whatever?"

They forced them to make decisions in areas where they had no direct personal experience. I believe war colleges should operate in a very similar way. Instead of being in marketing, production, and finance, the case studies should be in the three principal components of a military career, of the military profession.

The first component is *policy and strategy.* How do we decide why we have a military? What do we want to accomplish with it? What are the broad purposes? The second is *management.* How do we procure, train, and maintain the people and the equipment necessary to carry out that policy? The third is *operations.* How do we actually use those people and equipment in war, if necessary? It's policy, management, and operations.

Now, I don't think we could even try to fill the officer students with all the facts they might have to encounter in these three areas in the next 10 or 15 years of their careers. What we can do, as the Harvard Business School does, is to use historical case studies. For instance, at the Naval War College the first case study is the Peloponnesian wars of the 5th century B.C. When I put that in, some people thought I had lost my mind. Well, remember, please, it was 1972 and we were in the Vietnam War. The Peloponnesian wars were a case where Athens, a sea power, sent an expedition overseas to distant Sicily. They thought it was going to be a short campaign. It turned out to be a prolonged one. The people at home got dissatisfied with their government.

Now, if I had attempted to teach those students about Vietnam, many of whom had been to, and were wounded there, to discuss whether the United States, as a sea power, should have sent an expedition overseas and let itself get bogged down in a land campaign, they would be highly emotional. They were, though, perfectly willing to talk about the Athenians and the same issues were right there on the table.

Similarly, in the management curriculum, if I asked them to discuss whether the Navy should be buying large, or small, aircraft carriers, there is no way we could have had a rational discussion. They all had their minds made up. They all knew what was best one way or the other.

Instead, we took up the case study of the USS *Wampanoag.* It was the first ship the Navy ever built, from the keel up, with steam propulsion. It came off the ways in 1865. At the end of a year of experimenting with it, the Navy appointed a board of admirals and captains to review what to do with it. They decided to decommission it. Why? *Wampanoag* could go half again as fast as any other warship afloat. It didn't have to worry about which direction the wind was coming from. It had tremendous tactical advantages, but the board said that it would make the sailors turn soft if they didn't have to climb rigging and face the rigors of being seamen. The Navy did decommission the ship and it was 30 years before they found another ship of equal capabilities. The students could discuss the rationality or irrationality of admirals and captains in 1865, but they wouldn't grapple with a management decision on buying big or small carriers, at least not very sensibly.

The United States Steam Sloop of War *Wampanoag*[1]

In the operations course we talked about trench warfare in World War I. Why did General Alexander Haig keep sending the troops over the top and grinding them up? Because he was convinced that just one more effort would do it. Never could we have gotten students to talk about why continuous bombing in Vietnam was not producing much results, but grinding up men, people, and machines.

You must, I think, concentrate in war colleges on the historical. But you also need to detach officers in these case studies from the subjects they think they know and on which they have strong biases.

The style of conducting case-study teaching, though, is also very important. Unfortunately our war colleges have generally settled on lectures. Lectures, any educator will tell you, are the least efficient form of education. That is especially the case when you draw most of your lecturers from the Pentagon because of the positions they hold, not because of their academic knowledge or their skill at lecturing. People who come from the Pentagon to lecture at war colleges can't stick to your curriculum. They inevitably tell you what is on their desk today.

Instead of lecturing, the best teaching technique is reading, absorbing it yourself, being forced to think it through. You are particularly forced to think it through if you are also required to do some writing about the reading that you are doing. I would suggest, though, that should not be a big thesis or research paper over eight or nine months. Rather, lots of small pieces of writing are what is needed so that they can be critiqued as the student goes along. The student is forced on a regular basis to bring his thoughts together logically and express them clearly.

If you try to do one big paper, you may find at the end of eight months that the student is over his head. That will very likely be the case, in my opinion, because most officers at forty are not really skilled at academic research anymore.

Finally, another way to test an officer's ability to take the material he has read and turn it into logical conclusions is to have seminar discussions. These should be small seminars, but, hopefully, ones which are closely structured around a curriculum––around these case studies so that they don't degenerate just into bull sessions between officers.

So, reading, writing, and discussions are the ways I believe it is best to educate officers in a war

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[1] Etching by courtesy of the Beverly R. Robinson Collection, U.S. Naval Academy Museum.

college. We should do it around case studies of policy, management, and operations.

Lastly, examinations are an essential part of any educational experience, be it in the military or in civilian life. Examinations are the opportunity for the officer in a war college to bring together all of the lessons he has had in a particular course. You can't take case study 1, and when you have finished it just drop it. You must require the student to carry all the case studies along and at some point ask himself what lessons he learned from these various historical experiences he has studied. An examination is the way to do that, and we should not cheat our officers out of that normal academic experience.

To wrap up, I believe if you want to infuse strategic thinking into the officer corps, you don't do it by creating a course that says these are the four current strategic theories, such as the maritime strategy. You want to make the student understand that strategy is resource allocation. Strategy is not big, broad theorems like Clausewitz' Dictum that war is a continuation of diplomacy by other means. That is a nice truism, but the strategy of the United States is not what a president says. It is what a president does with the resources available to this country. Where does he put our money? Where does he put our armed forces? Where does he put his time and energy and that of his cabinet? That is what our strategy is.

Strategy is allocating resources, and you teach students to think strategy by having them go through case studies where they allocate resources in the fields of policy, management, and operations. That kind of experience will prepare them when they rise to levels where they actually have to make decisions for our country in those areas. Do it in practice with case studies at the war college level.

How do you infuse joint thinking? I think you do it exactly the same way. The case studies in each of these three areas can just as well be inter-service as intra-service. The Peloponnesian wars were not a naval campaign. The navy was part of it because Athens was a sea power, but the real emphasis was on the land campaigns. It is the same with the trench warfare in World War I and other case studies in the area of policy. With the management case studies they don't have to be in how the Navy prepares or procures equipment and such. They can be inter-service procurement. Similarly with operations case studies. They don't have to be only about how a ship captain hunts submarines. They can be about how a theater commander runs his theater from the four-star level. You can induce joint thinking into the kind of a curriculum that I am suggesting without taking it out and making it a different and special block. So I think it is dangerous to impose a set course in joint procedures with a set curriculum on all war colleges, and to have inspectors from the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the Congress to see whether it is being carried out. I think you need to give the war college presidents or commandants the freedom to integrate joint activity and joint considerations into their own curricula.[3]

The objective of the Naval War College is to enhance the capability of officers to make sound decisions in both command and management positions: to prepare our students to meet the challenges they will face in Washington, in command, or in staff positions. This means developing your intellect, encouraging you to reason, to innovate, and to expand your capacity to solve complex military problems. To do this the College will emphasize intellectual development and academic excellence. Your objective should be to improve your reasoning, logic, and analysis, not to memorize data that will soon be outmoded. Don't look for answers on how to conduct antisubmarine warfare or whatever. Search instead for methods of approaching antisubmarine warfare problems. Learn to discern which facts are trivia and which drive the results. Because almost every aspect of our society today has some impact on national security, higher military education cannot substitute prolonged briefings for rigorous intellectual development—scholarship for scholarship's sake is of no importance to us and course content is secondary. It is the development of habits of thinking that counts. The product the country desperately needs is military men and women with the capability of solving complex problems and of executing their decisions.

The Naval War College approaches the study of strategy through historical cases rather than through international relations or political science. Studying historical examples should enable us to view current issues and trends through the broader perspective of the basic elements of strategy. Approaching today's problems through a study of the past is one way to ensure that we do not become trapped within the limits of our own experience. Our concern is not with history as chronology, but with its relevance and application to today and tomorrow. In studying Thucydides' *History of the Peloponnesian War*, what could be more relevant than a war in which a democratic nation sent an expedition overseas to fight on foreign soil and then found that there was little support for this at home? Or a war in which a seapower was in opposition to a nation that was basically a landpower? Are there not lessons still to be learned here?

Every academic institution must periodically review whether it is fulfilling its mission. The issues and problems we face are increasingly complex. Our management study introduces students to the analytical tools, organizations, methodologies, and controversies associated with the allocation of resources to meet defense needs. Whereas strategy traditionally has been the paramount concern of the military and its war colleges, the political and economic realities of today's world dictate that the study of management (defense economics decisionmaking) be a vital part of senior military education. Today, greater sophistication in the fields of management and systems analysis will be required of our top-ranking military men and women. As the competition for limited resources sharpens at home and the potential dangers inherent in a multipolar world become more subtle and less clearly understood by the electorate, the military must be better able to manage effectively those material and human resources entrusted to it. The task has never been easy, but we have adapted to the requirements of change before. We must do so again.[4]

I am a strong believer in the importance and effectiveness of case studies in education. My most important contribution in more than 30 years of government service was revamping the curriculum of the Naval War College to use case studies. War colleges are mid-career education intended to broaden an officer who is already specialized in some area of warfare and first, introduce him to areas of his profession he has not yet experienced, and second, introduce him to uncertainty in contrast to operational experience. What could be better than case studies? Case studies draw on the experiences of others in a variety of areas and enable the individual to recognize how uncertainty pervades most decisions above the tactical level in national security.

Since leaving government service I used case studies in teaching in other ways. First, in writing a book on terrorism. After 444 days of frustration with terrorism in Iran, I decided to explore what could have been done better. I looked at the history of terrorism vs. the United States. What had other presidents done? I found first, that more presidents—and further back than I had expected––had had to deal with terrorism, and second, I found that democracy had a great impact. And why did I choose case studies? In that way we could best learn what future presidents may do. So I studied eight presidents from Washington to Reagan who had serious problems with hostage-taking, and did eight case studies. My conclusion was that though there are a lot of recourses in theory, presidents are lucky if they find one that is applicable to their situation, and therefore presidents need to study them all to ensure that they have not overlooked the best one, and should not believe in *a priori* rules.

A second way I used case studies was in teaching. For example, in teaching leadership I used several cases from my own experience to stimulate debate. This is more interesting than the theoretical—it gets students arguing.[5]

The Naval War College course applies the lessons of history to the issues of today in order to deepen the students' grasp of the motivating forces in international relations and strategic competition. It should be noted that the curricular changes instituted at the War College were undertaken not to immure our students from the current scene but,

by concentrating their efforts here, to better enable them to deal with it—in their relations with our sister services, with the political and bureaucratic arenas, and with the broader worlds of the press, of industry, and of society at large on which, in the last analysis, we depend entirely. The pressures to introduce specific material at the expense of material designed to develop critical reasoning faculties are unceasing. Almost every day someone comes by with a new idea of what has been left out of the curriculum. Most of these ideas relate to items that are high on lists of contemporary concerns. We do not have the time, however, both to treat in depth issues of current interest and to conduct courses aimed at enhancing defense problem-solving and decisionmaking.

At the Naval War College, the pendulum swings over the years between, on one hand, the theoretical, the historical, and the educational, but on the other hand, the practical, the contemporary, and the training. Another is the dichotomy between those periods of concentration, almost exclusively, on broad strategy—the periods of Luce and Mahan—and the periods on concentration on tactics—in the 1920s and '30s. Albeit there were periods off and on during those times when logistics or management, or whatever one calls it, was conspicuously interwoven. There appears the dichotomy again between whether this program should be a rather highly structured academic routine or whether it should be a broad exposure with a great opportunity for freedom to reflect and digest. Today's course comes down four-square on the side of education, not training—a balance of strategy, management, and tactics, one basic course for both colleges and a structured, ordered routine.

These points have been debated frequently and strongly in the past. In January 1919, when Admiral William Sims wrote to the secretary of the navy requesting to return as president of the Naval War College, Admiral Sims stated that he would operate the school solely as a post-graduate course causing officers to educate themselves "in many lines which routine duties at sea prevent." The Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral W. S. Benson, endorsed the request as follows: "I fully concur in the principle advocated, and the recommended action as outlined by Admiral Sims. The War

College may indeed be looked upon in the light of a university where officers are prepared for professional work, and not the professional office from which the applied knowledge comes to the service in the form of concrete work." I like to feel that our current program reflects this philosophy.[6]

II. The Naval War College: A Center for Strategic Thought. The Naval War College has––traditionally and historically—been a source of new concepts within the Navy. Its role in times of change or transition is absolutely vital. In an era of growing responsibilities and diminishing resources it is imperative for the Naval War College to be a dynamic, responsive, innovative center of creative scholarship and thought. I am also seeking, in every way, to encourage an atmosphere of academic freedom here at the Naval War College. True scholarship cannot exist in an ivory tower and to equip our students for effective performance in any future environment, we must expose them to the challenge of controversy, the rigor of opposing views, and the needs of a changing society. The Naval War College must continue to be an exciting place for students and professors alike, and to keep it that way we must adapt to the changing demands of our society and our profession. I am determined that our scholarly undertakings will provide the stimulus for innovative ideas and perceptive insights. There may be another Alfred Thayer Mahan in this year's class or the next. We cannot afford to miss him.[7]

Higher military education is under scrutiny today. We stand ready to defend the need for this college on the grounds of professional education for our profession alone, but it also has a more far-ranging justification. This is the need for a center of thinking on maritime matters. If we are indeed a profession and if the Navy has a long-term importance to our country, somewhere, someplace, some people must escape the standard stereotypes and think deeply about the purposes, trends, and future of that Navy. It is difficult to do this in the atmosphere of daily pressures in Washington. Newport is the ideal in many respects by being close yet distant from the day-to-day realities of

running the Navy. We need, then, to develop a true university atmosphere here in Newport, one in which, in addition to the teaching that is accomplished, there is a place for research, lectures, symposia, and visiting scholars and military commanders, all to the end of promoting a certain intellectual vigor and stimulus.

We have increased the dialogue between the War College and civilian academic institutions through the visits of lecturers and panelists who are teaching members of other universities and colleges; through establishing exchanges and working cooperation with a number of universities, especially, of course, our New England neighbors. The benefit of these efforts to the Navy and the War College itself is in the flow of educational ideas they provide, the added intellectual stimulus, and the establishment of communication links with young men and women in academic life.

On August 24, 1972, the Naval War College opened with a formal Convocation ceremony held on the lawn in front of Luce Hall. For this occasion those members of the faculty and staff who held master's degrees or PhDs marched in their academic gowns and hoods. Those who were also military officers wore uniforms with the gowns. Thus, the Convocation was intended to signify the blending of military and academic endeavor and purpose in this War College.[8]

The renewed emphasis on naval matters in our course raised some questions as to whether the Naval War College is appropriate for the other services, State Department, CIA, and other civilian agencies. The emphasis on decisionmaking, not current data, does make the Naval War College curriculum applicable to all facets of the government. One trimester—Tactics—does concentrate on the employment of naval power. For students not in the Navy or the Marine Corps this course offers the opportunity to acquire a depth of knowledge about a national security mission which should stand them in good stead. All agencies represented here need some analysts and managers who have more than a superficial understanding of the utility and employment procedures associated with naval missions. I hope that these agencies would consider it advantageous

to ensure that some of their staff members and managers were so skilled, not only in naval matters, but also in the field of ground combat and land-based tactical air employment.[9]

III. To Naval War College Graduates: From the Commencement Address, June 17, 1994.

In looking back on the course, the curriculum at the Naval War College has changed little as a result of the end of the Cold War because it was geared to the long run, not your next assignment. To the day when your taking a longer-term, broader view of where our profession is going may make a real difference. To me this is particularly warming because a whole group of us, some twenty years ago, did something which you still find useful. And, I emphasize that it was a group because, if I deserve any credit, it was for being a catalyst amongst a large number of very dedicated and capable people.

Four individuals were very important to the success of the program that we brought in 1972. The first was Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, the Chief of Naval Operations. Admiral Zumwalt called me in January 1972 and said that on the first of July I would be coming here to Newport. I said to him, "I don't think you should do that, sir, because I think the curriculum needs a lot of revision, and if I turn it upside down, you'll get a lot of criticism." We did put in an entirely new curriculum, and he did get a lot of criticism and complaints. A former secretary of state signed a petition condemning the fact that we had abolished international law week at the Naval War College. But Admiral Zumwalt, magnificent leader that he is, never once called me up and said, "What are you doing up there?" Never once sent us documents and letters and said, "Prepare a reply for this complaint that I have received." He shielded me from that and thereby from having the course picked apart piece by piece.

A few weeks after I met with Admiral Zumwalt and he announced my forthcoming appointment at a Washington cocktail party, I chanced across a long-term friend, Dr. William Emmerson. I said, "Bill, don't I recall that you spent a year at the Naval War College as a visiting professor from Yale?" He said, "Yes." I said, "Did you enjoy it?" He said, "Not much." I said, "What do I do?" He

said, "You teach Thucydides." I said, "What's a Thucydides?" For the next five months between that meeting and my coming here, Bill Emmerson and a small group of people he and I brought together, working weekends and nights, all voluntarily, wrote the new curriculum. It was Bill's inspiration to make it reading and writing and a lot of thought. And Bill Emmerson is the intellectual father of the Strategy and Policy course in particular. Without him, we never would have got it off the ground as quickly as we did.

One of the people Bill recruited to help write the new curriculum was Professor Philip A. Crowl, head of the History Department at the University of Nebraska. Phil came in from Nebraska, Phil talked to us on the phone, and I very quickly perceived that here was a man of exceptional intellectual depth, exceptional intellectual flexibility, and a man who understood the U.S. military, our profession, our people, our ways of doing business. I asked him early on, "Phil, would you take a semester off from Nebraska and come be the head of the Strategy and Policy Department for its first running?" He said, "Yes." He came and did a magnificent job of getting a whole new faculty, a whole new course running, and the fact that it worked well the first time around I think was very important to its continuation. He virtually never went back to Nebraska, we trapped him here for eight years as the head of the Strategy Department, and he is very much responsible for cementing that jewel in the crown of this college, I believe, the Strategy and Policy course, into place.

And finally, I had the good foresight to ask Captain Hugh D. Nott—we were working together in the Pentagon—to come up with me to be the Chief of Staff. If you can imagine instituting a whole new program with all kinds of new professors on the campus with new reading and book requirements, with money that used to be spent here having to be spent there, this could have been a scene of chaos and confusion, and certainly the students came here expecting a well-run course. Hugh Nott, because in Washington he had participated in the construction of the curriculum, understood what our academic, what our intellectual objectives were, and he always tailored his magnificent skills in administration and management to that end goal of making the course a solid program. Without Hugh, it never would have taken off as it did and, Hugh stayed here five years as the chief of staff, and then retired. He is very responsible for the continuation of this program.

Now I've taken far more time than you allotted to me but, you should remember the Army adage: old generals never die, they just fade away. In our profession, old admirals never die, they just keep on telling sea stories.

Let me conclude with one word to the graduating students. As you get some physical distance between you and the Naval War College, I suggest you look back at the subjects that you studied here, analyze them, and recognize that there are relatively few of them that are going to help you in your next assignment or the assignment after that. They were geared to broaden your mind and make you think in longer terms, to prepare you to be one of those creative thinkers that our government, our military, needs so badly. But please, recognize that in ten months you can only lay a foundation for being a deep and creative long-range thinker. You've got to continue by taking the concepts that you have developed here and discussing them, writing about them, expanding on them, rereading Thucydides and Clausewitz and others. You can't have absorbed Clausewitz in one or two weeks. And, by reading other new materials in your fields, only then can you become the kind of creative thinker that this course was intended to encourage you to be.

Build on the foundation laid here. Strive to develop the breadth and perspective necessary to shape the military establishment in ways that will enable it to meet the needs of the country even better. I congratulate you on graduating; I challenge you to continue.[10]

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Chapter 4: *The Navy*

I. The United States as a Maritime Power.

The United States is essentially a maritime, not a continental, power. The United States is in many ways an island, separated from friends and vital interests by broad expanses of ocean. We cannot permit any nation to exercise exclusive control of the seas, either by threat or fiat. Our peace and the peace of the world depend on the continued ability of all nations to communicate with one another by means of the ocean's pathways, to trade freely, and to develop those economic and cultural interdependencies on which understanding and lasting peace can be built. The great powers of the world have been sea powers and the U.S. Navy is unique in its ability to be an adjunct to diplomacy in peacetime.[1]

II. Navy Missions.

The beginning of a rational approach for designing a Navy is to be sure you know where you're going, what you want to achieve, and what your mission is. If you are going to develop a navy, you first decide how far up the scale of technologies you want or need to go considering the threat you anticipate having to cope with.[2]

One of the important challenges facing naval officers is to define, then articulate, why we need a navy and what it should be able to accomplish for the country. The changes in national attitudes and military technology and the relationship of nations today are such that we cannot accept as sacrosanct the traditional rationale for a navy. We must reexamine and be willing to change the well-established missions of our Navy. In 1970 a new Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, determined that the first undertaking in planning the future U.S. Navy must be a searching reassessment of the Navy's role and *raison d'être*. This introspective inquiry led to the definition of four naval missions areas: Strategic Deterrence, Sea Control, Projection of Power Ashore, and Naval Presence.[3]

"Missions of the U.S. Navy"
Interdependent Naval Missions.
1. Usefulness of Categorizing Navy Missions.

Observers of military affairs will have noted a changed naval lexicon over the past several years. To those accustomed to phrases such as "sea power," "command of the seas," "commerce warfare," and "amphibious warfare," the new terms, "Strategic Deterrence," "Sea Control," and "Presence," may seem to be just a new jargon. Not so. Since 1970 there has been a redefinition of traditional U.S. naval roles and missions. The primary purpose of this redefinition is to force the Navy to think in terms of output rather than input.

INTERDEPENDENT NAVAL MISSIONS

Why must we emphasize output? First, because a nation of concerned free citizens and skeptical taxpayers is naturally more interested in what is harvested than in what is sown. By measuring the value of output in terms of national objectives, the country can rationally decide what resources it should allocate to the Navy. Input categories such as manpower, ships, aircraft, and training are of little help in trying to determine why we need a Navy or, if we do need one, how big it should be and what it should be prepared to do.

Second, focusing on missions helps tactical commanders to keep objectives in mind. Antisubmarine Warfare (ASW) tacticians often over-concentrate on killing submarines when their ultimate objective is to ensure safe maritime operations. An example of a good sense of objectives was the Israeli achievement of air superiority in the 1967 war. Even though air superiority is traditionally thought of as a function of dogfight tactics, the Israelis recognized that shooting the enemy from the air was not the objective. Destroying Egyptian aircraft was. They employed deep surprise attacks on enemy airfields to achieve this objective.

Third, an amorphous mass of men, ships, and weapons is difficult to manage because it is difficult for an individual to visualize. By

subdividing these masses into their expected output, or missions, we are able to establish priorities for allocating resources—to know how much we are spending for different objectives and to judge their consonance with national strategy.

Mission categorization is useful in less abstract decisionmaking also. For instance, we shall propose that the Sea Control mission is executed by tactics of sortie control (barrier operations), chokepoint control, open area operations, and local defense. Different platforms have different utility in each of these tactics. Generally speaking, maritime patrol aircraft are best for open area operations, surface escorts best for local defense, and submarines best for chokepoint operations. Although each of these forces has secondary applications, resource distribution among them will be dictated by our evaluation of which tactics are going to be most important to us.

Categorization of mission tactics can also be used at even more detailed levels of resource allocation. A submarine designed for chokepoint operations should emphasize quietness at the expense of speed; a submarine for local or escort defense needs speed even at the expense of quietness. If we understand this, we will trade off speed versus quietness according to our evaluation of probable employment.

Fourth, an understanding of missions assists in selecting the best among several competing systems. A research program may develop five new air-launched munitions, but we may not be able to afford production of more than three. We shall divide tactical air projection tactics into deep interdiction, battlefield support, close air support, and counter air/antiair warfare. Each of these makes slightly different demands for weapons. While precision is mandatory for deep interdiction, it is critical in close air support. Surely in our mix of three new weapons we will want at least one that stresses accuracy. If this seems obvious, an examination of history will show that the military has sometimes become hypnotized by the weapons needed or used in one particular tactic or mission to the neglect of newly emerging requirements.

Finally, stressing missions helps to ensure that members of the organization focus on the whole rather than on one of its parts. This can help keep vested interests in proper perspective. Even the most professional, well-motivated individual can become so committed to a particular missile system, type of ship or aircraft, or special personnel program that he loses sight of what is best for the whole organization.

2. Evolution of Naval Capabilities and Missions.

How did the Navy come to define the four mission areas as Strategic Deterrence, Sea Control, Projection of Power Ashore, and Naval Presence? It was evolutionary. Navies have not always had each of these missions nor is this likely to be the definitive list of naval missions.

The first and only mission of the earliest navies was Sea Control. A classic example of the importance of being able to move military forces by sea is the Battle of Salamis in 480 B.C. The Persian armies had pushed the Greeks to the wall. The Athenian admiral Themistocles turned the tables by soundly defeating the Persian fleet at Salamis. Cut off from reinforcement and resupply, the Persians left Athens and Attica.

A few decades later, in the Peloponnesian Wars, Athenian Sea Control repeatedly permitted outflanking the land-based Spartan campaign. In the Punic Wars, Rome's exercise of Sea Control prevented the Carthaginians from being able to support Hannibal. And so it went. There were many technological milestones, new tactical concepts, and maritime initiatives, but the basic mission of navies was to ensure the safe movement of ground forces and their supplies across the sea.

In time, trade routes flourished, exploration became more far-ranging, the horizons of imperialism widened, commerce grew, and with it, piracy. Nations began to demand security for their endeavors. Broad command of the sea became the *sine qua non* of economic growth and well-being. The nature of Sea Control evolved to include the protection of shipping for the nation's economy as well as its overseas military expeditions. By the same token, denial of an enemy's use of the seas for commerce as well as military purposes became an important element of warfare—blockade hurt economies and warmaking potential.

By the early 19th century, another important naval mission had evolved—the projection of

ground forces from the sea onto the land. While there are many examples of landing operations throughout military history, amphibious warfare in the modern sense began during the wars of the French Revolution. Examples are the British amphibious assault operations at the Helder (1799) and Aboukir (1801). Ground troops traditionally transported by sea to some staging area began to use sea platforms as combat springboards. A new dimension in tactics was given to commanders in the Projection of Power Ashore through amphibious assault. This also extended the traditional Sea Control mission. In addition to protecting supply reinforcement and economic shipping, navies now had to protect the amphibious assault force.

Also during the 19th century the term "gunboat diplomacy" came into the naval vocabulary. In the quest for colonies, nations paraded their naval forces to intimidate sheiks and pashas and to serve warning on one another. In time the range of this activity extended from warning and coercion to demonstrations of good will. It has come to be known as the Naval Presence mission. Sea Control, Projection of Power Ashore by amphibious means, and Naval Presence were the missions of navies through the end of World War II.

During that war, naval tactical air was used primarily in the Sea Control mission (e.g., Midway, Coral Sea, and the Battle of the Atlantic) and secondarily in direct support of the amphibious assault mission. When the war ended, however, there was no potential challenger to U.S. Sea Control. In essence, the U.S. Navy had too much of a monopoly to justify a continuing Sea Control mission. It was a Navy in quest of new missions. Two arose.

The innovation in missions came from the final stages of World War II, when naval tactical airpower played a role in the bombing of the Japanese home islands. Postwar improvements in aircraft and munitions made it logical to extend this use of naval airpower. In a sense, the tactical air projection mission was born. The Navy staked out its claim to the use of airpower in support of land campaigns: strategic air attack on enemy industry, transportation, and cities; air superiority over the battlefield; and close air support of ground

forces. Its value was demonstrated early in the Korean campaign, where there were few alternative means of providing air support ashore.

The second innovation in naval missions came with the introduction of Strategic Deterrence as a national military requirement. The combination of improved aircraft performance and smaller packaging of nuclear weapons made the aircraft carrier capable of contributing to this new mission. With the Navy struggling to readjust its missions to peacetime needs, and the U.S. Air Force establishing its own place in the military family, it is understandable that there was a sense of competition for this new role. However, by the mid-1960s, the development of the Polaris submarine eliminated any question of appropriateness of this mission for the Navy.

At about the same time, the dramatic and determined growth of the Soviet naval challenge caused mission priorities to begin to shift and brought about a resurgence of traditional Sea Control requirements. The balance of naval resources and attention devoted to each of these four missions—Strategic Deterrence, Sea Control, Projection of Power Ashore, and Naval Presence— is especially difficult, because of their complex interdependence and because almost all naval forces have multi-mission capabilities.

The distinction between the four missions is primarily one of purpose. Despite these inevitable overlaps and interdependence, we can understand the Navy far better if we carefully examine each mission individually. We must know what each mission's objectives are so that we do not overlook some useful new tactic or weapon and so that we can strike the proper balance whenever these missions compete for resources.

3. Definition of Naval Missions and Discussion of Their Forces and Tactics.

1. Strategic Deterrence Mission. Our Strategic Deterrence objectives:

—To deter all-out attack on the U.S. or its allies;

—To face any potential aggressor contemplating less

than all-out attack with unacceptable risks; and

—To maintain a stable political environment within which the threat of aggression or coercion against the United States or its allies is minimized.

In support of these national objectives, we have three principal military "tactics" or force-preparedness objectives. The first is to maintain an *assured second-strike* capability, in the hope of deterring an all-out strategic nuclear attack on the United States. A second tactic is to design our forces to ensure that the United States is not placed in an unacceptable position by a partial nuclear attack; that is, a *controlled response* option. A third objective is to *deter third powers* from attacking the United States with nuclear weapons.

Finally, we maintain a quantity and quality of strategic forces which will not let us appear to be at a disadvantage to any other power. If we were to allow the opinion to develop that [any other country's] strategic position is markedly superior to ours, we would find that political decisions were being adversely influenced. Thus we must always keep in mind the *balance-of-power image* that our forces portray. In part, this image affects what and how much we buy for Strategic Deterrence. In part, it affects how we talk about our comparative strength and how we criticize ourselves.

In summary, the Strategic Deterrence mission is subdivided into four tactics: assured second strike, controlled response, deter third powers, and balance-of-power image.

2. Sea Control Mission. The term "Sea Control" derives from the traditional phrase "control of the sea." This change in terminology may seem minor, but it is a deliberate attempt to acknowledge the limitations on ocean control

brought about by the development of the submarine and the airplane.

In the 18th and 19th centuries, we passed through a period of maritime history in which full regulation of the seas in wartime was the ambition of Great Britain. Initially, this could be accomplished through possession of a superior sailing fleet. The enemy's harbors were closely watched by patrolling cutters and frigates. Ships of the line were called forth to defeat the enemy or at least to force him back into port whenever he dared to sortie. Later, when steam propulsion afforded ships greater mobility, the British found that they needed both coaling stations and control of vital chokepoints around the world. The intention was still to be able to move a superior fleet into position for a showdown engagement before an enemy had the opportunity to use the seas for his advantage. The term "control of the sea," as used by Mahan, meant both denying use of the seas to the enemy and asserting one's own use.

British and German naval strategies in World War I reflected this heritage. Both navies believed that a decisive encounter of their battle fleets would determine control of the seas. Hence caution dominated the tactics of Jutland. Germany challenged British reliance on a superior battle fleet first by employing surface-ship commerce raiders, then by unrestricted submarine warfare. The British reacted by attempting to blockade the German U-boats with mines laid across the exit to the North Sea. It failed. Few naval strategists understood how radically the concept of "control of the seas" was altered by the advent of the submarine. British, German, Japanese, and American preparations for World War II all concentrated on potential battle fleet actions. Only a few voices pointed out that an additional submarine might be more useful than another battleship or two.

Equally few strategists forecast the dominant role that control of the air over a surface fleet would have. However, in March 1941, off Cape Matapan in Greece, the first engagement of major surface forces since Jutland demonstrated that it was the presence of a British aircraft carrier that allowed an otherwise weaker force to prevail. By the end of World War II the idea of totally denying the seas to one's enemy while asserting one's own exclusive use had been overtaken by technology. On one hand it was nearly impossible to deny an enemy submarine fleet access to the seas; on the other, there were likely to be areas of the sea where enemy airpower would make the assertion of one's presence prohibitively costly. Yet, for the first several decades after the World War II, the U.S.

Navy had such a monopoly on seapower that the term "control of the seas" understandably continued to carry its long-established connotation.

The new term "Sea Control" is intended to connote more realistic control in limited areas and for limited periods of time. It is conceivable today to temporarily exert air, submarine, and surface control in an area while moving ships into position to project power ashore or to resupply overseas forces. It is no longer conceivable, except in the most limited sense, to totally control the seas for one's own use or to deny them totally to an enemy.

This may change with evolving technology and tactics but, in the meantime, we must approach the use of the term "Sea Control" from two directions: *denying* an enemy the right to use some seas at some times, and *asserting* our own right to use some seas at some times. Any seapower may assert its own right to use the seas and deny that right to the enemy at any given time. Its efforts will usually be divided between the two objectives. For instance, if the United States were attempting in wartime to use the North Atlantic to reinforce Europe, the greater percentage of its effort would be on asserting Sea Control. In a situation like the Vietnam War, we operated on the other extreme, since our use of the seas was not challenged, but we did make a substantial effort to deny the other side access to Haiphong. An opponent, of course, will usually respond with countering objectives and tactics.

Four U.S. national objectives which call for asserting our use of the sea and, by the same token, denial of them to an opponent are: to ensure industrial supplies; to reinforce/resupply military forces engaged overseas; to provide wartime economic/military supplies to allies; and to provide safety for naval forces in the Projection of Power Ashore role. There are four tactical approaches for achieving these Sea Control objectives:

1. Sortie Control. Bottling up an opponent in his ports or in his bases can still be attempted. As opposed to the 18th and 19th century tactic of forcing major fleet engagement at sea, today's blockade seeks destruction of individual units as they sortie. If we assume an opponent will be in control of the air near his ports, sortie control tactics must primarily depend on submarines and mines. If successful, *sortie control* is a most economical means of cutting off a nation's use of the seas or ability to interfere. Nevertheless, such established techniques have their disadvantages. No blockade is 100 percent successful. Some units may be beyond the blockade when hostilities commence and will remain to haunt opposition forces. Against the enemy's aircraft there is no static defense. Planes must be bombed at their bases. Thus we must conclude that blockades are weapons of attrition, requiring time to be effective. But the lesson of history is perhaps the most instructive of all—ingenious man has usually found ways to circumvent blockades.

2. Chokepoint Control. Sometimes the best place to engage the enemy is in a geographical bottleneck through which he must pass. In so doing, platforms like ASW aircraft that probably could not survive in the area of the enemy's sortie point can be used. This also requires patience. For those enemy forces that have cleared sortie and chokepoint operations, there are two remaining tactics for dealing with them.

3. Open Area Operations. Once the enemy is loose at sea or in the air, surveillance and search systems can assist in locating and putting him at bay. Aircraft are perhaps the most appropriate platform, because of high search rates. Here again, though, time and patience are required.

4. Local Defense (Engagement). In contrast to searching out a large area, we can let the enemy come to us. If we are asserting our use of the seas, this means that his attacking aircraft, ships, or submarines must close our forces to within weapon-release range. This enables us to concentrate our defensive forces around the units to be protected. Defensive forces may consist of surface escorts, submarines, and whatever aircraft can be brought to the scene—maritime or ASW patrol, fighter, or attack. These forces may attempt to destroy the enemy's launching platform prior to weapon release or may attempt to deflect or destroy the attacking weapons themselves. If we are denying use of the seas to someone else, local engagement amounts to positioning forces in a limited region and then preying upon the enemy.

The weapons employed in these four tactics are numerous, their selection depending on timing and

the situation. The same weapon may be used to assert our control or to deny control to an opponent. This multi-mission character of many weapons systems often causes misunderstanding of the boundary between Sea Control and the other naval missions. In executing Sea Control tactics, two passive techniques deserve particular mention:

—*Deception.* Assertive Sea Control objectives do not necessarily demand destruction of the enemy's force. If the enemy can be sufficiently deceived to frustrate his ability to press an attack, we will have achieved our Sea Control objective. Force routing, deceptive/imitative devices, and other anti-search techniques can be employed, often in combination with other tactics.

—*Intimidation.* The perceptions of other nations of our Sea Control capability relative to that of other major powers can influence political and military decisions. What any nation says about its capabilities influences the challenges that are offered or accepted.

In summary, Sea Control tactics include sortie control, chokepoint control, open area operations, local defense (engagement), deception, and intimidation.

3. Projection of Power Ashore Missions. Sea Control is concerned with what happens on, under, and over the ocean surface. Projection of Power Ashore is concerned with the impact of naval forces on land forces and can be divided into three

categories: amphibious assault, naval bombardment, and tactical air.

1. Amphibious Assault Projection. Ships have long been used to transport military power to conflict areas. As noted earlier, assault from the sea in the face of opposition began to develop as a naval mission in the early 19th century. The calamitous assault at Gallipoli in 1915 and subsequent failure to distinguish poor execution from good strategy lowered enthusiasm for this mission. However, World War II and the Korean conflict testified to its continuing importance.

Amphibious assaults are opposed landings on hostile territory and have four objectives:

—To secure territory from which a land campaign can be launched and supported. We do this by assault from the sea in several circumstances. One is when there is no other practical approach; that is, the enemy territory is a geographical or political island. Another is when we want to outflank and surprise the enemy. The Okinawa and the Normandy landings in World War II are examples. The purpose of the assault on Okinawa was to secure a base from which to launch the invasion of Japan. In Normandy the assault launched the attack into the heartland of Germany.

—To secure land area from which an air operation can be launched and supported. One of the costliest amphibious assaults during World War II was launched against Iwo Jima to gain a site from which the Air Force could strike Japan.

—To secure selected territory or facilities to prevent enemy use of them. The first offensive action of World War II in the Pacific was the capture of Guadalcanal to deny the Japanese the airfield facilities from which they could interdict U.S. supply routes between Pearl Harbor and Australia.

—To destroy enemy facilities, interrupt his communications, divert his effort, et cetera, by means of amphibious raids with planned withdrawal.

There are many specific ways in which amphibious assault forces can be tailored to the particular requirements at hand. Obviously the landing force must be adequate in size to handle the tasks assigned ashore. As the size of an assault increases, there are two factors that scale upward more than proportionally to the number of troops to be landed. One is the number of specialized units that are required such as command, control, and communications ships or facilities; minesweeping capability; and aircraft and gunfire support. The other factor is the time to assemble, sail, prepare the landing area, and assault. The larger the operation the more complex it becomes with attendant delays and risks of enemy advance defensive preparations.

Finally, when little or no opposition is encountered, such as in Lebanon in 1958, amphibious forces can be landed "administratively." They can then be employed as regular ground forces if supported. Administrative landings are considered amphibious operations only when the unique over-the-beach capability of amphibious force is an essential element.

2. Naval Bombardment. Although most commonly associated with amphibious assault, bombardment can have three separate objectives:

—To provide direct support to troops operating near a coastline.

—To interdict movements along a coastline.

—To harass military or civil operations in coastal areas.

Bombardment has been available from naval guns in destroyers and cruisers. There are two tactics: either direct or indirect fire control can be employed, depending on the distance of the ship and target from shore. Targets can be prearranged geographically, called by observers on the beach, or selected visually from a ship or aircraft. The accuracy of fire can be spotted from on board ship, from ashore, or from an aircraft. In time, even conventionally armed missiles may also be employed in this role.

3. Tactical Air Projection. Tactical airpower is used to achieve three objectives:

—Destroy portions of the enemy's warmaking potential.

—Provide support to a ground campaign directly or by interdicting enemy support to the engaged areas.

—Deny an enemy these same options against us.

There are four basic tactics by which these objectives are achieved: *deep interdiction, battlefield interdiction, close air support, and counterair/antiair warfare.*

—*Deep Interdiction.* Attacks conducted to destroy, neutralize, or impair the enemy's military potential before it can be directed against friendly forces are *deep interdiction.* Targets assigned may be military or civilian, remote from the battle area, and perhaps more strategic than tactical. To prevent the enemy from moving forces and material under the protective cover of darkness or

adverse weather, an all-weather attack capability is important.

—*Battlefield Interdiction.* Sometimes referred to as Direct Air Support (DAS), *battlefield interdiction* differs from deep interdiction in two ways: targets are usually military and of immediate tactical importance, and airspace control must be closely coordinated with frontline support operations. Sustained battlefield interdiction can restrict the enemy's capability to move supplies/reinforcements or maneuver his forces.

—*Close Air Support.* Providing direct support to frontline ground forces, *close air support* is generally exercised in a similar manner as call-fire support from field artillery. Therefore, very close coordination with gunfire support elements is necessary.

—*Counterair/Antiair Warfare.* In order to conduct the three types of airstrike operations, *counterair* forces are employed to neutralize the enemy's air capabilities to minimize expected attrition of our forces. The threat over enemy territory may be surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), antiaircraft guns (AAA), or fighter interceptor aircraft. Counters to these range from attack on enemy airbases or weapons sites to direct protection with our fighters or electronic countermeasures. When the situation is reversed and an opponent is projecting his airpower over our territory, antiair warfare operations come into play. Fighters, SAMs, and AAA are employed to exact attrition on enemy aircraft.

All of these tactical air projection tactics are carried out by attack aircraft supported as feasible and necessary by fighter-interceptor air-superiority forces. One of the values of categorizing air projection missions is to identify the aircraft and weapon characteristics and tactics best suited to each mission. [For instance, high-speed aircraft and long-range weapons are well suited to interdiction but not to close air support.] There will be specific scenarios where any judgmental tabulation will be incorrect. It would be desirable to be infinitely flexible and have maximum characteristics in all aircraft and weapons. Unfortunately, the laws of both physics and economics prevent that. Hence, some evaluation of probable use and likely need can be valuable.

Before leaving the projection mission, we would note that only a fine distinction separates some aspects of the Sea Control and Projection of Power Ashore missions. Many weapons and platforms are used in both missions. Amphibious assaults on chokepoints or tactical airstrikes on enemy air bases can be employed as a part of the Sea Control mission. Sea-based tactical aircraft are used in Sea Control missions for antiair warfare and against enemy surface combatants. The distinction in these cases is not in the type of forces nor the tactics which are employed, but in the purpose of the operation. Is the objective to secure or deny use of the seas, or is it to directly support the land campaign? For instance, much of the layman's confusion over aircraft carriers use stems from the impression that they are employed exclusively in the Projection of Power Ashore role. Actually, from the Battle of Cape Matapan through World War II, aircraft carriers were used almost exclusively to establish control of the ocean's surface. Today they clearly have a vital role to play in both the Sea Control and Projection of Power missions.

In summary, Projection of Power Ashore tactics are:

—Amphibious Assault: marine amphibious force, marine amphibious brigade, marine amphibious unit, and raid.

—Naval Bombardment: direct and indirect.

—Tactical Air: deep interdiction; battlefield interdiction, close air support, and counterair/antiair.

4. Naval Presence Mission. Simply stated, the Naval Presence mission is the use of naval forces, short of war, to achieve political objectives. The use of presence forces is for two broad objectives:

—To deter actions inimical to the interests of the United States or its allies.

—To encourage actions that are in the interests of the United States or its allies.

We attempt to accomplish these objectives with two tactics: *preventive deployments* and *reactive*

deployments. The key difference is whether we initiate a show of presence in peacetime (preventive) or whether we are responding to a crisis (reactive). In a preventive deployment our force capabilities should be relevant to the kind of problems which might arise; clearly they cannot be markedly inferior to some other naval force in the neighborhood, but they can rely to some extent on the prospect that reinforcements can be made available if necessary. On the other hand, in a reactive deployment any force deployed needs to possess an immediately credible threat and be prepared to have its bluff called. If another seapower is in the area, a comparison of forces will be inevitable.

In deciding to insert a presence force, we must consider what size and composition of force is appropriate to the situation. There are basically five actions with which a Naval Presence force can threaten another nation: amphibious assault, air attack, bombardment, blockade, and exposure through reconnaissance.

In addition, almost any size and type of presence force can imply that the United States is concerned with the situation and may decide to bring other military forces to bear as well.

All too often, especially in reactive deployments, we tend to send the largest and most powerful force that can move to the scene rapidly. The image created may not be appropriate to the specific problem. For instance, the threat of major air attack on a small oil sheikdom would not be credible, but the threat of an amphibious assault on the capital might be, or, sailing a major fleet to show support for a small government threatened with insurrection might be more unsettling than stabilizing, perhaps prompting overreaction.

When selecting a *Naval Presence* force, we must also take into account how the countries that we want to influence will perceive the situation. There are three distinctly different categories of national perceptions:

—*[Major Opponents]*. When contemplating a U.S. presence force, [opponents] must assess their comparative naval strength available over time and the expected degree of U.S. resolve. Their principal strength comparison would probably be on which country can exercise Sea Control in the

area in question, since the United States is not likely to pose a threat of projecting power directly against [a major opponent], except in a worldwide crisis of the most serious proportions.

—*Nations Allied to [Major Opponents]*. Nations with close ties to [a major opponent] must assess relative capabilities in the particular circumstances. These powers will be asking the questions, "Can the United States project its assembled power onto my shores?" and "Can the [opponent] deny them that capability?" Thus third-nation appraisal of relative Sea Control strengths may be the most critical factor. We should note, however, that third-power assessments may not correspond to the assessments either we or our [opponents] would make of identical military factors.

—*Unaligned Third Nations*. There will be cases where a nation is not able to invoke major-power support in a dispute with the United States. The perceptions of such a country would likely focus on U.S. capability and will to project its power ashore to influence events in that country itself.

Thus, the Naval Presence mission is simultaneously as sophisticated and sensitive as any, but also probably the least understood of all Navy missions. A well-orchestrated Naval Presence can be enormously useful in complementing diplomatic actions to achieve political objectives. Applied deftly but firmly, in precisely the proper force, Naval Presence can be a persuasive deterrent to war. If used ineptly, it can be disastrous. Thus, in determining presence objectives, scaling forces, and appraising perceptions, there will never be a weapons system as important as the human intellect.

In summary, the tactics of the Naval Presence mission are preventive deployments and reactive deployments.

4. Current and Future Issues Involving Naval Missions Areas.

The United States, as we have seen, has performed the four basic naval missions for many years. Yet the dynamic nature of world conditions demands a continuing reassessment of the relation of one mission to another and the comparative emphasis on their individual tactics. National priorities change; the nature of the threat changes. Only by understanding the complex interdependence between naval missions and their elements can we expect to be able to allocate resources wisely and prepare for the future rather than the past.

Some key issues which must be addressed are:

1. Intra-mission Issues.

1. Strategic Deterrence. Can we maintain our *balance-of-power image* and accent *controlled response* without appearing to be developing a first-strike capability?

2. Sea Control. Will probable scenarios allow time for attrition tactics? Can *local engagement* forces be made more effective? Should future SSNs [attack nuclear submarines] be designed for employment in barriers (attrition), or as escorts (local engagement)?

3. Projection of Power Ashore.

—*Amphibious Assault*. What size assault force is most likely to be needed? Should we design lift forces and tactics differently for different-size assaults?

—*Naval Bombardment*. Should vanishing 6-inch and 8-inch guns be replaced? Is there a place for bombardment by nonnuclear missiles?

—*Tactical Air*. How much high-performance capability is needed—or can we afford—for deep interdiction? What tactical application could vertical-and-short-takeoff-and-landing aircraft best fulfill? In what ways are electronic warfare requirements influenced by the different tactics?

4. Naval Presence. Are there different operating policies that would yield a greater presence capability?

2. Inter-mission Issues.

1. Strategic Deterrence vs. General-Purpose Forces. How much of the Navy's resources belongs in Strategic Deterrence? Should sea-based missiles be favored over the other elements of the SSBN/ICBM/bomber triad[*] and assume a greater role in Strategic Deterrence?

2. Sea Control vs. Projection of Power. Does the increased size of [an opponent's] Navy signal the end of our freedom to project power from sea sanctuaries and justify shifting more resources into Sea Control? Do our experiences such as in

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[*] SSBN: ballistic missile submarine;
ICBM: Intercontinental ballistic missile.

Vietnam diminish the probability of future force projection wars? Are "low-mix"[*] Sea Control forces incompatible with the Projection of Power?

3. Presence vs. Combative Missions. Is the Presence mission becoming sufficiently important to warrant building or designing forces for that purpose?

Obviously we cannot resolve these issues of inter-mission priority in a vacuum. We must consider both what our national political objectives are and what any potential opponent is doing.

There will always be this constant flow and counterflow of mission emphasis and tactical adaptation. Perhaps it is even more accentuated today than in the past. On one hand, the pace of technological innovation is forcing this. On the other, the changing nature of world political relationships demands a continual updating of naval capabilities to support national policy. Naval officers, as professionals, must understand the Navy's missions, continually question their rationale, and provide the intellectual basis for keeping them relevant and responsive to the nation's needs. Unless we do, we will be left behind, attempting to use yesterday's tools to achieve today's objectives.[4] —"Missions of the U.S. Navy," *Naval War College Review*, March–April 1974.

Sea Control. Sea control is the most fundamental mission of the Navy, because the country cannot thrive in peacetime without it and cannot fight overseas in wartime in any sustained way without it—and no other military service can perform it. Twice in the 20th century, in World Wars I and II, the vital security of the United States was challenged by the potential loss of Europe to hostile forces. Our ability to maintain control of the North Atlantic sealanes against a formidable and determined German U-boat threat permitted us to resupply our European Allies and to move our

own forces and supplies to the battle zones. The Allied victory in the Battle of the Atlantic was decisive in our ability to turn back the tide of aggression on the continent of Europe. Even if the challenge is not great at a particular time, the core mission of any navy will always be sea control.[5]

Presence (Deterrence). "Presence" is the orchestrated use of naval forces below the level of hostility in support of foreign policy. Naval presence tasks range from informal ship visits intended to maintain ties with an ally and formal ship visits to cement a burgeoning friendship, to a menacing patrol just outside a nation's water.

Naval presence takes many different forms for many different purposes. It can be used to deter an adversary from taking a particular action, to bolster the resolve of an ally, to influence an uncommitted nation to act within one's interests, or to coerce a nation to revise planned actions otherwise inimical to one's ends. Perception is the essence of the Presence mission: perception of capability, intent, and determination. Presence forces can be a subtle, effective instrument of diplomacy when understood and used adroitly.[6]

Tactics. Tactical thinking in the Navy rightfully belongs at all levels of rank and command. Every operational commander, from a ship's commanding officer to a fleet commander, must know his capabilities, correctly assess the enemy's capability, and think through the tactics he will use if the two forces meet. In the past, overwhelming superiority of force sometimes made up for poor leadership or bad tactics, though seldom without great sacrifice of men and ships. Good tactics are essential, and that means more than looking for a handy compendium of standard tactics to see a commander through every situation he may face. The days of off-the-wall tactical solution are past––if, in fact, they ever existed. Certainly, the wisdom of the past must be recorded and learned, but success in future naval engagements will favor the commander who has dissected his problem into its basic elements, who has analyzed the fundamental physical principles that will govern anticipated interactions, and who has established realistic options with criteria for their use, whenever possible.[7]

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[*] When we think in the accustomed terms of projection of power from sea sanctuaries, we incline toward larger, more cost-effective, and more efficient platforms (the "high" of the "high-low mix"). Sea Control favors numbers of units, because operations will likely spread to numerous areas—the "low" side of the mix.

III. Naval Strength Comparisons. In offering a professional appraisal of the process of measuring the naval balance and of the relative strengths of two navies, I can give no answer either wholly comforting or wholly alarming to the usual, brusque question, "Let's get down to brass tacks. Who's ahead, Admiral?" My general tenor will be, rather, to focus on two questions addressed to people who think seriously about foreign policy: "What do you mean by 'ahead'?" and "How far 'ahead' will suit you, for foreign policy purposes?" The answers lie in responding to two questions: What do we want to achieve with our naval power? And what does our present naval capability permit us to achieve?

The first step in judging the naval balance is to understand what each nation requires of its navy. Only then can we be sure that we are comparing opposed commensurables, for only forces that oppose each other directly can be compared directly. Generally, neither "projection of power" forces nor "strategic deterrence" forces are designed to be employed against similar forces of an enemy. Therefore, they cannot be usefully compared in quantitative terms. One can only assess whether these forces seem capable of carrying out their purpose against other kinds of opposition. For example, amphibious ships do not directly oppose other amphibious ships. Rather, in putting troops on a beach, amphibious ships and landing craft will be opposed by enemy shore defenses. Similarly, in their role of projecting power ashore, carrier-based tactical air forces are pitted against the enemy's varied forms of air defense: their mission is to penetrate to and destroy targets ashore. On the other hand, forces designed for presence and sea control are intended to counter each other and therefore can be directly compared.

When naval professionals try to assess balance subjectively, they are not asking, "Who's ahead?" but rather, "What are the trends in capabilities?" and, "Can we still undertake the old missions or perhaps take on new missions that were impossible yesterday?" In analyzing trends, three factors are particularly significant: the rise or fall of numbers and types of warfighting units; any technological developments which increase vulnerability or

potency; and such tempering factors as extension or loss of base facilities, national resolve, and alliance solidarity.

A historic fixation with the numbers game, stemming from the naval treaties of the 1920s, mires public discussion in fruitless debate on the wrong issues. That the United States built 122 ships over 3,000 tons over a 15-year period and the Soviet Union only 57 has no meaning by itself, other than to refute another set of illogical statistics, such as was reported in a respected news magazine, that the Soviet Navy totals more than 3,300 ships and the U.S. Navy 478. This latter comparison requires counting every 75-foot tugboat and barge and comparing it to who knows what.

There can and should be reasonable debate on naval force structure. Focus on what really matters in naval strength when the foreign policy chips go down on the table. The perception by allies, neutrals, and opponents of our will and capability to control sealanes, if necessary, can tip the scales of political actions in peacetime. Assessing the naval balance in sound terms thus directly touches our nation's safety. A sensible approach will be to ask not, "Who is ahead?" but to determine whether our naval forces, considering the other forces on the planet, can carry out our national purpose—which is principally to keep the peace if we can, and if we cannot, to protect ourselves from storms, and to help our friends to protect themselves.[8]

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Chapter 5: *Intelligence*

I. Intelligence.

1. How Intelligence Contributes:

1. To Our Nation. Governments, no less than any of us as individuals, depend upon accurate and timely information to make decisions. The collection, evaluation, and dissemination of information to protect national security, and upon which to base foreign policy, is essential for any sovereign state. And in this day when our country has such international responsibilities, a good intelligence collection organization is absolutely vital.

Our intelligence operation is the gathering of information on events, trends, and facts in foreign countries. The effort of the Intelligence Community is to provide a factual basis on which our policymakers in the executive branch and in the legislative branch may make educated decisions. It is our role to provide to those in policymaking positions objective information, as objective we can make it. We provide evaluation of the meaning of facts and trends and events that we perceive around the world, so that there is always available to Congress, to the President, and to the cabinet officers, somebody analyzing events of an international nature that affect the United States, and from an organization which has no ax to grind, no role to play in the policymaking function. It is that objectivity, that separation from the policy process, that is so important.[1]

2. To the President. The President is best served by a Director of Central Intelligence (DCI)[*] who is politically neutral. A DCI's major contribution is his unbiased and disinterested stance in the President's councils. Without that, he brings only one more opinion to the table.

Presidents would be well advised to have a reasonable understanding of the limits and capabilities of intelligence systems. They will call

on them, hear reports based on their performance, and make decisions on large expenditures to build the next generation of such systems. They can learn what they need to about the technologies in a few special briefings, but there is an advantage in the DCI's being able to point out periodically in the course of his briefings that the information he is discussing was collected by this system or that and with what degree of success.

When President Jimmy Carter and I were both new in our jobs, we went through a series of tutorials on satellites, electronic intercepts, espionage techniques, and the like. I would study the characteristics and capabilities of one or two means of collecting intelligence each week and then pass on what I thought would be useful to him. The sessions were worthwhile in letting him know not only what we could do, but also what our limitations were. When SALT II became the centerpiece of his foreign policy, the President needed accurate knowledge of what our verification capabilities were—he could not negotiate without a realistic understanding of how well we could monitor Soviet compliance with the treaty.

The briefings were also my opportunity to give him a feel for how the Intelligence Community was operating and the quality of its people. I regularly brought its leaders or specialists to brief the President. I wanted him to know at first hand the kind of people who were running the intelligence organizations. It was also good for each of them to be able to tell his employees that he had met with the President and been able to describe his agency's role to him. Sometimes I brought lower-ranking officers as well.

From the DCI's point of view, personal briefings are an ideal means of marketing the Community's product to its top customer—the President's firsthand reaction is invaluable in helping the DCI tailor future intelligence support to his needs and style. After each White House briefing, I dictated a memorandum on my reactions and conclusions. In the memo I told the analysts how the President had reacted to what I had presented and on any follow-up work that was needed. The memos were greatly appreciated by the analysts, who normally get very little feedback from their customers.[2]

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[*] The Director of Central Intelligence was later changed to the Director of National Intelligence (DNI).

3. To Policymakers. The payoff of having decisions based on the best available information makes aggressive marketing of the intelligence product well worth the effort. Politicians and bureaucrats already overwhelmed by information are not out shopping for more. But shown that the Intelligence Community can truly help them, they can be converted to relying more on the intelligence product. It is worth the effort to find out what they need and what form they prefer.[3]

4. To Military Strength. Real advantages can accrue from accurately knowing what your potential adversary's strength is and what he intends to do with it. He seldom tells you this, but he does give it away in many small ways, which when watched over a long period of time, and pieced together, can give you real advantages. It is the kind of leverage that can turn the tide of battle. That's an important end product of intelligence.

Long-range military planning cannot be done without adequate knowledge of a potential enemy's military capabilities, political strengths and weaknesses, and economic viability. Day-to-day operational needs and requirements for indications and warnings are highly time sensitive. The closer intelligence can be brought to real time, the more valuable they become to the military commander because they enhance his capability to make accurate decisions based on fact rather than assumption. The closer to real time a commander can receive tactical intelligence, the more likely he is to make the right decision. At sea, force survival in the initial hours of an engagement is greatly increased if the force commander has warning to assume an alert posture prior to an attack.[4]

5. To Arms Control. We are in an era of effort to reduce international tensions, and in this era, the United States needs an organization for intelligence of high quality and responsiveness. Congress has recognized the fact that the success of our ongoing negotiations for treaties may very well depend in part on our ability to verify that past agreements are in fact being carried out. Thus, our intelligence will be one factor in developing that mutual trust which will be essential to further progress in this important area. If our intelligence is faulty, we may misjudge; if it is inadequate, we

may read the signals incorrectly. Without good intelligence, we may simply miss opportunities to ensure the world of peace. I believe, then, that we must have the best intelligence agency in the world. I think we can do this and still be fully consistent with American values and laws.[5]

6. To Economic Strength. The publication of unclassified studies is one of the CIA's most important, substantive initiatives. It stems from a conviction that the Intelligence Community is working for the American people and that they deserve to share our results whenever that is possible. The greatest payoff from public release of unclassified studies lies in the area of economic intelligence. The U.S. business community, facing intense foreign competition, can greatly benefit from intelligence information on trends in research and production, pricing mechanisms, and other areas. One of the side benefits of publishing studies is the exchanges it leads to with critics. I replied to all serious critics of one study and invited them to detail their criticisms.

There is a strong bias in this country against involving our intelligence apparatus in helping American business. Some people consider it antithetical to our ethics; others see it as an intrusion of government into the free-enterprise system. I believe neither is a sound argument. Today, our national security is increasingly dependent on our economic competitiveness.[6]

2. The Limitations of Intelligence. It is too much to expect any human institution to foresee every single coup, invasion, or bombing. Placing an agent, microphone, or camera in just the right place can be risky and tricky—and can't always be done. Just imagine the difficulties and dangers involved in penetrating the inner circle of a Saddam Hussein. In addition, these actions must be taken well before there is a clear need, sometimes when a plot is still nebulous, so how can one know whom to target? Coups, attacks, and bombings can arise in intense secrecy and with great suddenness.

Look at the world in which we live today. With situations like the collapse of the Soviet Union or the fall of dictators, it was largely *people power* that brought about those changes. There were no political organizations or government inner circles

to penetrate with human agents. And these are situations we are likely to confront more and more in the rather unstable world around us today.

The old saw that we can learn about other people's intentions only through HUMINT (human intelligence) is nonsense. Intercepted messages and photographs can tell us a great deal about what people are likely to do next. For instance, satellite photographs revealed that someone in Lebanon had built a model of the approaches to the U.S. embassy and practiced driving into it. This was a sure tipoff of the truck bombing incident that followed shortly thereafter. (Unfortunately the photographs were not properly interpreted before the act.) Similarly, in 1986 we intercepted communications indicating that Libya was aware there would be a bombing incident against Americans in West Berlin. Military authorities did their best to prevent that but failed to stop the notorious bombing of the *La Belle* disco in Berlin because the information was not sufficiently specific. In neither case did human spying provide as much preliminary information.[7]

We did not understand the Shah of Iran well during my tenure as Director of Central Intelligence from 1977 to 1981. After that, intelligence professionals failed to foresee the fall of dictators in the Philippines and South Korea. And, of greatest historical importance, they did not anticipate the cataclysmic collapse of the Soviet Union and its division into many nations.

We should not gloss over the enormity of the failure to forecast the magnitude of the collapse of the Soviet Union. We have heard some revisionist rumblings that the CIA did in fact see the Soviet collapse emerging after all. If some individual CIA analysts were more prescient than the corporate view, their ideas were filtered out in the bureaucratic process—and it is the corporate view that counts because that is what reaches the President and his advisers. On this one, the corporate view missed by a mile.[8]

3. Ways to Improve Our Intelligence. How can Washington ensure that the money spent on intelligence produces better results? There are no simplistic formulas, like more effort in HUMINT, for adapting intelligence to new conditions. Rather,

the secret to keeping better track of adversaries and friends is good teamwork between the basic techniques for collecting intelligence data.[9]

1. Share Systems, Resources, and Information. The principal problem of the Intelligence Community is ensuring that all of the shreds of intelligence which are available, whether they are in Treasury, FBI, DIA [Defense Intelligence Agency], or anywhere else, are brought together and synthesized. *The secret to collecting good intelligence is to meld the technical and human systems so as to play to the strengths that are most appropriate for a particular problem. The clues that one system obtains may be just what is needed to zero in on another.*

I am as concerned with gaps as I am with overlaps. The latter costs us money; the former may cost us our security. We have to be sure that all of our agencies are working together so that we have the right amount of overlap and no critical underlaps.

There is a wealth of information no farther away than the media, academia, and commercial enterprises right at home. The chief of a foreign intelligence service once remarked to me, "You know, of course, you want to collect all the intelligence you can on home territory. Sometimes the very information you ask an agent to get is available at home." What he was alluding to was that journalists, professors, and businessmen, among others, are often in contact with their counterparts in other countries. Some professors have taught foreign students who now are in important positions in their native countries. International journalists keep in touch with key thinkers and politicians in countries where they've served. Many businessmen have frequent dealings with foreign businessmen. Although contacts of these kinds aren't likely to have access to the inner secrets of the local Politburo or Cabinet, they may have an excellent feel for the state of the economy, the degree of societal unrest, or the prospects for incipient political movements.

The primary need for contact between the CIA and academia is to share ideas on all manner of world affairs, ranging from the psychology of foreign leaders to the state of world oil production to the strength of Islamic fundamentalism. The

CIA, like every research and analytic institution, must be able to test its views and conclusions against the thinking of other experts. Through one-year fellowships, through committees of academics who periodically reviewed the CIA's work, and through individual consulting arrangements, we sought to tap the wisdom of academia. But the benefits did not flow in one direction only. Professors who consulted with the CIA benefited from seeing how governments actually work, rather than how they theoretically work, and from gaining valuable insights into world events based on classified sources that they otherwise did not have access to. Although they could not discuss the classified data with their students when they returned to the campus, they were more richly informed and more discerning in their interpretation of security issues.

The professions of intelligence and academia have similarities. In intelligence, as in the academic world, good research, digging out information, is the essential foundation of our work. Through the analyses and interpretation of that information, both communities add to the fund of available knowledge.[10]

2. Be Innovative. All techniques for collecting intelligence become compromised to some degree over time. Only constant innovation will keep the art of collection ahead of the art of counterintelligence. But innovation means trying something that has never been tried before. A brilliant and original idea may at first seem unorthodox and untenable. The Director of the CIA, then, must separate the wheat from the chaff among the many proposals that cross his desk.

Many successes in improving technical collection systems have come from a "skunk works" approach in which you tell inventors what you want and let them work freely with relatively open funding and little outside interference. In this way they do not need to justify their efforts to any committees. It costs money, but I know of no better way to encourage ingenuity, and it seems to work.[11]

3. Ensure Objective Analysis. I want more divergent views. I am tired of people coming up and telling me what will happen in the future. I don't want Delphic oracles. What I want to know is—it may happen this way for the following reasons, but it also may happen that way for the following other reasons. That way we, and those to whom we provide our analysis, can weigh the arguments, and see what they think the answer is going to be. That is the kind of thing we are paid to do rather than make express predictions.[12]

Objectivity benefits both the producer and the user of intelligence. The user obviously benefits because he is given all reasonable alternatives. As a frequent user of intelligence, I understand, I believe, the importance of approaching decisions with a range of choices in hand, not simply one option. The producer of intelligence also benefits from an emphasis on objectivity because he or she is not asked to sacrifice intellectual or scientific integrity to support an established position, but rather is asked to lay out all sides of a case indicating the level of confidence he has in the deductions made from the facts at hand. Objectivity simply must continue to be the hallmark of our intelligence effort.

Decisionmakers in Congress and in the executive branch will be better served if they all work from the same foundation of intelligence. But consensus among the various elements of the community must not be forced, and dissenting opinion must not be stifled. Contrary views must be presented, but in such a way that the rationale for such dissent is clearly evident.

Preserving the right of analysts to hold differing views from those of their superiors is very important. It is a disservice to the nation if intelligence is warped to tell policymakers what they want to hear. Skewed intelligence reporting can not only result in a bad decision in a particular instance, but can also erode confidence in all intelligence analysis.

The chiefs of departmental intelligence agencies are subject to pressures from many different individuals. The implied threat is that the boss will take it out on you if you do not fall in line. Policymakers exert such pressures because they do not want to have some intelligence report floating around that can be used to torpedo their programs or policies. The military officer feels free to express his views to his commander, but when the

commander has decided, the subordinate stops questioning and supports his superior in every way possible. The military commander has the final word once he has made up his mind. Thus, the military intelligence officer who attempts to interject analyses that run counter to the decisions of his superiors risks being considered disloyal. It is difficult to overstate the amount of pressure the military hierarchy can impose to get its way.

In the service intelligence agencies, it is easy to become so absorbed in your service's perspective as to lose objectivity. Most everyone around you is thinking similarly. If you call all of the questionable shots on one side, you're not likely to be challenged.

One way to ensure against analysts giving in to such pressures is to get separate opinions on important subjects, in the hope that a conclusion reached under pressure will stand out like a sore thumb. One can get several opinions by engaging outside consultants or advisory panels to review analytic work, or even by having some analytic work duplicated by outside contractors, which may produce a fresh viewpoint.[13]

Conformity of intelligence to political ideology was always one of the great weaknesses of Soviet intelligence. I once had the opportunity to ask a senior Soviet defector whether the top Soviet leadership received reasonably accurate assessments of why the United States was doing what it was. He replied that even very senior people like then-Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin, who certainly understood the United States well, did not dare report with full frankness if their views ran contrary to established doctrine.[14]

4. Use Technology. Technology has so increased the amount of information we can acquire that a whole new set of problems has resulted. On one hand, analysts are inundated with data and must find ways to filter, store, and retrieve what is significant. On the other hand, analysts must be concerned with whether they are receiving everything that is collected in their area of interest.

Technically generated intelligence appeals to decisionmakers not just because of timeliness but because it is highly credible. Reports from spies are subject to the strengths and weaknesses of the

agent doing the reporting. Has he interpreted correctly what he saw or heard? What biases does he have? How has he shaded his conclusions about what was going on? Does he have some reason to falsify his report? A classic example is the report of the reconnaissance mission Moses sent to "spy out the land of Canaan." When it returned, Caleb reported finding a land that flowed with milk and honey and had only such occupants as the Israelites would be able to overcome. But others from the same reconnaissance party reported finding a land that "eateth up the inhabitants thereof" and that was filled with fearsome giants. Caleb and the others saw the same things, but when those facts were filtered by the perceptions of different observers, contradictory reports emerged.[15]

5. Organize the Intelligence Structure Well. The most vital decisions of war are political decisions made by civilian leadership. The military must want those decisions to be as sound as possible. It is in the military's own interest, as well as the nation's, that the final control over the collection of war intelligence from national technical systems be in the hands of someone free of military pressures or biases. The more control the military can retain over national collection systems, the more certain they are that their tactical needs will be met. However, the national interest is never exclusively the military's interest.

We are going to require all of the leverage that good intelligence can give to our military posture if we are going to remain adequately strong in the future. However, today there are more than military requirements for intelligence. Our intelligence must be acutely aware of foreign political, economic, and social trends, as well as the military ones, and must be able to relate these in assessing the prospects for our future. We possess the capability to have the best of all intelligence services in all of these areas, but we must ensure that our intelligence resources are employed in an optimal manner.[16]

Problems in the intelligence structure grew out of a flaw in the National Security Act of 1947, which created the Office of Director of Central Intelligence. That law charged the director with coordinating our national intelligence apparatus,

which consisted of a number of semi-autonomous agencies. The law, though, gave the director no real authority to manage many of these disparate entities. The defense secretary controlled a disproportionate number of the departments and agencies involved in intelligence as well as the money allocated to national intelligence (Fig. 1).*


Fig. 1. The Intelligence Community, 1999

It was all right in many ways for the Defense Department to control our intelligence operations to a high degree during the Cold War, but when the primary threat comes from terrorism, the military is only one line of defense against this danger. Our intelligence efforts must reflect these realities, which means giving the intelligence director greater authority.[17]

6. *Keep Intelligence Politically Neutral.* The CIA is not a political agency, and it is not and should not be viewed as a place where people come and go because of political loyalties. One reason for having a CIA, set out in the law of 1947, is to ensure that there is one place within the government where intelligence information is sifted and analyzed with no ax to grind, no Democrat or Republican ax, no ax for a stringent control on monetary policy, or a loose one. In short, every other source of intelligence in our government reports to a policymaker. It's more difficult for those subordinate intelligence chiefs to

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* *A Consumer's Guide to Intelligence,* CIA, 1999, p. 28.

go up and say, "Boss, the information that I've got says your policy is just off the track." But that's what we're here to do. So we try to stay out of both the political stream of domestic politics and out of the policy-formulating phase within the government.

Once an intelligence chief begins to recommend policy, it becomes very difficult for him not to want his intelligence to support that policy. However honest a DCI may be, advocacy creates a mental filter that tends to give less credence to intelligence that does not support his policy choice. And even if a DCI can both recommend policy and be objective, it may not appear that way to others.

Congress will sometimes say, "Well, you're just telling us that because it supports the President's policy." And sometimes the White House will tell me, "Why did you tell that to Congress? It undercuts the President's policy." I can provide press clippings about myself. On one hand they'll say, "Turner doesn't support the President." On the other they'll say, "Turner is the stooge of the President." And they fortunately, I think, balance each other out.[18]

II. Secrecy and Openness.

1. The Strength of Openness. Americans feel strongly that the United States should live by its principles. Honesty, openness, and respect for the rights of the individual are important elements of our international reputation. We are a democracy, one with high ethical ideals. We should never turn over custody of those ideals to any group of individuals who divorce themselves from concern for the public attitude. The crimes against mankind perpetrated by zealots who did not need to answer to citizens are too many. The most basic strength of the Constitution is that it entrusts the people to make the ultimate decisions for the country—but they cannot do that if the government lies to them about what it is doing. Nor can the system of checks and balances among the three branches of government work properly if one branch withholds information that the others are entitled to have.

The withholding of information from the public is a serious matter. Every time our government designates a piece of information secret, that

diminishes our democracy. Every time someone leaks a true government secret, that weakens our ability to sustain our democracy.

The heart of our democracy is a well-informed citizenry who participate in the decisions of government. A society that not only permits but encourages the vigorous exchange of ideas, and does not believe that wisdom necessarily comes from the top, will always have a healthy edge on a society where ideas that do not conform with state wisdom are regarded as treasonous.[19]

2. The Risks of Secrecy. Secret, unaccountable power is subject to misuse, ranging from deliberate, improper diversion of resources to just plain carelessness in the making of decisions. We have seen how Lt. Col. Oliver North used the supposed secrecy of some of his activities to shield them from the secretary of state and others, and to lie to Congress and others. No corporation can prosper with executives who lie to and conceal information from each other, nor can our government operate effectively without trust among its executives and without the proper use of the mechanisms of government. Secrecy tempts people to think they can get away with unethical and illegal acts. They believe they will not be held fully accountable if only a few people know what they are doing. We should note this quotation from an article by an official of the Soviet secret intelligence service, the KGB. This is hardly someone we would expect to be excoriating excessive secrecy: "The preservation of the secrecy cult in political practice...is a chance for power to be used irresponsibly and controllably in the narrow interests of small groups of people." The author went on to claim that excessive secrecy in the Soviet Union produced abuses of power, crippled scholarship, and left citizens ignorant of basic information about their own country.[20]

There are special temptations for someone engaged in espionage. I insisted that reading and discussing the 1976 report on Yuri Nosenko by John Hart be made a compulsory part of every training course for senior officers in the CIA. (Nosenko was a defector who had been a KGB officer, and was abused by the CIA.) What I intended was that they

understand that counterintelligence has the potential of great abuse and that the Agency's senior people bear a responsibility not to let it get out of hand.[21]

3. The Risks of Openness. We must recognize that because we are a free, democratic society we will be more vulnerable to spying than we would like. The openness of our society permits the rest of the world to know in considerable detail what we think, what we are doing, and what we plan to do. With this information they can anticipate our actions and plan their counter-strategies. However, none of us would trade the short-term advantages that accrue to a closed society for the blessings of openness and respect for the individual inherent in our system, and we all have faith that ours is a long-term strength of great advantage.[22]

4. Covert Action—Usefulness and Risks. Covert action is the term that describes our efforts to influence the course of events in a foreign country without our role being known. It is separate from intelligence—the collecting and evaluating of information about foreign countries—but has always been assigned to the CIA to perform.

We must maintain a capable, viable, strong covert action capability. It is absolutely essential that we have that potential, ranging from the paramilitary right on down to some of the lesser dramatic types of covert action, in the kit of tools a President may have available to him.

No covert operation should be undertaken until two standards have been met. The first would be that there was a thorough exploration of alternative ways to accomplish the objective in an overt manner. The second would be that there was a very careful weighing of the potential value to the country of what might develop from the operation versus the risks that have to be accepted. I would urge that we think of the risks in two categories: the risk of disclosure of the covert operation, and the risk of undermining our own respect for the fundamental laws and values of our country.

One of the risks of any covert action is that it may get out of control. One reason is that the people the CIA enlists to do the covert work will

not always have the same purpose as the United States. Generally, their aim is to obtain political power for themselves as soon as possible. As the price for getting the support that we offer them, they may well accept the somewhat different purpose and timetables that we establish. But as a covert action progresses, they may well start working for their own objective, not ours. A second reason covert actions can get out of control is that our own purposes change from those originally set. A third reason is that the CIA people operating them can get carried away with their dedication to getting the job done.

President Ronald Reagan was burned four times by covert actions that the public rejected: the mining of Nicaragua's harbors, publication of a manual for the *contras* that appeared to condone assassination, support of antiterrorist actions by Lebanese intelligence that got out of the CIA's control and resulted in some 80 innocent deaths, and arms deliveries to Iran. None of these passed the verdict of "makes sense." It is contrary to the spirit of our constitutional process to carry out foreign policies in secret that the public and Congress would not accept if known.

The overall test of human intelligence activities and covert actions is whether or not the decisionmakers believe that they could effectively defend their decisions if the actions became public. As DCI, I asked myself, "Would I be proud of what I have done? Would I be able to say, 'Yes, I did that, and I did that for our country?'"[23]

5. Controls on Secrecy. No one wants the process of gathering intelligence in order to defend our liberties, to, in fact, undermine them. We should conduct our intelligence activities in foreign areas in as close a manner to those in the United States as we possibly can, and we must keep a floor of decency below which we will not stoop.

Four types of controls and oversight over intelligence activities include internal controls created and enforced within the intelligence agencies themselves, presidential controls such as executive orders, controls that come from Congress in its role as overseer of intelligence, and controls that flow from public scrutiny of intelligence activities.[24]

The right kind of visibility can be beneficial both to the Intelligence Community and to the American public. What I mean is the kind of visibility that gives the public access to information about the general way in which we go about our business and why we are doing it, and which confirms that the controls that have been established over intelligence are being exercised as they were intended. On balance, increased visibility is a net plus. We do need the understanding and the support of the American public, and we do need to avoid any possible abuses.

Finding the right balance between secrecy and disclosure to Congress will always be part of the DCI's task. For that reason it is important that an adversarial relationship not be allowed to develop between the Intelligence Community and either oversight committee (House or Senate). To make Congressional oversight compatible with secrecy you must have good will and trust on both sides.[25]

6. Balancing Secrecy and Openness. It is simply a fact that some things cannot be done without the assurance of some degree of confidentiality. This is particularly true with respect to intelligence. Our country has a legitimate need to know what is going on around the world because the activities of so many other nations affect us directly. If we reveal exactly how we are obtaining this necessary information, our sources will be turned off. Look back to World War II—what good would it have done us to have broken the German and Japanese codes if we had let them know that we had done it? Some secrecy is necessary in all governments and in particular in intelligence operations. The issue regarding secrets is how can the public be sure that secrecy is not imposed simply for bureaucratic convenience or perhaps to cover up misdeeds?

Too much secrecy can impede justice or staunch the flow of information within our society. Too little secrecy can give away data that is of vital importance to our nation. It is a delicate balance between a government that serves its people poorly because it does not keep them informed and one that serves them poorly because it does not maintain necessary secrets.

There are valid national secrets. Though American citizens can rightfully expect their

government to operate openly, there must be a relatively small amount of information and activity that is kept secret. As long as representative groups of elected officials such as the Congressional Oversight Committees and the Chief Executive are kept informed, and as long as they can act for society in regulating the secret information and activities, I think that the difficult balance between necessary secrecy and an open, democratic society can be maintained.

We are striving for an ideal: an open society in which government processes are as open as possible. On the other hand, every responsible American recognizes the necessity for an essentially secret intelligence service to prevent our country from being surprised or threatened. Can the ideal and the necessity coexist? I believe they can. I believe they must. The issue is not the leashing or unleashing of the CIA. The issue is whether we can equip our intelligence agencies with both the legal and practical tools to do an effective job in a changing world and, at the same time, require them to adhere to the legal and ethical standards on which our country was built. I believe we can do both.[26]

7. Classification. Although bureaucrats are not willing to accept it, the useful life of most secrets is quite brief. I would like to see the ten-year limit on secrets be lowered to five, and that some impartial party be given authority to review and reverse decisions of bureaucrats to retain secrets longer. This cannot be a declassification center dedicated to declassification, but a permanent presidentially-appointed panel attuned to both the need for and danger of secrecy.[27]

8. The Media and Secrecy. The two professions, journalism and intelligence, have a great deal in common. They have in common the task of finding the facts about what is going on in the world—the press primarily for the American public; the Intelligence Community primarily for the American government. Beyond that, both recognize the great importance of protecting our sources of information. The appreciation of the value of an exclusive is another common professional characteristic. For the press it can provide an important edge over competitors. For

the Intelligence Community it can give the President of the United States an important edge of advantage when competing or negotiating with others.[28]

The United States uses less propaganda now because it blows back because the world is so unified through globalization. And our media is so probing that false stories planted by another country in the United States will be identified.[29]

III. Conclusion. The CIA's personnel are a highly talented group of people who represent almost all of the academic disciplines and do an important job for our country for which they get little credit. If a mistake is made the public usually hears about it, but if the accusation is incorrect it usually cannot be denied because doing so would give away some secret. Their best successes are closely guarded secrets.

In the entrance lobby of CIA Headquarters one of the marble walls is inscribed with gold stars. Underneath them is a small glass case with a book that contains the names of CIA men and women who have died in the line of duty; in some instances there is just a blank space for someone whose role in the CIA can never safely be told.[30]

Those who criticize our intelligence as a threat to our society's values and those who would condone any kind of intrusion into our personal privacy for the sake of the nation's security are both wrong. Between those outlooks is the mature appreciation that there is a need for good intelligence capabilities, but the need cannot justify abuse of the secrecy that must surround intelligence activities.[31]

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Chapter 6: *Terrorism & Democracy*

I. Ten Steps to Defeat Terrorism. The secret of dealing with terrorism lies in selecting the option or mixture of options, both pro-legal and pro-active, that will have the greatest impact on terrorists while minimizing the intrusions into societal values. Presidents and their advisers cannot afford to focus on only one strategy against terrorism. Because we are a democracy and the public voice counts, Presidents can be driven by terrorism far from their preferred paths. Presidents have attempted all ten of the pro-legal and pro-active options. That means that they, and we the public, must understand the strengths and the pitfalls of each one.

1. Assassinations are neither an appropriate nor an effective counterterrorism tactic.

Assassination is morally repugnant to the majority of Americans. It is always dangerous to counter terrorism with terrorism, for we can lose what we are defending in the process of defending it. For instance, let's say we decide that we'll go out and assassinate somebody because we think he's a terrorist. We're by-passing the due process of law that means so much to our country. The United States is not God. We must not take it upon ourselves to determine, without due process of law, who is and who is not going to live. You can easily get tempted into that, but maybe in the long run you've lost more than you've gained. And you're not always confident who's going to come and replace the person you assassinate—he may well be worse.

The lure of assassination is that it seems surgical and final. It is neither. If we attempted to kill a foreign leader, we would logically turn to foreigners to do the deed or to help our people get away safely; thus, we would lose control. Furthermore, assassination is very impractical. It is not that easy to go out and hire an assassin because it is a very risky business. This is especially true when the target is a dictator like Saddam Hussein who, unlike U.S. presidents, is well protected—the U.S. president, as the most open and visible head of state in the world, may also be the most vulnerable.

Because an assassination would be a major foreign policy choice, it would require an order by the President, who would then be embarked on a game of dirty tricks in which our opponents are likely to be far more ruthless and persistent than we. Still, most administrations, when frustrated beyond measure by a Khomeini or a Qaddafi, will be tempted to consider assassination. I believe we need a law, not just a presidential Executive Order, prohibiting assassination. The rationalization that the deliberate killing of an individual would not be assassination would be more difficult to maintain against a law than against an Executive Order. I believe, though, that such a law should be limited to peacetime.

2. Punitive military attacks are a remedy we should use, but sparingly. The fundamental dilemma of a democracy in using force against terrorists is that if we strike too broadly, we kill innocents, and are just like the terrorists—as President Ronald Reagan said, "If you just aim in the general direction and kill some people, well, then you're a terrorist, too." But if we aim too narrowly, we appear to be targeting a person, and violate our policy against assassination. The margin is slender—if we use force, we will almost always transgress one boundary or the other.

It is futile, even irresponsible, to advocate consistent use of force against terrorists. The record shows our people will not accept it. For instance, Ronald Reagan unleashed only one attack, despite repeated provocations; Gerald Ford, one; Lyndon Johnson, Richard Nixon, and Jimmy Carter none. A principal inhibition on Reagan was the reluctance to take human life outside the due process of law or war.

A policy of determined retribution certainly sends a message to terrorists, but how much it achieves is debatable. Terrorist attacks on Israelis did not stop, and some people even believe that the terrorists may have continued attacking as a matter of counter-retaliation. On the other hand, the situation might well have been worse without the retaliatory attacks.

Most democracies that are not in similar peril are less willing to violate their normal respect for human life and the process of law. Great Britain,

for instance, suffered a continuing and grievous problem with the terrorism of the Irish Republican Army (IRA). It drove their police into breaking the law in dealing with the IRA; even the courts were less than even-handed toward accused terrorists. Although the British public tolerated this, there were voices of protest. And the public's respect for law checked the government from straying too far. For instance, when Parliament passed the Prevention of Terrorism Act of 1974, weakening *habeas corpus* by permitting police to detain suspects longer than is normal, it made the law effective for only one year. The government had to justify the need for it annually. The British model, then, was one of reluctant resort to the use of extraordinary means in the fight against terrorism.

Nonetheless, it would be equally irresponsible to rule out punitive responses. Perhaps the best argument for exercising the punitive option is that doing so reinforces all other options. In short, between "never" and "always" there is some ground for the occasional use of force.

3. Covert actions should be undertaken, but judiciously, because the probability of success is low. There are a number of covert techniques that can be effective against terrorists, such as infiltrating an organization and making its plans go awry, feeding disinformation to groups to mislead them and perhaps cause them to terrorize one another, and toppling governments that sponsor or provide support to terrorists. Maneuvers like these present formidable challenges: Jimmy Carter's efforts to change the complexion of the Khomeini government in Iran never made headway; Ronald Reagan's attempt to use arms to advance the position of moderates in that same government ended in the giant con game of the Iran-Contra scandal.

In assessing the potential benefit of covert activities, we must take into account that these actions come under even less scrutiny than other secret government operations. Who, for instance, will make the judgment that the people we support to overthrow a government will do so within our bounds? Who will determine the cost

if our disinformation feeds back into our own media? We should not ignore covert actions just because there are such risks, but we must weigh the prospects for success against the threat to our values.

4. Rescue operations have a role but will continue to be highly risky for the United States. Any government would like to maintain a capability for rescuing its citizens if they are taken hostage. And a rescue operation will be tempting because if it is successful, it will solve the problem instantly. But rescue operations carry high risks. They endanger the lives of the hostages. Many former hostages say they were afraid of being killed during a rescue attempt, either deliberately by their captors or accidentally by the rescue forces. Because such operations are complex and often demand feats approaching the heroic, they can fail through poor execution, as with the assault on Koh Tang Island and the staging operation at Desert One, or bad timing, as with TWA 847 and the *Achille Lauro.*

Maintaining competent rescue forces will always be difficult for the U.S. military, because it is expected to have such a wide range of capabilities. At one end it must deter thermonuclear war, and at the other outwit a handful of 20-year-olds who have seized an airliner. Naturally, attention is concentrated on the greater threat, on the assumption that if our military is prepared to answer the most formidable challenge, it surely possesses the skills and equipment needed to subdue terrorists. Unfortunately, this has not always been the case, and leaves our military in a dilemma. Do the requirements for rescue operations demand a corps of specialists dedicated to that very task, or with extra training can regular forces do the job? Neither arrangement will work unless the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the theater commanders focus adequate attention on the lower level of warfare. Presidents and secretaries of defense would do well to make periodic inquiries about the readiness of rescue forces and order unannounced tests of them, as a modest amount of such high-level attention to low-level operations will advance the day of readiness.

5. Improved intelligence, especially human, is always desirable but difficult to achieve. In dealing with terrorism it is essential to anticipate what terrorists are going to do next, and anticipating means having good intelligence. Good intelligence can enable us to take defensive steps against acts of terrorism, or, alternatively, to track down terrorists and arrest them, both desirable ways to handle terrorism. Penetrating terrorist organizations, though, is difficult, as evidenced by the failure of the Reagan-Casey efforts. Even more, American intelligence operatives also work under the handicap of being easily identified. Most are unwilling to accept the privations associated with living their cover—actually working at their cover job as well as their spying. And it may be difficult for them to obtain the cooperation of other government agencies and private organizations in providing cover jobs.

There is a danger that overemphasis on improving human intelligence as an antidote to terrorism could lead to the neglect of technical intelligence systems. NSA electronic intercepts produced the clinching evidence about the terrorist bombing in Berlin that sent our bombers over Libya in 1986. When George H. W. Bush's Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism recommended more attention to human intelligence, just what did it expect the President to do? He could have called in his DCI, William H. Webster, and told him to put more agents into the field, but Webster was almost certainly doing all he could in that respect. We must also be careful that our intelligence agencies, in their zeal to track down terrorists, do not intrude unlawfully on the privacy of Americans.

6. Restraint of the media could be helpful, but modest self-restraint is the most we can expect. Publicity for their cause is usually one objective of terrorists. Consequently, there is no question that almost any media coverage plays into their hands. There also have been situations when our counterterrorism efforts are hurt by media reporting, as when the hijackers of TWA 847 were tipped off that Delta Force was on the way to the Mediterranean, or when too many details are printed about hostages. Brian Keenan, an Irishman

held hostage in Beirut for four and a half years, made this point eloquently when he was released: "To all members of the press and the media, I would ask you to use all your judgment and exercise restraint in your reports, remembering the lives and the physical and psychological well-being of those who remain in captivity. Some members of the American media issued reports after the release of [a hostage] which suggested the tapes their kidnappers had given them to bring out had been coded by the hostages. Such unfounded remarks came within a hair's breadth of having some of the remaining hostages executed."

When our hostages were being held in Iran, there were particular threats against those whom the Iranians identified as having been with the CIA. Two major newspapers in the United States published detailed descriptions regarding how to distinguish a CIA person from other embassy employees based on records that the Iranian captors held.

During another hostage crisis the American media covered the story from everywhere—on the scene in Beirut, Cyprus, Athens, Jerusalem, and Amman, and at the homes of the hostages' families in the United States. In addition to the newspapers, magazines, and national TV networks, over fifty local or regional TV stations sent correspondents to Beirut for live shots of the aircraft at the airport and whatever snippets the terrorists fed them. And when more than a hundred people were released from the plane during the first two days, there were all sorts of opportunities for interviews. The hijackers soon realized they could use the media and even demanded to see reruns of the previous day's American TV coverage to learn what kind of a splash they were making. On Day 6, June 19, 1985, there was a dramatic moment when an ABC cameraman was allowed to interview Captain John Testrake, who was leaning out a window in the cockpit while a hijacker held a gun to his head. Testrake's shouted message was that the United States should not attempt a rescue effort: "I think we'd all be dead men if they did, because we are continuously surrounded by many, many guards."

This kind of manipulation of the media continued the next day when the hijackers brought five hostages before a horde of reporters, who,

with incredibly undignified behavior, turned the event into a circus. With dozens of microphones thrust forward and questions repeatedly shouted at him, the spokesman for the hostages had difficulty just making his statement. When he finally did, he dramatically increased the pressure on the President by pleading that the United States persuade Israel to release 766 Lebanese prisoners. He cited the President's earlier rebuke of Israel for holding these prisoners against the Fourth Geneva Convention on prisoners of war, and even endorsed the claim of the hijackers that holding passengers and crew from TWA 847 was no more illegal than what Israel was doing. The wisdom of the spokesman can be questioned, but it was a good example of how terrorists can benefit by playing to the media.

In addition, the networks allowed Nabih Berri, the negotiator for the hijackers, to become a regular on American TV. He put pressure on Ronald Reagan by telling Americans that if their President would only arrange for Israel to release the Lebanese prisoners, the hostages would be freed. One anchorman even turned to Berri at the end of an interview and asked, "Any final words to President Reagan this morning?" Thus, the media became participants, not just reporters, and were accused of making the negotiations more difficult for the President.

There has been media self-restraint. During the 1979–1980 Iranian hostage crisis, some Canadian and American media deduced that a few American diplomats were hiding in Tehran, but did not publish their conclusion. In exercising such self-restraint, the media face difficult decisions. Would publication of the information harm the national interest or hostages? Or is the administration trying to bury a political embarrassment or to use secrecy to do something the public might reject?

Administrations that appreciate the media's dilemma will think carefully before attempting to manipulate them in terrorist incidents. (It is not only terrorists who attempt manipulation of the media.) In building credibility and understanding about terrorism, administrations would do well to conduct simulations of terrorist incidents with media participation. Each side could then learn to appreciate the other's considerations.

Over the long run, it is the public that exercises the most suitable outside control over the media. The First Amendment is integral to the character of our society, and while the media have come to interpret that amendment very broadly, erring on the side of the openness that keeps our government accountable is preferable to governmental control of our sources of information. What the public demands of the media and what it tolerates are the major determinants of how the media will balance their obligations to the First Amendment and to the nation's security. For instance, in 1986, NBC News interviewed Abu Abbas, mastermind of the *Achille Lauro* hijacking, after agreeing not to disclose where the interview took place. Giving a platform to a criminal who refuses to disclose his location was seen as a questionable act by many, including other media, which claimed they had declined the interview. The best way to deter such acts is for the public to express its disapproval, as it did in this instance. The alternative is the one Margaret Thatcher, the British prime minister, employed in 1988, when her government used its powers to forbid such interviews, with all the opportunity for abuse such action involves.

7. Economic sanctions should be used against state sponsors of terrorism, even if they take a long time to be effective. Unilateral economic sanctions can have only limited effect. Someone else will usually fill whatever gap we create and take the business away from us besides (Jimmy Carter's freezing of Iranian assets in American banks was an exception because Iran had placed so much money in those banks.) Congress in 1985 strengthened the hand of Presidents by authorizing them to bar imports from or aid to countries that harbor or otherwise support international terrorism. These are useful tools.

Presidents Jefferson, Johnson, Carter, and Reagan all found how difficult it is to obtain the international cooperation needed to impose multinational economic sanctions. Despite these hurdles, Presidents will regularly turn to economic sanctions when there are few other choices. Americans tend to believe there must be something we can do to solve any problem, and just forcing other nations to decide whether to

honor or reject our requests for sanctions can help. These countries must evaluate what they believe to be their responsibilities; over time, their assessment can help make them more reliable.

8. Defensive security is unlikely to receive sufficient attention or money. It has been difficult to persuade Americans to take security overseas seriously. We have refused to barricade ourselves inside fortresses, chafing at both the inconvenience and the symbolism of fear and vulnerability. And too much security can make it impossible for an embassy, for instance, to do its job of dealing with a foreign public. But there are new forms of physical defense that are easier to accommodate, and we should encourage their development to warn of impending attacks, improve perimeter defenses, and provide greater security against hijackers or bombs on commercial aircraft.

9. Deals are an option we cannot rule out. Official U.S. policy has been that the United States will never make deals with terrorists. The "no deals" policy is based on the premise that making deals encourages more terrorism. But if you were being held hostage, would you want your government to forgo the option of a deal to obtain your release? What if the hostage was a member of your family? And if other Americans are hostages, do you want our government to appear indifferent to their fate?

Some would argue that sacrificing a relatively few people today is sometimes necessary to deter terrorists from endangering many more tomorrow. That is not likely to be accepted in our democracy. It is a hallmark of our society and its government that we have a deep concern for the individual human being, and when present suffering is almost certain and future suffering only problematical, the present concerns almost always win out.

A President, understandably, will be reluctant to acknowledge that he is willing to make deals, lest he seems to be sending an invitation to terrorists. But the record shows that American presidents will make deals with terrorists, some good, some bad.

How, therefore, should we distinguish between different deals with terrorists? And is it necessarily true that making a deal with terrorists always encourages more terrorism? There are four useful questions:

1. Were the terrorists encouraged to believe that terrorism pays off because they got what they demanded?

2. Was their demand for something they might easily ask for again?

3. Did the deal damage our national honor by making us look weak?

4. Did we get what we sought?

By answering these questions, we can compare Presidential deals.

George Washington paid ransom to the Barbary pirates for the release of American merchant sailors being held prisoner. He, and the next president, John Adams, paid tribute to ensure against seizures of our ships and sailors. George Washington's deal merited poor marks except that it did get the hostages back, but only after some had been held for ten years. It certainly damaged our young nation's honor, but our first President's only alternative was to let the hostages stay where they were. (Thomas Jefferson as president forced down the asking price, and later stopped the payment of annual tribute.)

In 1904 Theodore Roosevelt was faced with the kidnapping of Ian Perdicaris (a Greek citizen believed to be an American), by a brigand, Raisuli, who was making demands on the Sultan of Morocco. Roosevelt sent the fleet to Tangier and had his secretary of state proclaim, "I want Perdicaris alive or Raisuli dead," but obtained the release of Perdicaris by pressuring the Sultan to make the concessions Raisuli was demanding. Raisuli took no more Americans hostage. Teddy Roosevelt did poorly on all counts, except that he obscured the damage to national honor by making it look as though the Sultan of Morocco was making the concessions.

In 1968, North Korea seized the USS *Pueblo* and demanded a confession from the United States that the ship had been spying. To obtain the release of the crew, Lyndon Johnson agreed to a false confession that the United States would repudiate at the same time. The North Koreans took no more Americans hostage. Lyndon Johnson did pretty well, even though after eleven months he gave the

North Koreans what they originally demanded. He protected our honor and reduced the likelihood of repetition by baldly denying the truth of the confession signed.[*]

—In 1970, Richard Nixon encouraged the British, West Germans, and Swiss to release 7 known or convicted terrorists from their jails in exchange for 38 hostages who had been hijacked to a desert landing strip (Dawson Field) in Jordan. Whether spurred by this success or others, terrorists subsequently demanded the release of fellow terrorists from jails on numerous occasions. Nixon's deal was very questionable, like Roosevelt's, except that it was more apparent to the world that we were condoning the deal. Hence, there was some damage to our national honor.

In 1981, Jimmy Carter exchanged more than $8 billion in Iranian assets that were frozen in U.S. banks for 52 Americans held hostage in Tehran. The Iranians did not take more hostages. Jimmy Carter's returning $8 billion to Iran did not give the hostage-takers what they had demanded and did not encourage them to do it again because there was no more money available if they seized more hostages. Our national reputation was damaged considerably by the failed rescue mission and by the fact that it took 444 days to make this deal, but not by the terms of the deal.

In 1985 Ronald Reagan pressured Israel to release 766 Shiite prisoners in exchange for the release of Americans being held hostage after the hijacking of TWA Flight 847. The Iranians continued to demand more arms and 5 more Americans were taken hostage in Beirut. The TWA 847 deal raised the probability of repetition, but damage to national honor was mitigated somewhat by the thin fiction that it was an Israeli deal. The terrorists obtained a big piece of what they originally demanded, the release of their

compatriots from jail, and that was bound to encourage them. Several subsequent incidents of terrorism resulted in demands for the release of more prisoners from Israeli jails. Less than four months after the hijacking of TWA Flight 847, Palestinian terrorists took over an entire cruise ship, the *Achille Lauro*, and demanded that Israel release still more prisoners.

Reagan also traded arms to Iran [the Iran-Contra scandal] and obtained the release of 3 hostages. The Reagan arms-for-hostages deals did badly in all categories and did not even succeed in a net release of hostages, and clearly invited the terrorists to come back for more. The Reagan administration pretended that the swaps of arms for hostages were not deals after all. For instance, because the first was done through the Israelis, the argument was made that *we* were not selling arms. Later, when arms were flowing directly from U.S. arsenals to the Iranians, the rationalization was that the United States was dealing with the Iranian government, not with the terrorists in Beirut.

Thus the score is mixed regarding deals with terrorists. The odds are high that any President will seriously consider a deal when other possibilities have been exhausted and Americans are in trouble. Even while a task force headed by Vice-President George Bush issued a 1986 report saying the United States would never make deals with terrorists, President Reagan was trading arms to Iran for hostages. And other nations that oppose deals with terrorists have made them.

During the Iranian hostage crisis, we had a long discussion of what kind of insults and humiliations we would accept to get the hostages back. National honor, not just the release of the hostages, had become an issue, just as it had with Lyndon Johnson in considering what kind of confession he could sign in the *Pueblo* affair. We decided the United States could agree to a UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim suggestion for organizing a commission to investigate Iran's complaint about past American support for the Shah, but only simultaneously with the release of the hostages. We were, of course, concerned about whether such a commission would produce anti-American propaganda, but everyone agreed we would have to take the chance.

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[*]Major General Gilbert Woodward, senior representative of the United States to the Military Armistice Commission, repudiated the "confession" he was about to sign by stating: "The position of the United States government [has] been that the ship was not engaged in illegal activity. [The] document which I am going to sign was prepared by the North Koreans and is at variance with the above position, but my signature will not and cannot alter the facts. I will sign the document to free the crew and only to free the crew."

I suggested promising to cooperate with such a commission, or almost anything else, and then, once the hostages were out, reneging, on the grounds that we had agreed under duress. President Jimmy Carter immediately and peremptorily said, "You know we can't do that, Stan." The aspect of working for Carter that I liked most was that one always knew he was going to take the honest and honorable course. Did we always have to play by gentlemen's rules when our opponents ignored them? The President was saying something close to yes.

He wasn't the first President to face that kind of choice. In 1790, Thomas Jefferson, as secretary of state, proposed that we take Algerians hostages and trade them for our seamen being held in Algiers. He thought the Barbary States would accept a deal whereby, if the United States released two Algerian prisoners, they would release one American. Nothing ever came of this suggestion, though Jefferson had opened the door to using what we today would call "covert action," or "dirty tricks," to fight terrorism.

The Johnson administration turned in this direction when the *Pueblo* was captured in 1968. According to Secretary of State Dean Rusk, "We considered seizing a North Korean merchant vessel in retaliation, but...the North Koreans had coastal vessels only, no oceangoing ships." Later, though, a story leaked to the press that the administration was considering capturing two fish-processing ships the North Koreans had purchased from the Netherlands and which were scheduled to begin the long sea journey from Europe to Asia. When this idea surfaced, the *New York Times* editorialized: "The seizure of innocent fishing vessels on the high seas is not a legitimate form of pressure in anybody's book. It would be an act of piracy." Nothing came of this idea either.

Presidents would do well to mute their rhetoric about not making deals, lest they box themselves in. We must be wise enough to identify the middle ground where the terms today for the release of American hostages do not create undue hazards for other citizens tomorrow.

10. Legal recourse is the option most compatible with American values. Legal recourse against terrorists falls into two categories: apprehending terrorists, and isolating states that support terrorism. Apprehending the terrorists themselves serves as a warning to would-be terrorists that they are likely to be caught. Bringing culprits to justice is an important step in curtailing terrorist acts. Despite much folklore to the contrary, most terrorists like to live—and outside of jail. Isolating a nation by means of political condemnation can be telling over the long run, though it seldom has an immediate impact. For instance, in October 1980, when the Iranian Prime Minister visited the United Nations to seek that body's denunciation of Iraq's invasion of his country, he found a total lack of sympathy because for eleven months Iran had been holding our diplomats hostage.

Legal means are by far the preferable way of dealing with terrorism. Keeping within legal means makes a difference. When we forced down the aircraft carrying away the hijackers of the *Achille Lauro,* we broke international law, and just a few months later, after conducting a similar act of piracy against people who turned out to be innocent, Israel cited our action as precedent.

We must be particularly concerned with states that support terrorism and also aspire to nuclear capabilities. Again, tightening entry inspections at airports, ports, and border crossings would be one recourse. Our major effort, though, should be directed toward preventing the acquisition of nuclear capabilities by such nations. This will require worldwide, highly intrusive controls and inspection procedures, something possible only with the wholehearted support of all responsible nations, large and small.

II. Conclusion.

There are reasons why the United States is vulnerable to terrorism. As the sole superpower, people with grievances can be persuaded that we are responsible for their problems, either because of what we have done or what we have not done. We are the most open society in the world, and an act of terrorism against Americans is bound to be widely publicized in the world's media. Any modern society is inherently vulnerable, especially large cities. That we experienced few

significant terrorist attacks on our soil before the horrific attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, was because it is easier and less risky for foreign terrorists to find closer targets to attack Americans than crossing an ocean. But even though terrorism in the United States has been limited, we need to be more concerned about it. Foreign terrorists, for example, often hold very superficial views of our society, such as believing it to be so close to collapse from internal disputes that they can tip it in that direction. But we have good defenses in our law enforcement system and citizens are willing to play their part—in some countries, terrorists have so frightened the population that there is little such cooperation.

What, then, is the balance between our vulnerabilities and our defenses? Much depends on how we conduct ourselves at home and abroad. There are many considerations in foreign affairs, but the end of the Cold War made it easier for us to conduct ourselves on the basis of principle rather than expediency. Likewise, if our domestic policies evidence a similar morality and humanity, they may discourage disaffected groups from turning to terrorism rather than working within the system.

We will strengthen defenses in many ways, but we must also be careful to avoid violating our rights in the name of searching out terrorists. In fighting terrorism, you can go overboard and jeopardize the very democratic foundations that you have. Every time we take an action against terrorism, we have to weigh it against the impact on our basic standards as a democracy—we cannot become terrorists in order to fight terrorism. We cannot give up democracy in order to defend democracy. *If there is any logic in attacks like those on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, it is precisely in wanting us to overreact and undermine our core values.*

Only when we truly analyze which alternatives promise the best payoffs will we begin moving toward a long-run solution to terrorism. One of the key elements for us in combating terrorism is international cooperation. We need the help of other countries because we simply cannot operate on other people's territory in the ways needed: intensified intelligence and police operations that

keep hard-core terrorists on the run and dry up their support. If we are going to defeat international terrorism—not just terrorists like Osama bin Laden but the broader sweep—we will need a multinational program that will put international pressures on the movement of individual terrorists and on their bases of support in our societies.

The responsible nations of the world are increasingly aware that terrorism affects them all. Today we face the prospect of being able to meet the threat by selecting options weighted more toward the nonmilitary side, but that means more cooperation among countries is needed. Countries can set aside differences and cooperate in order to protect all countries. We should set our sights high that fighting terrorism will help usher in a new era of world cooperation that will reach well beyond the suppression of terrorism itself.

Terrorism comes in waves until societies close in and make it too difficult for terrorists to operate. The French had the RAF [Red Army Faction]; the Italians the Red Brigades; the Germans the Baader-Meinhof gang. One flaw in terrorism is that it is an inhumane, uncivilized practice—indiscriminate killing is basically unacceptable to all societies, and in time they will close in.

Terrorists are not invincible—the Zealots and others were suppressed in time. Today many countervailing strengths come from the very fact that we have a democratic system. But that means we need public understanding of our options for curtailing terrorism, and the wisdom to avoid actions that might undermine the democratic process we are defending.[1]

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
Chapter 7: *Caging the Nuclear Genie*

I. Nuclear Weapons.

Nuclear weapons are not only much more powerful than conventional ones but are also qualitatively different. It is not too far-fetched to think of them as small pieces of sun brought to earth, creating effects otherwise not experienced.

Nuclear Explosion Mushroom Cloud

That nuclear weapons are a species unto themselves is best shown by the terminology we employ to describe their power. The pound is the unit of measure for the explosive in conventional munitions. In contrast, nuclear weapons are so powerful that we measure their force in kilotons (KT: thousands of tonnes) and even megatons (millions of tonnes).[*] The 12-KT Hiroshima weapon had a blast effect alone equivalent to some 25 million pounds of TNT, and a 550-KT weapon is the equivalent of more than a *billion* pounds of TNT (see Table 1).[**] It would take more than 25,000 sorties by a B-2 bomber to deliver that much conventional explosive.

TABLE 1
LETHALITY INDICATORS FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Warhead (kilotons)	Use	TNT Equivalent (pounds)	Comparison to 2000-lb Bomb
0.1	artillery	200,000	100X
5	Senate proposal	10,000,000	5,000X
12	Hiroshima	25,000,000	12,500X
250	U.S. ICBM	500 million	250,000X
550	Soviet ICBM	1.2 billion	605,000X

Plus: radiation, heat/fires, EMP, societal disruption

The lasting impact of multiple nuclear detonations upon an economy and a society would be far greater than the sum of individual blasts. The ability of any urban area to recover from a nuclear attack would depend on outside assistance, as at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. But if those sources of assistance had been attacked and required assistance themselves, the recovery would be prolonged. Estimating such secondary effects is very difficult, but they are real. By the time our economy, government structure, and social institutions revived, our society would not be recognizable. Many democratic and humanitarian values would have been set aside while we struggled with primary needs. If the nation's transportation net was crippled, the national economy might divide into regional economies. Our tightly integrated industrial economy might give way to a more agrarian one. Given regional agrarian economies, new internal political alignments would likely develop. And with medical resources severely overstrained, human relations could become dangerously confrontational. For instance, one sizable nuclear detonation over a major city could create more burn casualties than all the specialized burn facilities in the entire country could handle. The prolonged struggle for basic survival and recovery could eclipse any substantive U.S. role in world affairs. Society would have passed what we might term its *point of non-recovery*.

Every society has a *point of non-recovery*—an amount of destruction that would make it impossible for it ever to be the same again. It is this factor—what it takes to threaten *non-recovery*, and not comparisons of the size of nuclear arsenals—that should determine how many nuclear weapons any nuclear power requires. There is, then, a finite amount of damage anyone needs to threaten. Instead, Russia and the United States fell into the trap of trying to match each other's capabilities, with the result that each was able to destroy the other's society many times over. Once would be sufficient.[1]

II. Potential Causes of Nuclear War.

1. Accident. The more nuclear weapons we have, the greater risks we take. We have had thousands of false alarms of impending missile attacks on the United States, and a few could have spun out of control. There have been a number incidents in which nuclear weapons were accidentally lost from aircraft in flight or were involved in accidents in aircraft, and there have been other accidents involving submarines with nuclear

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[*] The unit of measure for nuclear munitions is the metric tonne (2,200 pounds).
[**] "The Dilemma of Nuclear Weapons in the Twenty-First Century," *Naval War College Review* (Spring 2001): 14.

weapons. The safety features that we built into the weapons prevented any detonations. The most glaring case was in 1961 when one of our B-52 strategic bombers broke up in flight over North Carolina. Two nuclear bombs of megaton size landed near Goldsboro, North Carolina. On one, five of the six safety switches failed. Only the last prevented detonation. Fortunately, the only untoward result was that some radioactive materials were spread over a small area.

A small number of nuclear weapons could be launched by accident or mistake. A single, typical Russian nuclear warhead detonated above any major city could unleash the equivalent of one billion pounds of TNT in blast effect, kill as many as 250,000 people, level almost all buildings in a 2-mile radius, ignite fires and sustain winds of 100 mph over an area twice as large, and start an unpredictable sequence of counter-actions and counter-counter actions.

2. Proliferation. A small number of nuclear devices could be detonated on almost any nation by a rogue state or terrorist group because of a failure to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. A single rogue or terrorist detonation could be as small as that at Hiroshima, where 110,000 people died within days, though it could possibly be only a crude nuclear contaminating device that would make an area of several square miles uninhabitable. Psychologically, however, the uncertainty as to where, when, and why the next nuclear detonation would occur would distort the international scene.

3. Miscalculation. A large nuclear exchange between Russia and the United States could take place much as we feared during the Cold War, should relations between Russia and the United States deteriorate and a miscalculation flash out of control. The consequences of major nuclear war are unimaginable.

4. Conventional War. A superficially appealing use for nuclear weapons against nonnuclear powers is to extricate ourselves from some difficult tactical situation in conventional war. Nuclear weapons are not very useful tactical instruments, however, when you consider their ancillary effects. They may irradiate territory into which your forces want to move; send radioactive fallout back onto your own forces or cities; and disrupt your own, as well as the enemy's, electronic environment. And even in their smaller forms they can easily be overkill, as tactical weapons come in many sizes but all are large—the smallest we had, a nuclear artillery shell, was the equivalent force of five B-2 bombers fully loaded with conventional bombs.

One commonly imputed purpose for our initiating the use of nuclear weapons is to deal with tyrants. Many believe we need the threat of maximum force to deter them. Nuclear weapons could, for instance, threaten them personally, even in deep, hardened bunkers. Or they could threaten a particularly important military unit, or underground facilities for manufacturing weapons of mass destruction. Threatening might have its value but would be risky because it is doubtful we would ever follow through and use nuclear weapons for such purposes. In part we would be inhibited by moral considerations, and we would also be deterred by the unfathomable responsibility for opening a new nuclear Pandora's Box.[2]

III. Ways to Reduce the Risk from Nuclear Weapons.

1. Contain Nuclear Proliferation. A major challenge is to prevent irresponsible actors from acquiring nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons, and to deter their use by those who possess them. One major approach to controlling nuclear weapons has been to pressure, cajole, and legally tie the hands of would-be proliferators and those abetting them. For example, South Africa voluntarily disposed of its five or six nuclear weapons, and Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan returned to Russia all of the Soviet nuclear warheads that were in their territories when the USSR dissolved.

There are many courses we can pursue toward these objectives. Core to them all, however, is the example we set in our treatment of each of these types of weapons. Unless our own house is in order, we will not be able to obtain the international cooperation needed to prevent materials and technologies for making such weapons from falling into the hands of irresponsible nations and terrorists. As the

Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons stated, "the possession of nuclear weapons by any state is a constant stimulus to other states to acquire them." When powerful nations place so much importance on their own nuclear arsenals, it is inconsistent for them to argue that none of the world's nonnuclear states has a need for even a few nuclear weapons.[*] Russia and the United States simply must demonstrate a far greater resolve to reduce their arsenals quickly if they hope to elicit support for preventing others from having even small arsenals.[3]

2. Reduce the Numbers of Nuclear Weapons. In conventional warfare, comparative numbers and capabilities are often decisive. Not so in nuclear war, where weapons are so destructive that at some point there is nothing more that can be achieved. Former President Dwight Eisenhower coined the phrase "bouncing the rubble around" to describe the impact of the United States executing the nuclear war plan of his day. What any nation needs by way of nuclear capability is only what it takes to deter anyone wise from initiating nuclear war.[4]

3. Decrease Tension and Increase Stability. The key objective of arms control is not control of the number of weapons but a lessening of the likelihood of anyone starting a nuclear war, either deliberately or accidentally. The critical step toward that goal is a reduction of the number of weapons that put people on edge by posing the threat of surprise attack. The fundamental choice, then, is not between weapons of greater or lesser potency but between greater stability or less. With tension high, the risks of miscalculation would be high as well.[5]

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[*]Under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), the five declared nuclear states (Britain, China, France, Russia, and the United States) agreed to *not* proliferate nuclear weapons, *to* share benefits of peaceful nuclear technology with nonweapon states that are NPT parties, and to pursue *good faith negotiations* to end the arms race and achieve general and complete disarmament. The nonnuclear weapon states agreed not to acquire nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices, and to submit their peaceful nuclear facilities and materials to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards.

The end of the Cold War opened new opportunities for controlling nuclear weapons. The painfully slow process of arms control agreements need not limit us. We could take a leaf from one of the most successful efforts to limit nuclear arms. In 1991 U.S. President George H. W. Bush, using his authority as commander in chief, took a unilateral initiative to reduce the readiness of many U.S. nuclear systems by removing tactical nuclear warheads from deployed positions overseas and from all naval ships, and by taking nuclear armed aircraft off alert status. Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev responded with similar actions almost immediately.

A corresponding initiative with strategic nuclear weapons would be for either side to remove perhaps 1,000 warheads from operational strategic launchers and place them in *strategic escrow*; that is, in designated storage areas some distance from their launchers. The other side would be invited to place observers at each storage site. Their duties would be limited to counting the number of warheads going into storage, keeping track of whether any were moved, and conducting surprise inventories to ensure none had been clandestinely removed. They would also be allowed to check that other warheads had not been placed on the launch vehicles from which those in storage had been removed. These observers would have no authority to prevent the removal of any or all warheads from any storage facility. They would provide warnings if there were removals.

The door would then be open for a rapid series of initiatives and reciprocations. There would be no need for protracted negotiations while quibbling over details. There would be no need for parliamentary approvals, though both the U.S. president and the Russian president would need to build support in their legislatures. Both would want to point out that because the warheads would all be intact neither would have fewer than the other at any time. The weapons would always be retrievable, and would be stored so as to be secure from a surprise attack.

At the same time, this would be a more meaningful step than de-targeting and de-alerting

procedures, as reconstitution would take days or weeks, not minutes or hours. There would be no need to hammer out detailed rules for verification, as all that would be required would be straightforward counting of numbers of warheads going in and out. Cheating by placing elaborately faked warheads in storage would theoretically be possible, but technical devices can counter such a ploy.

Such a dramatic move on the part of the United States and Russia would also pressure third parties to put global security ahead of their economic interests, by not selling materials of use in a nuclear program to states of concern. Presently, our country, with its hoard of excess weapons, does not appear serious about preventing proliferation and therefore does not get the needed cooperation. The world badly needs some imaginative approach like strategic escrow.[6]

4. Develop Effective Strategies. The United States treated nuclear weapons as though they were simply larger conventional weapons. More specifically, the basic mistake was to apply certain theorems of conventional warfare to nuclear warfare, producing four misleading concepts:

—The importance of a rough parity in numbers of weapons;

—The possibility of deterring an opponent from initiating nuclear war by threatening some specific set of targets;

—A "window of vulnerability" for both sides; and,

—The stated willingness, even in 2001, of the United States to initiate nuclear war.

The old strategy led us to produce inordinate numbers of these weapons, a willingness to accept great risks in maintaining weapons in conditions of high alert, and war plans that reached astronomical lengths. By the 1980s our nuclear war plan filled more than one million pages. General Lee Butler told me that when, in 1991 he took over command of the Strategic Air Command (SAC) (which became the Strategic Command (StratCom)), he began a month-long effort to review every aspect of the master war plan,

including each of the 12,000-plus targets. One of his conclusions was that no single person on his staff had a grasp of all of the factors essential to creating a coherent nuclear war plan.[7]

We developed nuclear strategies as though we were playing chess. The first Soviet test detonation was conducted in 1949, beginning a race, a spiral that produced a peak on the American side of some 32,500 nuclear warheads. How could Americans possibly have thought they could use 32,500 nuclear warheads? After all, there were fewer than 200 cities with populations of more than a 100,000 in the Soviet Union. I once had the opportunity to ask Robert McNamara, who was secretary of defense from 1961 to 1968, how the United States accumulated over 32,000 nuclear weapons. The U.S. government, he explained, would periodically receive intelligence reports that the Soviets were starting new nuclear-weapons programs, apparently with the aim of either catching up with or exceeding the American arsenal; each time, the United States would build new systems of its own to counter them. The Soviets, in turn, would learn that the Americans were building new weapons, and they would start new programs to counter *them*—and on we went, spiraling upward.[8]

5. No "First-Use." In 2001 U.S. strategic planners conjured up new contingencies in which the United States might wish to initiate nuclear war:

—To preclude the revival of a Soviet-type threat to Europe;

—To respond to the use of biological weapons against U.S. forces;

—To destroy underground headquarters, weapons, or weapon storage;

—To repel a cross-Straits invasion of Taiwan;

—To repel a massive Chinese ground attack on South Korea; and,

—To respond to, and thus deter, any sort of heinous act against the United States.

But do any of these scenarios make sense? Talk of first strikes has an Alice-in-Wonderland quality, and nuclear weapons are simply not a rational solution to anyone's problem.[9]

6. Use "Controlled Response." How should we react if deterrence does fail? With respect to a nuclear attack, there are three options: (1) not respond, (2) respond at or above the level of destruction of the aggression, and (3) respond at a lower level:

—*Not to respond.* This would invite more nuclear aggression; however, for a very small or perhaps accidental attack, it could serve as a prudent brake on escalation.

—*To respond by exchanging blows until one side capitulates.* This would invite more nuclear destruction on the United States, regardless of whether we "won" by doing more total damage to the opponent. The exception to this is the unlikely event that our retaliation completely disarmed the aggressor's remaining nuclear capability.

—*To respond at a lower level, rather than escalate.* This might encourage the aggressor to call a halt to the use of nuclear weapons and attempt to resolve differences by other means before matters got out of hand. McGeorge Bundy, in his landmark book on nuclear policy, *Danger and Survival*, favored what he termed the "less-than-equal reply."

Perhaps the most cogent objection to the doctrine of controlled response is that simply discussing less than fully lethal responses to a nuclear attack weakens our deterrent threat. It is an axiom of conventional war that deterrence is a function of both military power and the will to apply that power. In other words, possessing force alone will not deter your adversary if it appears you do not have the will to employ that force. However, this axiom is not applicable in the context of nuclear deterrence. Any nation considering aggression against the United States could not help recognizing that our overwhelming capabilities with nuclear weapons could end their society. To gamble that we did not have the will to use it, no matter what our stated policy, would be an enormous risk.[10]

7. Use Sanctions. Sanctions are an accepted device for controlling international behavior. Sanctions, however, are controversial: some nations fear setting a precedent that could later be used against them, others refuse to subordinate their commercial relations to the sanctions, others object that economic sanctions often hurt people more than leaders and countries, and still others point out that sanctions are difficult to terminate.[11]

8. Deter. The *point of self-deterrence* defines the level of nuclear damage in retaliation that would deter a nation from initiating nuclear war. There is no foreign policy objective today that is so threatening that we would employ nuclear weapons and accept the risk of receiving just one nuclear detonation in retaliation.

There are also self-deterring forces working on terrorists. One is that the odiousness of a nuclear detonation could boomerang and lose them support were they identified with it. Also, an actual nuclear detonation would likely be overkill for most of their purposes. Still, because threatening a nuclear explosion in a major city has to be the ultimate in extortion, we cannot count on self-deterrence here.

The concept of a point of self-deterrence tells us, then, that in varying degrees nuclear weapons are self-regulating. From nuclear powers to terrorist groups, the very power of nuclear weapons restrains their use. The cause of this restraint ranges from the risk of retaliation in kind, to the uncertainty involved with breaking the more than 50-year taboo on the use of these weapons, to the likelihood that any use will be seen as a disproportionate response to anything but a nuclear attack.

With respect to chemical and biological weapons, it is not the potency but the widespread sense of odiousness of their use that is self-deterring. This is reflected in the fact that many nations have voluntarily forsworn their possession and use through signing the Chemical and Biological Conventions.[12]

How should we calculate what it takes to deter? First of all, deterrence is in the eyes of beholders—what they *think* is going to happen. If populations are dealing with the very survival of their societies, they have to assume the worst. The worst would be the other side hitting cities, destroying the society and its population. How many cities in the United States does any country have to threaten to deter us?

The destructiveness of nuclear weapons is so great that "winning" or "losing" a nuclear exchange is meaningless. The lethality of nuclear weapons is measured in tens of miles. Nuclear superiority is simply not a genuine threat when your opponent can retaliate at all, because, in the end, you remain vulnerable.[13]

9. Build International Teamwork. The involvement of many nations in myriad undertakings to limit proliferation is the key to success in controlling weapons of mass destruction. It promotes an international norm that weapons of mass destruction are not to be considered weapons of warfare and are not to be employed. It opens the possibility of a system of global management to control these threats. What we should aim for is a system of global management of weapons of mass destruction that makes it unrewarding to use them.[14]

10. Involve the Nation. Nowhere in our government has secrecy been more profound than with respect to nuclear weapons. A well-informed pubic could help us escape from the senseless and outdated theorems of nuclear warfare, such as the importance of numerical parity, windows of vulnerability, and the possible utility of initiating nuclear war. A better understanding of the realities of nuclear weapons would enable us to reach out to new alternatives for caging the nuclear genie, even if we cannot return it to the bottle. The American public needs to inform itself on this basic issue and then let its feelings be heard.[15]

IV. Conclusion and a Vision for the Future. For over 50 years no nuclear power has employed a nuclear weapon, even in the face of losing wars. The United States looked at the nuclear option in Korea, the Cuban missile crisis, Vietnam, and the Gulf War, but never came close to employing it. In 1962, President John Kennedy said, "The decision to use any kind of a nuclear weapon, even tactical ones, presents such a risk of getting out of control so quickly." The uncertainties are simply too great. There is no foreign policy objective that the United States could achieve by the use of nuclear weapons that would be worth even *one* retaliatory nuclear detonation on its soil. Russia, too, has looked nuclear use in the eye and rejected it, even in the face of its defeat in Afghanistan.

Our vision encompasses a world with as few nuclear nations as possible, with each nation possessing as few nuclear weapons as possible, and with all of those weapons in supervised escrow, plus the threat of sanctions against first-use and modest defenses as a backup against limited attack.

In the best of worlds, we could even hope that an understanding of both the pragmatic and moral impediments to the use of nuclear weapons would gradually apply also to conventional warfare. How many conventional wars have been fought to achieve objectives that simply were not achievable through the use of force? How much of the world's wealth has gone into armaments that were in excess of any legitimate need? Is it too idealistic to hope that an understanding of why nuclear weapons are difficult to employ usefully, and of why we came to spend wildly unnecessary sums on them, will in time be applied to progressively lesser forms of violence, until they are finally removed from the world's agenda?

We have been under the spell of having tapped the most fundamental source of power, that which binds atoms together. Increasingly, though, the view that nuclear weapons are too powerful to be useful has gained credence. The United States must shoulder the responsibility of bringing such a vision to the world. After World War II, the United States was in a position to design and implement the Marshall Plan. After the Cold War, we are in a position to lead the world into a plan to cage the nuclear genie.[16]

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Chapter 8: *Address to Young Graduates: Success in Life*

Graduating from school makes you special because some time ago you set yourself a goal, and you persevered. You dedicated yourself, and you achieved it. Don't forget that you did that, because you're going to have other goals in life, lots of them. And for each of those you're going to have to persevere and dedicate yourself. That doesn't mean you won't sometimes set a goal that's unachievable, or that you won't sometimes deliberately decide to change goals. You just don't want to fail in a goal because you didn't persevere. *Perseverance is what wins the prize*.

I started out at Amherst College with the objective of a bachelor's degree with the intent thereafter to go on to law school. But along came World War II and I ended up, as did all of my classmates, in the military. I chose the Navy and went to Annapolis. When that was over, I stayed in the Navy for a while. And then I almost decided to get out and set a new goal; to try something else. In fact, that happened to me three times. But finally, after 31 years I received a phone call: "The President of the United States wants to see you in the Oval Office tomorrow morning." Now I had never been to the Oval Office. I had never talked with a President. I was excited. But I asked myself, am I ready for what may come? When I got to the Oval Office, what the President told me was: "You have a new goal—to be the nation's Chief Spy."

Why me? I'd like to suggest that the President had looked from north to south and east to west across our entire country and said, "Turner's the most qualified," but I'm afraid I have to admit that the fact that Jimmy Carter was my classmate at Annapolis may have had something to do with it. What actually happened was that the President was having difficulty deciding whom to put in the CIA, and one night he rolled over in bed and scribbled on a pad next to his bed, "Stan Turner." The next morning Rosalynn got up first, and as she walked out she saw this note. She said, "Jimmy, what have you in mind for Stan Turner?" The President said, "I can't remember." Well, he did remember, and I spent the next four years in my second unexpected career. Then I began my third unexpected career—

teaching, writing, and lecturing. I have found all of these careers challenging and rewarding. But note that they're all a long way from being a lawyer.

My message in this to you is that there are going to be many opportunities for you to set different goals—some voluntarily, some involuntarily. And the majority of you will change your goals, professional and personal, a number of times in the course of your lives. So be ready. Be ready for the unexpected when opportunity knocks. The issue, then, is how do you get ready for what's unexpected, for what cannot be anticipated? Let me suggest three principles. First, always try to have broad interests in life. Second, be open-minded about your exploration of new ideas. Third, always act with integrity and morality.

First, always try to have broad interests in life. Don't let yourself become narrow because you think you know what you're going to do from here to eternity, and that's all you need to know. Be willing to absorb new information, new knowledge, in fields you've never had any contact with before. If you are to continue to grow and be ready for the unexpected, your aim should be to develop yourself into a person with broad interests—one who is never content not to be interested in learning something new, whether a new area about which you know nothing or about which you know a lot.

A threshold event in my life was my first semester, when at Amherst College I was called into the dean's office and told I had a schedule conflict in the courses I wanted to take for my first semester. And when I couldn't take the two courses that conflicted, the dean said, "Why don't you take this art appreciation course?" Now, never in a thousand years would I have volunteered for an art appreciation course. I was a football player—I didn't want anything to do with art. But I was a young kid, and the dean said, "Take art appreciation" and I took it. And it expanded my horizons, made me understand a little of painting, and sculpture, and architecture, and really changed my life, because I found there was much more beauty, much more of interest out there in the world that I had never appreciated before. I went on and took music appreciation the next semester.

If there is anything that has helped me, it was the liberal education at Amherst College and at Oxford

that made me say, "I love to be inquisitive. I like to know what's going on. And I don't want to know the surface view of it. I want to really understand what's making things tick." And learn from people. There is no one from whom you cannot learn, but you must ask questions and be interested.

Second, be open-minded about exploring new ideas. Ask yourself occasionally, are the ideas that I'm expressing the same old tired ideas? And are they really *my* ideas, or are they those of my teachers, my parents, or maybe even just the television? Am I willing to look as objectively as possible when somebody suggests a different way of approaching a problem—one that may require reversing my previous position?

Only you can determine whether your understanding of our nation's role in the world will be dictated by others, or molded by your own independent thinking. Our media are prone to emphasizing immediate or dramatic issues while letting longer-term problems lie fallow until they become crises. You, as individuals, must stand up to the supremely superficial, instant analyses of our times. That is really why you have been at school––to develop your creative abilities and learn to think independently—rather than to learn the skills of any particular profession. I challenge you to reason soundly and deeply about the world of the next decade, and our nation's role in it because that role will continue to be critical to all people. You will all be leaders of our country. Everyone will play a role—in the business community, local politics, civic groups, PTA, voting. At all levels the country requires leadership.

And don't accept political gridlock. Don't accept unethical behavior in high places. How many times do people say: "All politicians are corrupt," and "Let's throw them all out of Washington." Well, you know that neither answer is correct. All politicians are not corrupt, and we don't want to throw them all out. What if we just replaced them with more of the same? The answer really lies not with politicians or business leaders. It lies with you and me. How do we couch our demands? What do we want in terms of honesty and integrity from our leadership? So set your standards high. This is a great country. We have accomplished so much in our short history. We must not become a status quo

nation, content to live the good life because it is too difficult to figure out how to change.

Third, always act with integrity and morality. Besides being inquiring and open-minded, another way to prepare for the unexpected is to ensure that you always act with integrity and morality. Only if you do so can you truly be prepared for the unexpected opportunity, for most opportunities will in one way or another test your integrity.

There are two important lessons you must know. One: ethical dilemmas will arise for all of you— you will not be able to avoid making ethical decisions. Two: issues are not black/white—you have complex, ambiguous choices. This means you must think about ethics *now*, not when you are under pressure. Integrity requires constant attention, constant vigilance. Ethical positions are a matter of judgment. Small ethical lapses can lead to big problems. We must catch ethical lapses before they equal a habit.

What are ethics all about? *Webster's Dictionary* defines ethics in this way: ethics = moral character = conforming to moral standards. How do we decide what is moral? There are lots of actions we all agree are immoral—theft, murder, lying. But are these black/white? Take lying—is lying always bad? There is no question it is always something we should try to avoid. But what about a situation in which lying may save a life? Should you tell the truth? Ethics isn't only about lying—it is what is the right thing to do. Start with prayer. Remind yourself every day that you have your own direct pipeline to God. Your prayers can play a role in any situation—personal, national, or international.

In conclusion: We have a saying in the United States Navy that if your ship is not making waves it's not going anywhere. You want to be wave-makers. Use the foundation of academic excellence you've gained, and the foundation of the practical application of your principles. And then, go out there to leave this world a better place. You *can* make a difference. God bless you.[1]

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
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This is a seminar course. Students will be expected to learn primarily through reading and writing, augmented by active participation in class discussions. They will be required to develop well-reasoned recommendations on what to do in various circumstances of terrorism, as though they were advisors to a senior advisor to a president. What will count is how well they can support their recommendations, not whether the instructor agrees with them or whether the authors of the readings would concur." Source: START (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism) database, www.start.umd.edu/start/education/course_materials/search_syllabi/UMD_TerrorismDemocracy.pdf (Jan. 23, 2013).

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[2] *Caging the Genies*, 1999, 11, 55, 56, 67; "A New Nuclear TRIAD," *American Diplomacy*, www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/AD_Issues/amdipl_8/turner.html (July 18, 1998); and *Caging the Nuclear Genie*, 1997, 17, 18.

[3] *Caging the Genies*, 1999, 3, 21; *Caging the Nuclear Genie*, 1997, 21, 22, 101; "The Specter of Nuclear Proliferation," *Security Dialogue* (Sept. 1998): 294, 295.

[4] "The Specter of Nuclear Proliferation," *Security Dialogue* (Sept. 1998): 295.

[5] "The 'Folly' of the MX Missile," *New York Times Magazine*, March 13, 1983; "Is the U.S. Pinning False Hopes on the MX System?" *Los Angeles Times*, Sept. 20, 1981.

[6] Address, "Strategic Escrow," 1999; "The Dilemma of Nuclear Weapons in the Twenty-First Century," *Naval War College Review* (Spring 2001): 22, 23.

[7] "The Dilemma of Nuclear Weapons in the Twenty-First Century," *Naval War College Review* (Spring 2001): 14–15; *Caging the Genies*, 1999, 74–75; and *Caging the Nuclear Genie*, 1997, 10.

[8] *Caging the Genies*, 1999, 67; "The Dilemma of Nuclear Weapons in the Twenty-First Century," *Naval War College Review* (Spring 2001): 13–15.

[9] Addresses; "The Dilemma of Nuclear Weapons in the Twenty-First Century," *Naval War College Review* (Spring 2001):18–19; "Reagan Is Right: No ICBMs Means No First Strike," *Washington Post*, Oct. 26, 1986; and "Nuclear Non-Proliferation After India and Pakistan," *International Politics and Society*, no. 4 (1998): 387.

[10] *Caging the Genies*, 1999, 72, 74.

[11] *Caging the Nuclear Genie*, 1997, 79–80.

[12] *Caging the Nuclear Genie*, 1997, 43, 44, 50; *Caging the Genies*, 1999, 60.

[13] "The Dilemma of Nuclear Weapons in the Twenty-First Century," *Naval War College Review* (Spring 2001): 16–17; "Is the U.S. Pinning False Hopes on the MX System?" *Los Angeles Times*, Sept. 20, 1981; and "Why We Shouldn't Build the MX," *New York Times Magazine*, March 29, 1981.

[14] *Caging the Genies*, 1999, 123, 128.

[15] *Caging the Genies*, 1999, 144, 147; "Is the U.S. Pinning False Hopes on the MX System?" *Los Angeles Times*, Sept. 20, 1981.

[16] "The Specter of Nuclear Proliferation," *Security Dialogue* (Sept. 1998): 296; *Caging the Nuclear Genie*, 1997, 105, 106; *Caging the Genies*, 1999, 24; and addresses.

Sources for Chapter 8: *To Young Graduates: Success in Life*

[1] The material in this chapter came primarily from Admiral Stansfield Turner's addresses.