Introduction
What effect has NATO enlargement had on US national security? Few issues have been as central to US foreign policy over the last three decades. Since the mid 1990s, a bipartisan foreign policy consensus has held that enlarging the alliance was critical to US national security and the only practical manner of consolidating what President Clinton termed a Europe “whole, free, and at peace.” This position is so well-established in the United States’ political culture that several rounds of NATO expansion proceeded without meaningful debate in the US Senate. Indeed, occasional efforts by some policymakers to question the merits of enlargement have been met with accusations of isolationism, or of “working for Vladimir Putin”. By this logic, not only does US national security benefit from an enlarged NATO, but were the United States to stop expanding NATO the sky would be likely to fall.
In contrast, this paper makes the case that NATO expansion has been a net loss to US national security and ought not to continue. Note that I focus on US national security, not whether enlargement may have benefitted other actors. Drawing on over a decade of archival research into the origins and consequences of enlargement, I advance three specific arguments. First, claims that NATO benefitted US national security by anchoring the alliance, ensuring the stability of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), and promoting democracy are almost certainly overstated. Instead – second – the alliance has generated a host of problems for the United States by encouraging allied cheap riding and reckless driving, limiting US strategic flexibility, and contributing to the collapse of relations with Moscow. As a result, future enlargement to states such as Ukraine is not in the United States’ interest.
The remainder of this essay proceeds in three sections. First, I review and critically evaluate the purported benefits of NATO enlargement. From there, I discuss the variety of problems enlargement has posed to US national security. In both of these sections, I pay particular attention to the consequences of enlargement itself and to how alternative policy options may have affected US interests. I conclude by briefly reflecting on the future of enlargement at a time when Ukrainian accession in particular dominates policy debates.